Recent Studies in Empirical Approaches to Language

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In the summer of 2001, when UCSB hosted the Linguistic Society of America’s Linguistic Institute, some of us UCSB Linguistics alumni were lucky enough to be able to make it back to Santa Barbara, to our old intellectual nest. There we gathered together for a two-day symposium to catch up with each other and to exchange ideas. Most of the papers in this collection were presented at that meeting. (For a list of participants and the titles of the presentations, we have attached the original program for the symposium in the back of this volume.)

We would like to think of this volume as a celebration of our very special, memorable years in Santa Barbara. The Ph.D. program in Linguistics at UCSB had just started when most of us arrived. The place was full of excitement and enthusiasm of creating something new, and we took pride in the fact that we were part of the initial process in the formation of the Program. The Department provided a community of people who had the same kind of love and respect toward language as well as an extraordinary intellectual environment. We owe many aspects of our intellectual growth to the happy years at UCSB.

Our reunion was added with tremendous joy with a happy moment of the life of one of our mentors at UCSB, Sandy Thompson, and we are honored to dedicate this volume to her.

Finally, we would like to thank Stefan Frazier of UCLA Applied Linguistics for his invaluable editorial assistance.

The Editors
July 10, 2002
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TWO VERBS OF GIVING IN CIREBON JAVANESE CONVERSATION

MICHAEL C EWING

The University of Melbourne

0. INTRODUCTION. The notion ‘give’ has long interested linguists. The act of giving is fundamental to human experience and words expressing the concept of giving are basic to the vocabularies of the languages of the world. At the same time, because of the complex nature of the act of giving, involving three participants in an act of transfer and often entailing a range of interactional and cultural subtleties, the linguistic expression of this notion can itself be complex and can vary greatly from language to language. Newman 1996 and the studies in Newman 1998 present a typological analysis of the notion ‘give’ and its realization cross-linguistically. In these studies, the literal concept of ‘give’ is understood to involve the ‘transference of a THING (and the control over the THING) from one person to another’ (Newman 1996:61). These studies also investigate the many figurative extensions that words meaning ‘give’ have developed in languages of the world. In the present study I present a discourse-functional analysis of two verbs of giving in Cirebon Javanese. First I will compare the Central Javanese words for ‘give’ as described in standard grammars with a regularized account of the words for ‘give’ in the Cirebon variety of Javanese, based on elicitation. I then turn to the discourse data, which reveals striking patterns of usage that are not apparent from the regularized account. This analysis gives us a more thorough understanding of the contrast between the two verbs of ‘give’ in Cirebon Javanese and a better picture of the grammar associated with these verbs.

Javanese is spoken by some 90 million speakers (Ogloblin to appear), predominantly in the provinces of Central Java, East Java and the Special Administrative Region of Yogyakarta on the island of Java in Indonesian. Pockets of Javanese speakers are also found on the north coast of West Java, a province where Sundanese is the most widely spoken regional language. There is a large amount of regional variation in Javanese and the variety spoken in the cultural centers of Yogyakarta and Surakarta is usually considered the standard. The variety being analyzed here is Cirebon Javanese, with some two million speakers living in the city and surrounding regency of Cirebon on the north coast of West Java, just west of the border with Central Java. Data used in this study include tape recordings and transcriptions of natural conversations together with elicited
data, all collected during fieldwork in 1993 and 1994\(^1\). The conversations are transcribed using the conventions of Du Bois et al. 1993 (see list of conventions used at end of the paper).

1. **Transitive Clauses in Cirebon Javanese.** One characteristic of the notion 'give' that has made its realization in the languages of the world a frequent object of study is that, like other verbs of transfer, it notionally involves three participants. These are an Agent that initiates the transfer, a Goal or recipient of the transfer, and a Theme, that which is transferred from Agent to Goal. As background, we will first look briefly at the grammatical resources used in intransitive and transitive clause forms in Cirebon Javanese. We will then move on to a more detailed discussion of how the three-participant event of 'giving' can be expressed using these same resources.

In Cirebon Javanese, highly accessible referents, which can be recovered from the discourse context, are often not explicitly expressed (see Ewing 2001). Thus intransitive clauses often occur as a predicate with no explicit S argument, as illustrated in (3).

(3) A: Teka ning kéné.
(We) came here.
(151:581)

Participants other than the core agent or experiencer of intransitive verbs are expressed as oblique arguments, marked with prepositional phrases, as in (3) and (4).
Transitive clauses consist of a predicate with two core arguments, which we can call A and P following Comrie (1989). A refers to the more agent-like argument of a transitive clause, while P refers to the more patient-like argument. As with other languages of the region, Javanese makes a voice distinction among transitive clauses between A-trigger and P-trigger constructions. The following is a brief overview of this voice system; for a more detailed account, see Ewing 1999. In the A-trigger construction in Cirebon Javanese, the A argument can exhibit various subject-like properties; for example, it is usually definite and can serve as the pivot in various clause combining constructions such as relativization. It also triggers verb morphology, namely the nasal prefix N-, realized as either a nasal homorganic with the initial segment of the base, or as a velar nasal. The constituent order in an A-trigger clause is usually AVP, illustrated in example (5).

\[ \text{(5)} \quad \text{Mak lagi nggodog bolé.} \\
\quad \text{mother.1s PROG AT-boil cassava} \\
\quad \text{I'm boiling cassava.} \]

As noted above, highly accessible referents, which can be recovered from the discourse context, are often not explicitly expressed. In Cirebon Javanese conversation, the A argument of an A-trigger clause is frequently highly accessible; thus it is often not expressed explicitly. In contrast, the P argument of A-trigger clauses commonly expresses information that is new, is not being tracked in the discourse, or is represented by a generalizing noun phrase, and which is thus usually expressed explicitly. The outcome is that the most frequent type of A-trigger clause in discourse includes, among its core elements, only V and P, as illustrated in (6).

\[ \text{(6)} \quad \text{Sebuté nggawa tép.} \\
\quad \text{often AT-carry tape.player} \\
\quad \text{'(They) often carry a tape player.'} \]

In P-trigger constructions in Cirebon Javanese, the P argument is usually definite and has subject-like properties similar to the A in A-trigger constructions, e.g. it is often accessible and can serve as the pivot in clause combining constructions. A-trigger constructions in Cirebon Javanese are characterized by a verb which either has the prefix \textit{di-} or \textit{tak-}. \textit{Di-} can be used regardless of the person of the A
argument, while tak- is only used if the A is first person. In a P-trigger construction, the A argument can be explicitly mentioned in which case it is marked with the preposition ning ‘by’. The constituent order is usually PVA, as illustrated in (7).

(7) Kan mamang ku ditinggal ning Éti,
    PART uncle that PT-leave by Éti
'Eti left that man you know.'

As with A-trigger clauses, in P-trigger clauses, A arguments tend to be highly accessible and so are often not explicitly expressed. Thus there are also clauses which are explicitly made up of P and V, as in (8).

(8) Ibu <@ beli dijak @>.
    mother.1s NEG PT-invite
'(You) didn't invite me.'

The P argument of an P-trigger clause, unlike the P argument of an A-trigger clause, is usually highly accessible. This fact, in combination with the fact that A’s also tend to be highly accessible, means that P-trigger constructions frequently consist of a verb alone, with no explicit core arguments. This is illustrated in (9) and (10), whose verbs are marked with di- and tak-, respectively.

(9) Dadi sengaja di=teken.
    so intentional PT-pressure
'So (he) has intentionally pressured (you).'

(10) Takceritaknang ndingin.
    PT.1s-tell now
'(I)’m telling (it) now.'

As shown in the corpus based study discussed in Ewing 1999, in naturally occurring Cirebon Javanese Conversation, A-trigger clauses are somewhat more frequent than P-trigger clauses, in a ratio about 60% to 40%.

2. Two words of giving. The root verb meaning ‘give’ in standard Javanese is wénéh and has two affixed forms: wénéhi ‘to give (Goal as P)’ and wénéhaké ‘to give (Theme as P)’. This root verb, with its two affixed forms, is not used in the Cirebon variety. In Cirebon Javanese there are two different words for ‘give’: ngupai and naknang. A regularized image of how these two verbs work emerged from elicitation work I did with one of my research assistants in the field. This regularized account is illustrated in the constructed examples (11) through (14).
ngupai 'give' Goal as P

(11) Uli ngupai baturé hadia.
    Uli AT-give friend-DEF gift
    'Uli gave his friend a gift.'

(12) Baturé dipai hadia ning Uli
    friend-DEF PT-give gift by Uli
    'His friend was given a gift by Uli.'

naknang 'give' Theme as P

(13) Uli naknang hadia ning baturé
    Uli AT-give gift to friend-DEF
    'Uli gave a gift to his friend.'

(14) Hadia iku dinaknang ning Uli ning baturé
    gift that PT-give by Uli to friend-DEF
    'That gift was given by Uli to his friend.'

Here we see that with ngupai, the Agent or giver is coded as the A argument and the Goal or recipient is coded as the P argument, while the Theme or the thing given is coded as a secondary object. The ngupai construction appears to correspond to Standard Central Javanese wenehi or to an English construction with give in which the recipient is the direct object. This contrasts neatly with naknang, in which the Agent or giver is again the A argument, but in which the Theme or thing given is now the P argument and the Goal or recipient is coded in a prepositional phrase marked with the general preposition ning. The naknang construction appears to correspond to Standard Central Javanese wenehaké or to an English construction with give that has the Theme as the direct object. Such an alteration between recipient and Theme as the argument coded of as the grammatical P has been called dative-shift in the literature and has been observed in many languages of the world. Dative-shift alternations are often encoded morpho-syntactically, eg. a change in word order and use of a prepositional phrase as in Standard Central Javanese and English, and the additional change of verbal morphology in Standard Central Javanese. Examples (11) through (14) neatly illustrate that in Cirebon Javanese, lexical resources are also used in conjunction with verb morphology and noun marking to code a similar alternation.

While containing different roots, the morphology of the Standard Central Javanese and Cirebon verbs of giving are nonetheless similar. The Standard
Central Javanese forms wénéhi and wénéhaké show an alternation in suffix. In Javanese the suffix -i can, among other things, indicate a directional P argument; this meaning is consistent with a P argument that is the Goal of a verb of giving. The suffix -aké has a range of meanings including causing a change of state; this meaning is consistent with a P argument that is the Theme of a verb of giving, and which thus undergoes a change in sphere of control as a result of transfer. This same suffix alternation occurs in Cirebon Javanese as well. The verb upai is historically derived from the noun upah ‘gift’ with the directional suffix -i. The verb naknang has the suffix -nang which is a regional alternative to -aken, the Cirebon equivalent to Standard Central Javanese -aké. The source of the root of naknang is not clear, although speakers I spoke with concurred that nak resembles the expressives particles that are often used by Javanese speakers to represent states or events through what are conceived to be onomatopoetic sounds. Upai appears to be an older form than naknang. This hypothesis is based on the fusion of -i to the base form and the reduction of upai to pai when prefixed with di- or unprefixed. In contrast naknang seems to be productively analyzable as a base with suffix due to its alternation with the form nakaken.

3. UPAI AND NAKNANG IN DISCOURSE. To investigate the use of these two verbs of giving in discourse, I used a corpus comprising ten conversations, totaling about 55,000 words of spontaneous conversational interaction. These recordings were made by research assistants in Cirebon and transcribed by them working with myself. Details of the recording and transcription process can be found in Ewing 1999. In the corpus there were a total of 82 tokens of 'give' verbs. Of these, eleven were in subordinate clauses or part of gerund constructions; these have not been included in the analysis here. Frequencies for the 71 tokens of verbs of giving in independent clauses are given in the following tables. The frequency of the two root forms, upai and naknang, in independent clauses is given in table 1. The frequencies for A-trigger and P-trigger clauses in which each form occurs are given in Tables 2 and 3.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>upai</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>naknang</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Frequency of GIVE verbs in independent clauses
Two things are immediately striking about the frequency results for tokens of the two words for ‘give’. First, the verb *upai* is much more frequent than the verb *naknang*. Second, for both verbs of giving, P-trigger clauses are much more frequent than A-trigger clauses, outnumbering them by a ratio of 80% to 20% or greater. This is in dramatic contrast to the frequency for transitive clauses in general, in which A-trigger clauses outnumber P-trigger clauses, by 60% to 40%. In order to identity motivations for this frequency patterning, the remainder of this paper will look to the pragmatic and semantic facts about how speakers use these verbs in conversational interactions.

3.1 INFORMATION STATUS. In this section we will look at the information status of the arguments of the two verbs of giving in both A-trigger and P-trigger clauses. It will be shown that there is a tendency in all cases for the Agent and Goal of the these clauses to be accessible and expressed with light coding options, while the Theme is variable between high and low accessibility and between light and heavy coding. This will be shown through counts for Identifiability, Tracking, and Form. This information will be discussed in conjunction with what we know about the coding of transitive clauses in Cirebon Javanese in order provide a motivation for the high frequency of P-trigger forms among clauses with the verbs *upai* and *naknang*, as well as to give further insight into to functional difference between these two forms.

Identifiability has to do with what a speaker perceives the cognitive status of a referent to be in the mind of a hearer during interaction (Du Bois 1980, Chafe 1994). If the referent is perceived by a speaker to be sufficiently identifiable to the listener for the purposes at hand in the interaction, it will be deemed to be identifiable and, in Cirebon Javanese, this identifiability will usually be indicated
by some marking: through use of ellipsis, pronoun or proper name, or in the case of lexical noun phrases, by marking with a demonstrative pronoun, the definite enclitic =é, or both (Ewing 1995). Identifiable referents include those which have already been introduced into the discourse, or those which are newly introduced into a discourse, but which are considered sufficiently identifiable because of their association with some knowledge shared by the interactants. An unidentifiable referent is one which the speaker perceives to be not sufficiently identifiable to the hearer and is usually expressed in Cirebon Javanese by an unmarked lexical noun phrase. In these tables, NA (not applicable) indicates those arguments that present a generalized concept that is not being tracked through discourse. Because these arguments are not introducing referents nor tracking them through discourse, the category of identifiability does not apply to them. The Identifiability of Agent, Goal, and Theme arguments in the corpus is shown for clauses with *upai* in Table 4, and for clauses with *naknang* in Table 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Identifiable</th>
<th>Nonident.</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>44 - 72%</td>
<td>2 - 3%</td>
<td>15 - 25%</td>
<td>61 - 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>57 - 93%</td>
<td>1 - 2%</td>
<td>3 - 5%</td>
<td>61 - 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>12 - 20%</td>
<td>8 - 13%</td>
<td>41 - 67%</td>
<td>61 - 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Identifiability of Participants in *upai* clauses (main clauses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Identifiable</th>
<th>Nonident.</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>10 -100%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 -100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>10 -100%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 -100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>9 - 90%</td>
<td>1 - 10%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 -100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Identifiability of Participants in *naknang* clauses (main clauses)

What the tables show us is that, while both *upai* and *naknang* have Agents and the Goals that are usually identifiable, a major difference between these two verbs occurs in the identifiability of the Theme. In the case of *naknang*, the Theme is also usually identifiably. In the case of *upai*, the Theme can be identifiable, unidentifiable, or most frequently expressed by a generalizing NP for which the notion of identifiability is not applicable.
Tracking means that an argument is deployed by a speaker so that its referent can be reused in the discourse (Du Bois and Thompson 1991). This is in contrast to a non-tracking argument which is intended as a one-off deployment, usually giving some kind of orienting or predicating function. The frequency of tracking and non-tracking status for arguments of the two verbs of giving is shown in Table 6. and Table 6. Tracking of Arguments in upai clauses (main clauses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tracking</th>
<th>Non-Tracking</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>46-75%</td>
<td>15-25%</td>
<td>61-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>58-95%</td>
<td>3-5%</td>
<td>61-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>18-30%</td>
<td>43-70%</td>
<td>61-100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Tracking of Arguments in upai clauses (main clauses)

The tables show again the a difference in the function of these two verbs of giving is in the information status of the Theme. In the examples in the corpus the Theme of naknang clauses is always expressed by a tracking NP, while the majority of Themes in upai clauses are nontracking.

The concept of Preferred Argument Structure (Du Bois 1987) is based on the observation that cross-linguistically in spontaneous speech production, there is a preference for clauses to contain at most one full lexical noun phrase. This preference is clear in the Cirebon Javanese conversational data. Table 8. shows the number of ‘give’-clauses which contain no full lexical noun phrases, and one, two or three full lexical noun phrases.
Of the 71 main clauses with 'give' verbs analyzed here, only one consists of three full lexical noun phrases. This clause is given in example (15).

(15) Bi Mesni diapi seg=a sun.
    aunt Mesni PT-give rice 1s.QUOTE
    ... Ning Endang 'u.
    by Endang that

'I said Bi Mesni was given rice by Endang.'

This clause was in fact produced with only the Goal and Theme in the same intonation unit with the verb. This intonation unit is in fact marked with final intonation. The Agent is expressed after a pause, in a supplementary intonation unit. It could be argued that this is in fact a case of a clause with only two overt lexical arguments at the moment it was produced. An analysis that categorizes it as having three overt arguments can only be made after the production of a supplemental intonation unit. Only four 'give'-clauses in the data have two lexical noun phrases. The vast majority of the clauses, which notionally involve three participants, contain only one full noun phase (70%) or no full lexical noun phrases at all (23%). The data in Tables 9 and 10 give us an indication of which argument slots these noun phrases appear in and how this pattern differs between the two verbs of giving, upai and nakanang.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lexical</th>
<th>Pronominal</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>5 - 8%</td>
<td>4 - 7%</td>
<td>52 - 85%</td>
<td>61- 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>8 - 13%</td>
<td>4 - 7%</td>
<td>49 - 80%</td>
<td>61- 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>43 - 71%</td>
<td>8 - 13%</td>
<td>10 - 16%</td>
<td>61- 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Form of expression of Participants in upai clauses (main clauses)
In the case of *upai*, Agents and Goals, that is the A and P arguments, are most commonly unexpressed, while the Theme, the third argument, is the preferred slot for full lexical noun phrases. This indicates that with the verb *upai*, there is a strong tendency for both the Agent and the Goal to highly accessible, while the locus of the less accessible information, whether expressed as a full lexical noun phrase or as a pronoun, is in the third augment of the clause. As a result the most common structure of clauses with *upai* in the data is to have a verb, followed by an explicitly expressed Theme, while the Agent and Goal are understood from context as in (16) and (17).

(16) Pertama mono, 
     first thither 
     dipai kopi ca.  
     PT-give coffee child 

'[When I] first [went] there, (I) was given coffee, man.'

(17) pai duwit. 
     give money 
     '(He) gave (me) money.'

A similar structural preference also occurs among clauses with *naknang*, although the specific patterning is somewhat different than that with *upai*. From Table 10 we see that among clauses with *naknang*, there is a strong tendency for the Agent and the Theme to be unexpressed and so highly accessible. Because with *naknang* the P argument is usually the Theme this means that, like *upai*, it is usually the A and P arguments which are unexpressed. It is more likely in clauses with *naknang* for the Goal, that is the third argument, to be explicitly expressed. With the data we have available, limited to only ten examples of *naknang* clauses, it is not possible to say that this Goal is also the most frequent locus of full noun phrases as well, since there are in fact more full noun phrases occurring in the Theme position than Goal position. However, all occurrences of pronouns also occur in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lexical</th>
<th>Pronominal</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 - 100%</td>
<td>10 - 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>2 - 20%</td>
<td>3 - 30%</td>
<td>5 - 50%</td>
<td>10 - 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>3 - 30%</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 - 70%</td>
<td>10 - 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Form of expression of Participants in naknang clauses (main clauses)
Goal position, making it the most commonly expressed of the three participants in *naknang* clauses. So, as with *upai*, we see that the common pattern among *naknang* clauses is for the A and P arguments to be unexpressed, while the third argument, in this case the Goal, is more commonly expressed explicitly. This is exemplified in (18) and (19).

(18) Dinaknang ning isun ka Ang As.
PT-give to 1s that brother As
'(She) gave (it) to me like that, As.'

(19) Taknaknang ning Slamet.
PT.1s-give to Slamet
'(I) gave (it) to Slamet.'

The preceding discussion has shown us two thing. First, one of the differences between *upai* and *naknang* has to do with the information status of the third argument in the clause. Whether we look at this in terms of identifiability, tracking, or form, the indication is that *upai* tends to be used when the Theme is in some way lower in accessibility with less predictable informational content. In contrast *naknang* tends to be used when it is the Goal which is lower in accessibility with less predicable information content. This alternation is similar to that observed in other languages. In English for example, as shown by Thompson (1990), more topicworthy recipients tend appear post-verbally while less topicworthy recipients tend to appear in a prepositional phrase, where topicworthiness encompasses a complex of information flow properties similar to those referred to as highly accessible here. In the case of Cirebon Javanese, marking of the accessibility of Theme and Goal are indicated not only by placing the less accessible and less predictable participant in the third argument slot, but also with an alternation in verb form. Because there tends to be at most only one argument in a clause that has low accessibility and because this will tend to be expressed as a third argument in three place clauses, this means that the P argument of these clauses, like the A argument, will tend to be of higher accessibility and more predictable. A situation in which the P argument has high accessibility is precisely the condition in which a P-trigger clause is likely to be used in Cirebon Javanese, as discussed in Section 1 above. Here we see the convergence of three patterns in discourse:

1) the preference (cross-linguistically) for no more than one NP with low accessibility in a clause;
2) the preference (cross-linguistically) in the expression of three participant events, for less accessible information to be expressed in a non-core argument;
3) the preference (in Cirebon Javanese) for the P-trigger construction when the P is accessible.

From this convergence of these three patterns of clause organizing emerges a preference for P-trigger clauses among three-participant structures and thus offers and explanation for why there is a preponderance of P-trigger constructions among such clauses in Cirebon Javanese conversation. Second, this discussion has also confirmed an important difference between the verbs *upai* and *naknang*, namely the role of the information status of the Theme in motivating speakers' choice between use of *upai* and *naknang*. We have, however, not yet been able to explain why *upai* is much more frequent in discourse than *naknang*. For this we will now look more closely at some of the semantic characteristics of clauses with these two verbs in the following section.

### 3.2 Semantic Class

The arguments that occur with verbs of giving in the data were coded for semantic class, whether human, inanimate or abstract. In a few cases no referent or concept could be associated with a given argument role and these were coded as Not Applicable for semantic class. The semantic class of arguments for each of the verbs of giving are shown in Table 11 and 12.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Human</th>
<th>Inanimate</th>
<th>Abstract</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>53 - 87%</td>
<td>1 - 2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7 - 11%</td>
<td>61 -100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>43 - 70%</td>
<td>18 - 30%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>61 -100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45 - 74%</td>
<td>13 - 21%</td>
<td>3 - 5%</td>
<td>61 -100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. Semantic class of Participants in *upai* clauses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Human</th>
<th>Inanimate</th>
<th>Abstract</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>10 - 100%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 - 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>10 - 100%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 - 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 - 100%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 - 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Semantic class of Participants in *naknang* clauses

The most striking fact about these data is the consistency of the patterning with *naknang*, in contrast to the variation in semantic role of all three participants in
clauses with upai. In all the cases of naknang in the corpus, a human Agent is transferring an physical object to a human recipient. While there are a relatively small number of examples with naknang and other patterns may thus appear in a larger corpus, it is nonetheless noteworthy that this verb is consistently used to express literal Give-events involving ‘transference of a THING (and the control over the THING) from one person to another’ (Newman 1996:61) as seen in examples (18) and (19) above.

Similarly, literal events of giving can be expressed with upai as well, as in examples (16) and (17) above. However, there are numerous examples in the corpus where the semantic class of participants in events described with upai does not correspond to that of the prototypical participants in a literal give event. The following examples illustrate these figurative extensions of upai.

In the following examples, the Goal is not a prototypical human recipient who receives and object and has control over it, but rather a location.

(20) U: É krasa asem beli si Ang On. 
  hey taste sour NEG PART sister On
  ...
  sambelé.
  hot.sauce-DEF

'Hey, does the sambel taste sour Ang On?'

(six intervening lines)

B: .. Dipai tomat. 
  PT-give tomato

'(I) put tomato (in it).'

(21) Dipai susu baé. 
  PT-give milk just
  'just put milk (on it).'

Here the Theme is physically transferred to the location, which is the P argument of the clause. But because the referent of the P is a non-volitional non-human, there can be no sense of transfer of control or ownership, as you would have ion a prototypical Give-schema. Here upai ‘give’ is used with the figurative meaning ‘to put something somewhere’, where the thing being placed is mapped onto the non-core Theme and the location is mapped onto P-argument Goal.
Example (22) illustrates a case where Agent of the Give-event is non-human. Here the speakers are describing a 'magic mug' which has an embedded chip causing the mug to produce a melody when it is picked up.

(22) dipai musik arané.
    PT-give music name-DEF
    '(The cup) gives music, you could say.'
    or '(The person drinking) gets music, you could say.'
    or 'There is music, you could say.'

One interpretation would be to construe the A argument as the cup in question, while the person who picks up the mug could be construed as the Goal or recipient of the Theme, the music. However, because this is a generic statement about a hypothetical cup and a PT clause construction is used, in which neither the Theme nor Agent is explicitly expressed, it is not clear to what extent either of these participants is being strongly evoked in this clause. This gives rise to other interpretations, as illustrated in the alternative free translations for (22). As seen from the Goal's point of view the expression could be similar to the notion 'get' or 'receive' in English. More generally, if one assumes that the strongest information focus is given to the explicitly expressed notion 'music', then an existential reading would be possible. The latter is probably not wholly appropriate as the use of upai, even in this figurative sense, which seems to be expressing a sense of transfer (giving off) as well as the presence of an audience for the music, the recipient of the transfer. In any case, it is interesting that the speaker chose to use the affective adverbial arané, literal 'the name' or 'it is called' meaning something like 'you could say, one could call it this.' This draws attention to the words the speaker has chosen in addition to conveying a particular ideas or concept and this suggests an explicit recognition that a somewhat figurative turn of phrase has been used.

In example (23) the speaker is talking about the mystical properties of the Javanese alphabet, which contains 20 letters. The speaker makes the point that while there are 20 letters, only seventeen are used for the purposes at hand and then proceeds to explore the meaning of the three unused letters.

(23) S: Dipai rongpulu baé,
    PT-pai twenty just

    .. sing dinggo mung pitulas.
    REL PT-use only seventeen

    .. Telué mendi.
    three-DEF where
‘(We) have just been given twenty, seventeen are used, where have the other three gone?’

In this example, the Theme is abstract, and additionally an Agent cannot be clearly determined. The recipient of these letters has been expressed previously as *wong* 'person'; so that while this is generic, it is clearer that the speaker is presenting the situation in terms of human recipients. What is not clear is who gave these letters. Reasonable assumptions would be God or the ancestors, although neither are explicitly mentioned in conjunction with the topic of the alphabet. Because of the indeterminate provenance of the Theme, form the perspective of grammaticalization this example could be seen as a figurative use of *upai* with an existential meaning similar to that which was suggested for the musical cup above. However, the use of *upai*, rather than *ana* 'EXIST' implies some (unexpressed) source. From a culture-internal point of view, this indeterminate quality of the figurative use of *upai* is probably very important, implying that the alphabet does not simply exist as some historical accident. Rather, the hear is invited to consider, at least at some subliminally level, the possible Agent from whom this mystical system originated.

We have seen that *upai* is used not only for literal senses of Give events, but for figurative extensions. The most frequently used and most easily described figurative meaning is to place or put, that is, a transfer to some location. But another figurative meaning is hinted at in a small number of examples. This is of emanation and (coming into) existence. Rather than a straight forward existential construction, here the source of this coming into existence is still important to the discourse participants, either as a figuratively expressed notion of the mundane (the magic cup) or a subtle evocation of transcendental (the mystical alphabet).

In this section I have shown that constructions with *naknang* expression literal ‘give’ events in which control over an object is transferred from one person to another. In contrast, constructions with *upai* include those with non-prototypical participants, with figurative extensions of this literal meaning of ‘give’. The wider and more general semantic range of *uapi* compared to *naknang*, helps to explain its much more frequent occurrence in conversational discourse. The observation that constructions with *upai* have undergone figurative extensions while constructions with *nakang* have a more literal meaning is consistent with the hypothesis presented in Section 2 that *upai* is the older of the two forms. This suggests a situation in which the newer form *nakang* has arisen to reintroduce a way of expressing a literal notion of giving as a transfer between people, as a response to the expansion of *upai* to cover a wider and less prototypical range of meanings.
4. CONCLUSION. The two words for giving in Cirebon Javanese are not simply a lexical extension of a purely structural alternation between three argument constructions which mark either the Theme or the recipient as the P argument in the clause. Rather, I have shown through an analysis of the distribution of these verbs in conversation that the different constructions have different pragmatic and semantic stories to tell, which result in their unique structural characteristics. First they are differentiated in the information flow characteristics of the their-recipients and Themes. Themes tend to be less accessible in the case of upai, where these Themes are non-core arguments, but more accessible in the case of naknang, where they are P arguments and the recipient is a non-core argument. This results in the P argument of both constructions tending to more highly accessible. This fact converges with Preferred Argument Structure and the function of P-trigger voice in Cirebon Javanese to yield a situation in which P-trigger voice is used much more frequently with these verbs of giving than it is among transitive verbs more generally. A further differentiation between these verbs has to do with their semantics. Naknang, apparently the newer form, carries a concrete literal meaning of transfer of control over an objects from one person to another, while upai has expanded semantically to include figurative meanings of placement and emanation or existence.

What remains to be more thoroughly investigated is why it is a verb of giving which favors a Theme in non-core position that should develop a figurative extension meaning 'to place'. Based on what we know about the emergence of grammar from frequency effects in discourse (see for example, Bybee and Hopper 2001) we can hypothesize that speakers of Cirebon Javanese tend to talk more frequently about placing a new or generic object in an identifiable place. This situation would be compatible with a construction like that with upai in which the Goal tends to be known and unexpressed, while the Theme is usually explicitly mentioned. This contrasts with the presumably less frequent situation in which an identifiable object is placed in an (informationally) less accessible location. Such a situation, if frequent, could have motivated the (unattested) development of a locative meaning with naknang. Whether this hypothesized frequency conditioning exists and, moreover, what cultural and interactional motivations there would be for such patterning, does however remain to be more thoroughly investigated.

TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

final transitional continuity
continuing transitional continuity
appeal transitional continuity
separate line used for each complete or truncated intonation unit
short pause
long pause
lengthening of preceding segment
speaker attribution
pulse of laughter

INTERLINEAR GLOSSING

1s First person Singular
APL Applicative
AT A-trigger
DEF Definite
NEG Negative
PART Particle
PROG Progressive
QUOTE Quotative particle
REDUP Reduplication
PT P-trigger

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2 Standard Javanese also uses a third P-trigger prefix, kok-, which indicates that the A argument is second person. This form does not exist in Cirebon. Thus, while Standard Javanese has an P-trigger paradigm based on the person of the A argument (tak- first person, kok- second person, and di- third person A argument), Cirebon can use di- for a first-, second-, or third-person A argument, and additionally has the alternative form tak-if the A argument is first person. Unlike Standard Central Javanese, in Cirebon Javanese, when tak- is used, the A argument can still be explicitly indicated with a prepositional phrase such as ning kita 'by me'.
WHAT CAN INTONATION TELL US ABOUT CONSTITUENCY?

MARJA-LIISA HELASVUO

1. INTRODUCTION. Many studies on intonation make the assumption that intonational grouping reflects syntactic structure directly. In intonation studies that focus on single sentences (see e.g. Pierrehumbert 1980, Ladd 1986), the question of the relationship between intonation and syntax does not even arise as the scope of intonational patterning has been limited a priori to the sentence. Thus, the assumption that there is a direct relationship between syntax and intonation can be left implicit, whereas in studies that are more oriented to larger stretches of discourse, it is often stated explicitly (see e.g. Halliday 1985, Cruttenden 1986). For example, Cruttenden (1986: 130) states: ‘[I]ntonation-groups generally correlate with major syntactic constituents, although a good deal of choice is available to speakers concerning which constituents intonation-groups should correspond with.’ With major constituent boundaries Cruttenden (1986: 37) means boundaries between clauses and between the subject and the predicate. Thus, according to Cruttenden, intonation unit boundaries should occur either at clause boundaries or between the subject and the predicate. In many studies it is assumed that in an unmarked case the intonation unit is coextensive with one clause (see e.g. Halliday 1985: 274).

Constituency has been one of the basic concepts in grammatical analysis over the past decades. In the generative paradigm, it has played a central role in syntax, since constituency, as manifested in constituent hierarchies and immediate dominance relations, has provided the primary means of assigning syntactic relations (see e.g. Chomsky 1965). In the discourse functional tradition, constituency has perhaps been a little less central, and it has certainly not been considered exhausting the description of important grammatical relationships. Still, constituent structure has been assumed as a level of syntactic organization (see e.g. Du Bois and Schuetze-Coburn 1993). In particular, discourse studies have shown the robustness of the category of noun phrase, both as a clausal constituent and as a free construction, the so-called unattached NP (or free NP; see Helasvuo 1991 and 2001, Durie 1994, Ono - Thompson 1994, Tao 1996, Ford et al. 2002). It could be called a classical constituent, following Langacker (1995, 1997). However, as Langacker (1997) has noted, assuming that classical constituency exists does not imply that it always emerges.

Langacker (1997) has proposed that constituency emerges from more basic phenomena, such as conceptual grouping, phonological grouping and symbolization. According to him, classical constituency combines two sides: conceptual constituency based on (semantic) valence-links between component structures, and phonological constituency, which is based on temporal contiguity. In a classical grammatical constituent, there is a valence-link between the component structures, i.e. they form a classical conceptual constituent, and the component structures are temporally contiguous and thus, form a classical phonological constituent. It is of course the notion of classical phonological constituency and its relationship to grammatical constituency that is particularly interesting to the present study.
Looking at classical constituency from another perspective one could say that it is another manifestation of iconicity in grammatical organization. The iconicity principle has been stated in terms of several different correlations, such as 'The linguistic distance between expressions corresponds to the conceptual distance between them' and 'the temporal-physical distance between chunks of linguistically coded information correlates directly to the conceptual distance between them' (see e.g. Haiman 1983, 1985a and b, Givón 1991). In intonational grouping, the temporal aspect is of course crucial, and it includes not only linear organization but also rhythm and pausing. Change in melody could be counted as physical distance. By definition, intonation units are defined as stretches of talk uttered under coherent intonation contour (Chafe 1987). Pauses and rhythmic changes typically occur at intonation unit boundary. Given the iconic correlation between temporal distance and conceptual distance, we could hypothesize that intonation unit boundaries are very likely to co-occur with constituent boundaries.

This paper examines the relationship between intonation and constituency in the light of discourse data from Finnish conversations. I am comparing the results of this analysis to a pilot study on English conversation. Both data sets have been analyzed in terms of intonation units, and my aim is to study what intonation can tell us about constituency as it is manifested in discourse.

2. DATA. The data come from six naturally occurring conversations between speakers of Finnish. For closer analysis, I have chosen excerpts that I have transcribed in terms of intonation units (henceforth: IUs) following the conventions of Du Bois et al. (1993). The excerpts amount to appr. 40 minutes of transcribed data, consisting of almost 2000 IUs.

In addition to the Finnish data, I have analyzed excerpts of three different conversations obtained from the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English. The excerpts amount to 13 minutes of transcribed data. The transcriptions are made following the same conventions as the Finnish data, and they consist of 1008 IUs (for a closer description of the English data, see Kärkkäinen 1996).

The data have been analyzed syntactically in terms of constituent structure and syntactic role. More specifically, I have looked at noun phrases and verbal predicates. The analysis reveals interesting facts about constituent structure, syntactic roles and clausal organization in respective languages. However, the English database is relatively small, thus allowing for tentative conclusions about the similarities and differences in the two languages.

Everyday conversation is chosen for analysis because I consider it to be the most natural setting of language use, in which grammaticization patterns are most readily observable. Naturally, the data are representative of conversational language only. There is reason to believe that the patterning might be different in other genres (see section 5).
3. Constituency and intonation units. The analysis shows that in both languages, the vast majority of IU boundaries indeed do co-occur with boundaries for grammatical units, thus confirming the findings of previous studies based on English data (see Crystal 1969, Brown 1977, Croft 1995). Whether or not these grammatical units are considered to be constituents depends on what kind of view of constituency is adopted. I assume that intonation is an important means of combining elements together to form constituents, on a par with grammatical and semantic grouping. In the majority of cases, these different groupings yield similar results, and we find that IU boundaries almost always are also syntactic constituent boundaries. I take this to offer strong evidence for the robustness of the category of noun phrase in discourse. However, intonation patterning does not lend support to the category of VP in either language under study.

In the Finnish data, 98.5% of IU boundaries were also constituent boundaries, and the percentage was even higher in the English data, 99%. The figures show extremely high, rule-like regularity, given that the data for both languages come from unplanned conversational discourse. But the remaining 1.5% or so should not be considered as performance-errors, because even there we can find distinct patterns that I will try to illustrate below.

In the Finnish data in most cases of constituent split the IU boundary occurs after a determiner but before the head noun. Most often the determiner is the definite article *se* or the pronominal adjective *semmone* which marks the NP unidentifiable. It may seem odd that these determiners should be in a separate intonation unit from the head noun, and it is certainly not a pattern we would expect to find e.g. in English. It becomes more understandable, however, if we consider the syntactic characteristics of noun phrases in Finnish.

In Finnish noun phrases, nearly all determiners and modifiers precede their heads and agree with them in case and number. We could say that this is one of the defining features of noun phrase formation in Finnish. This means that the determiners and modifiers show the case and number of the whole construction, and in terms of syntactic processing they give an idea of how the clause as a whole will be structured, even though they may not contain enough semantic and discourse referential information. Thus we could say that noun phrases are highly projective in Finnish in that the form of the modifiers already reveals the case and the number of the whole construction (cf. Himmelmann 1997). Consider example 1 (for transcription conventions and abbreviations used in the glosses, see appendix) which comes from a conversation between two brothers. M has been out on a fishing trip, and he is telling his brother about the trip.

(1) (Brothers)

1 M: mä tempasin sielt semmose-n,
   1SG caught there a.kind.of-ACC
   I caught a,
In example 1, the determiner *semmosen* appears in the same IU as the predicate verb *tempasin* 'caught'. It is a determiner that serves a classifying function (see Erringer 1997). Morphologically, it is derived from the demonstrative *se* with an adjectival suffix. It is followed by a relatively long pause and an adjectival phrase *yli puoltoist kilosen* 'over 1.5 kilos (weighing)' which modifies the head noun *raudun* 'trout-ACC'. In terms of processing, when encountering the determiner *semmosen* we know that it is going to be part of the object NP of the clause by virtue of its case marking. At the same time, it projects more, since it cannot form an NP by itself (on the notion of projectability, see Goodwin 1981).

Note that the predicate verb *tempasin* 'caught' is accented in line 1, as well as the quantifying phrase *puoltoist kilosen* '1.5 kilos'. In many studies, primary accent has been identified with new information (see e.g. Chafe 1976, Prince 1981: 992). The constituent split can be seen as a way to manage information flow because it serves to fulfill the 'one piece of new information per intonation unit' -principle observed by Chafe (1980, 1994; for more discussion see next section).

As Laury (1997) has shown, the definite article *se* has only recently been grammaticized in Finnish, and on a par with the article usage, it is still used in its older function as a demonstrative pronoun. Thus, it can be used either as an independent demonstrative pronoun or as a definite article in a noun phrase. It is important to note that in the definite article usage *se* does not usually receive accent, but the head does. In the cases that I have analyzed as constituent splits the determiner was never accented, thus indicating that the two parts indeed formed a constituent even though the constituent was split into two intonation units. Consider example 2.
In example 2 we have an object NP that is produced in two IUs (lines 3 and 4). The determiner sitä is produced after the subject se 'she' and the negative verb ei which shows agreement with the subject (3rd person). The determiner is followed by a pause of 0.5 seconds, and a slight hesitation and the head noun minkkiturkkia 'mink coat'. The determiner sitä shows the case of the head of the phrase, namely the partitive. Interactionally the split constituent does very interesting work: Before this sequence, there has been talk about spending money, and the current speaker reports on her friend telling about her mother's ways of dealing with money. Just prior to the sequence given in the example, Leena has told that the friend’s mother had been using money sparingly but she had changed her attitude towards money just before she died. The mink coat referred to with the split constituent exemplifies the new way of thinking adopted by the old lady before she died. The split constituent offers a definite description of a referent that has not been talked about before. Thus, it is not anchored to a prior mention, but rather, is identifiable through the cultural knowledge the speaker assumes that she and the co-participant share. The split and hesitation can be seen as an indication that there may be some problems with the assumed identifiability.

In the English data constituent splits do not usually occur between determiner and head but in between a complex description of a referent. Consider the following example which comes from a conversation between a couple, Ken and Joanne, and their friend Lenore who are talking about Ken's illnesses. In this sequence, Ken is quoting a doctor diagnosing him.

(3) (Deadly Diseases)

1 Ken: I think uh=,
2       you- you [picked up] some,
3 Joanne:       [H ]
4 Ken: .. v- [2 u=m2],
5 Joanne:       [2 Virus2].
6 Ken: virus,

In example 3 the participants are co-constructing a mention of a new referent. In line 2, Ken produces the subject and the predicate and the indefinite pronoun some modifying the object constituent that is to be constructed. After that Ken is hesitating (line 4), and Joanne
produces the head noun *virus*, which Ken accepts by repeating it in line 6. Throughout the sequence where the participants have been talking about Ken's illnesses Joanne has prompted that she knows what Ken is telling. Thus, to use Goodwin's (1979) terminology, she is a *knowing recipient*. It is an interesting question from an intonation perspective whether Joanne's line 5 is actually produced as a completion of the noun phrase Ken is producing or just as offering the lexical material that Ken is searching for in line 4. In her utterance in line 5, Joanne is using low voice and a falling intonation contour signalling finality (marked with a period in the transcript). Choosing this intonation pattern and voice quality, Joanne displays that she does not step in as a co-teller (see Goodwin 1979). Note also that when Ken repeats the word, he doesn't repeat Joanne's intonation pattern but uses a continuing intonation marked with a comma. In the sense of Couper-Kuhlen (1996), this is not a case of prosodic repetition but just lexical repetition.

In both sets of data, constituent splits are most common in NPs in the object role (about half of the splits were in the object role in both languages). In order to interpret this finding it is important to bear in mind the fact that only constituents that consist of several parts can split. It is well known in the discourse linguistic literature that in the subject role pronominal NPs or zeros are preferred over full NPs, whereas in the object and the oblique role the proportion of full NPs is higher. At least in the Finnish data, however, the full NPs in the object role differ from those in the oblique role so that object NPs are more likely to receive modifiers whereas oblique NPs are more often formed by one noun only. Thus, NPs in the object role lend themselves to splits more readily than others.

In his work over the years, Chafe has emphasized the role of intonation in managing information flow (see e.g. Chafe 1994). Not only has he suggested the ‘one piece of new information per intonation unit” -principle (see above example 1), but also, he has proposed ‘the light subject principle” according to which subjects tend to be light in terms of information pressure (Chafe 1994). This often means lightness in linguistic substance. It is no wonder then that constituents functioning as subjects do not split. One could hypothesize that dislocations could be used as escape valves. However, although dislocations are available in both English and Finnish as a structural device, they are not used very much in either language (in the Finnish data, there were two left dislocations in 2000 IUs).

In conclusion, IU boundaries almost always occur at constituent boundaries. I have shown that even in cases where a constituent is split into subsequent IUs the splits are not ‘errors’ due to performance factors but show clear patterns. Most of the time intonational phrasing is convergent with grammatical constituency. However, as we will see in the next section, intonational grouping suggests a flexible view of constituency that allows for various alternative groupings rather than a fixed view.

4. **Intonational Grouping and Clausal Organization.** The view that IUs correspond to clauses (or sentences, depending on definitions) seems to be quite widely accepted. However, it is usually assumed rather than argued for. For example, many transcription theories employ the notion of clause or sentence in describing the transcription conventions
of intonation contours; thus, they speak about sentence-final intonation that is marked with a period (see e.g. Chafe 1994). Less often does one find discussions on what is meant by clause. I would like to discuss this question here, and then discuss how clausal constituent structure is reflected in intonational grouping.

In my view, clauses are emergent syntactic constructions that consist of the predicate and its arguments (on emergent grammar see Hopper 1987, 1988; on “sentences” as emerging constructions, see Goodwin 1979). These may be accompanied by optional adjuncts, but the adjuncts do not constitute the clause in the same way as the core arguments and the predicate do. With core arguments I mean subjects and objects. (For more discussion, see Helasvuo 2001.) Often enough, there are no syntactic grounds to decide what clause a given oblique argument belongs to, but rather, it depends on the semantic content, intonation and the action the oblique argument serves. Consider the following example which comes from a conversation between four men discussing the cost of living in suburban Helsinki. (Note that the recording was made in the late 1950’s and the living standards were different from those of today.)

Example 4 starts out with O asking a confirmation question about the rent A is paying. Partly overlapping is P’s question in lines 2 and 3 about A’s form of living. These questions
are both directed to A. A's answer to the first question is in line 4, which is overlapping P's question. After listening to P's question, A produces the NP kolme huonetta 'three rooms' in line 5, which serves as an answer to P's question about A's form of living. Syntactically, the answer is elliptical and the predicate is recoverable from the question. In line 6, O continues the same line of query, namely the cost of living, but the part which is in overlap with A's line 5 is unfortunately not audible. What is audible is the NP + locative -construction matkat lisaks 'trips to-addition'. This construction is not elliptical, and it is syntactically free. Of course the inaudible part may contain a predicate, but even without any such predicate the construction is fully comprehensible. With this construction, O continues to query about the various costs of living outside the city. In line 7, P produces a postpositional phrase with a rising terminal contour marking it as a question. Syntactically it would be possible as an extension of the clause in lines 2 and 3; however, this does not make sense semantically. In 2 and 3, P is asking, 'Do you have a villa there or what?', to which he could add, 'With the owner?', but it would be odd semantically. Rather, P's line 7 builds upon the exchange between P (lines 2 and3) and A (line 5; note that A's line 4 is an answer to O's question in line 1 rather than P's). In line 5 A gives an indirect response to P's question: without denying that they have a villa, he states that they have three rooms. In line 7, P bases his confirmation seeking question on the whole exchange, not just on either part. It would be odd if he suggested that they have the villa together with the owner but also that they have the three rooms with the owner. Rather, what he is suggesting is that the owner is living there too.

My point with example 4 is that we do not have any clear syntactic, semantic or intonational evidence that the postpositional phrase in line 7 would be part of one clause rather than another in the context. In my view this is not an important question. Clausal syntactic relations are clearest in the clause core, whereas peripheral arguments often give information about circumstantial relations which are syntactically not tightly related to the clause core. It would seem reasonable to hypothesize that they are intonationally not necessarily bound to the core, but may just as well occur in a different IU from the core. Moreover, there are syntactic constructions that are independent of clausal organization, namely unattached NPs (see line 6 in example 3). Unattached NPs differ from obliques in that they cannot be conceived as being part of any clause in the context but are syntactically 'unattached'. They usually stand in the grammatical cases. In my view, then, it is most profitable to seek correspondences between intonation and clausal constituency by looking at how the constituents of the clause core are distributed across intonation units.

If we study the clause in terms of the predicate and its core arguments, it turns out that in both sets of data, it is most often so that the predicate and its core arguments are in the same IU. This was the case in 90.5 % of the clauses in the Finnish data, and in 95.2 % of the English clauses. We could say then that there is a clear tendency in spoken discourse for clause cores to be produced in a single IU. In cases where either of the core arguments or both were in a different IU from the predicate, there was an interesting similarity between the two languages: namely, in both languages, it was usually the object that was in a different IU from the predicate and the subject. This contradicts Cruttenden's
claim (see section 1) that IU boundaries should occur between the subject and the predicate. Neither do the results lend support to the traditional tree structure analysis of constituency which takes as its starting point the assumption that sentences can be divided into two major parts, NP and VP, the latter of which subsumes the possible object-NP.

Interestingly enough, clauses in which the clause core is distributed across several IUs show features of low transitivity (in the sense of Hopper and Thompson 1980). They tend to show imperfective aspect, describe non-punctual actions or processes with no permanent effect on the object. Often they involve cognitive or communicative verbs. The object is usually not highly individuated. These are all features that Hopper and Thompson (1980) identify as indicators of low transitivity. Consider example 5, which comes from the same conversation as example 3. After talking about Ken's illnesses (cf. example 3), Lenore, the friend of the couple asks: ‘And you both eat the same things?’, meaning ‘you eat the same things but only he gets sick’. To this Joanne answers by giving a lengthy list of things she eats, and after that Ken gets his turn. He starts by telling what he doesn't eat, and after that he gets into the things that he does eat.

(5) (Deadly Diseases)

1 Ken: I eat like,
2 .... you know,
3 .... vegetable=s,
4 and,
5 s- salads and,
6 Joanne: [(H) that's the problem though,
7 Ken: [m- f- meat from like little corner sta=nds,

In example 5, Ken produces a clause that extends over several IUs. IU 1 contains the subject and the verb. The action described is habitual, and the object is produced as a three-part list, each part of which is produced as an IU of its own. None of the coordinated object-NPs (lines 3, 5, and 7) refer to individuated referents.

During the sequence where the participants talk about the food they eat, they are in a list mode: first Joanne lists what she eats, then Ken tells what he doesn't eat and finally, what he does eat. These lists are all produced by giving one new item per intonation unit, which is congruent with the ‘one new idea per intonation unit’-principle. Ono and Thompson (1996) have observed in their conversational data that cases where a clause is produced across several intonation units are often attributable to this principle, which results from the cognitive constraints speakers are faced with. Ono and Thompson also observe several interactional factors which may result in the production of one clause in several intonation units. Interestingly enough, both Joanne and Ken's answers to Lenore's question take the same structural and intonational form: that of listing the items in separate intonation units. We could say that the participants are orienting to the list-mode and they
display this orientation by choosing the same structural intonational patterns for their contributions.

Looking at constituency from the perspective of intonational grouping, the data suggest a subject-verb grouping on a par with a verb-object grouping. For Finnish, this is not surprising in the light of what is known about the syntactic relationship between verb and object in Finnish. Many researchers have cast doubt on the reality of a verb phrase in Finnish (most recently Vilkuna 1996). To say the least, verb phrases do not form a 'classical constituent' in the sense of Langacker (1997). Even in clauses in which the verb and the object are presented in the same IU, they do not necessarily form a continuous constituent. Consider example 6.

(6) (Birthday)

1 N: <@ kissa istu siel ^lihatiskin ääressä,  
The cat was sitting there at the meat counter (in a supermarket)

2 (H) katto [sil]mät ymmyrkäisina,  
looking, with its eyes wide open,

3 S: [(H)]

4 N: kanoja grillissä.  
chicken in.barbecue

In example 6, we have the verb *katto* 'was looking' in IU 2, followed by an adverbial construction describing the subject (the cat, line 1). Only after that does the speaker produce the object *kanoja* 'chicken' (IU 4).

Finnish has often been characterized as a language with free or 'discourse-configurational' word order (Vilkuna 1989). Support for this claim has been sought in the fact that syntactic permutations rarely yield ungrammatical orderings (Vilkuna 1989: 9-10). However, analysis of word order in conversational discourse has shown that the mutual ordering of subject and verb is very stable with the subject usually preceding the verb (Helasvuo 2001, in press). This tendency is very robust, especially in clauses with personal pronouns functioning as subjects. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that subjects are more often presented in the same IU with the predicate than are objects.

In the English data, the tendency for clause cores to be presented in a single IU is even more pervasive (95 %) than in Finnish. However, if an argument was produced in a different IU from the verb, it was much more likely to be an object than a subject (26 objects vs. 8 subjects in 704 clauses).

The fact that objects are more likely than subjects to be produced in a different IU from the verb poses problems to the traditional view of constituency. One major problem with the traditional view on constituency is that it is fixed *a priori* and does
not allow for overlap at any level. Analysis of spoken discourse suggests a more flexible view on constituency that allows for different kinds of groupings (as in Langacker 1997). *Inter alia*, in cases in which the object is produced in a different IU from the verb, the bound between the verb and the object cannot be as tight as in cases in which they are temporally contiguous or at least part of the same IU. In terms of classical constituency as proposed by Langacker (1997), we could say that if the object (or the subject) is not adjacent to the predicate, they do not form a classical phonological constituent because they are not temporally contiguous. Thus, although there is a valence link between the two, they do not form a classical grammatical constituent.

In this section, I have shown that there is a strong tendency in spoken discourse for clause cores to be presented in a single IU. However, in both languages studied here, if an argument was produced in a different IU from the predicate, it was much more likely to be the object than the subject. This finding is of course problematic to the traditional analysis of constituency, but can easily be accommodated in a more flexible view of constituency. The similarities between the English and Finnish data are quite striking, especially in view of the fact that in English, word order is quite fixed, whereas in Finnish there is more flexibility.

5. GENERALIZABILITY. The two databases analyzed here have been compiled with similar criteria: they both represent free conversational discourse produced in informal everyday settings. Thus, they allow for comparisons between the two languages. Of course, the data are representative of conversational language only, and it is a task for future research to find out whether the results are generalizable to other genres as well. Based on what we know so far, I would like to make some reservations.

In Helasvuo (in press) I show that personal pronouns play an important role in the grammaticization of the subject role in Finnish. In the same data as analyzed here, it turned out that almost half of subjects (45.2%) were personal pronouns. As we know from cross-linguistic research on case marking and cross-referencing systems, personal pronouns often show coding patterns that are different from those of other pronouns and nouns (see e.g. Silverstein 1976, 1981, Mithun 1991 among others). This is the case also in Finnish. Thus, the analysis of 3rd person narrative would have yielded very different results concerning, inter alia, the grammaticization of the subject role.

In Helasvuo (in press) I show that in comparison with other pronouns and nouns, personal pronouns show more explicit coding of grammatical roles, especially the subject role, not only in terms of case marking and agreement, but also, in terms of word order. As was noted above, Finnish has been described as a ‘free’ or ‘discourse-configurational’ word order language in previous studies. The study of conversation shows, however, that 1st and 2nd person subjects show a fixed subject - verb patterning as over 96% of 1st and 2nd person subjects precede the verb. In full NPs, the percentage is 84 for NPs referring to human referents and less than 63 for non-humans (Helasvuo in press).

These findings may be of some importance when studying the relationship between constituency and intonation. Given the fixed order of subject and verb in clauses
with 1st and 2nd person subjects, and reversely, the flexibility of Subject - Verb ordering in clauses with 3rd person subjects, we could hypothesize that our conversational data show a higher percentage of subjects occurring in the same IU as the verb, whereas in a database consisting of 3rd person narrative for example, the likelihood of the subject to appear in a different IU from the verb is higher (Croft 1995 gives hints to this direction). This hypothesis remains to be tested.

6. CONCLUSIONS. I hope to have shown that intonation is an important means of combining elements together to form constituents, on a par with grammatical and semantic grouping. Most often the different groupings yield similar results. In the analysis of Finnish and English conversational discourse, we found that IU boundaries almost always occur at constituent boundaries. I further showed that even in cases where a constituent is split into subsequent IUs the splits are not random 'errors' due to performance factors but show clear patterns. In sum, we could say that intonational phrasing is often convergent with grammatical constituency as well. However, the data suggest that the traditional view of constituency is not dynamic enough to account for patterns found in actual discourse.

In both data sets analyzed here, there was a strong tendency for clause cores to be presented in a single IU. I see this as a strong argument for clauses as emergent constructions consisting of the predicate and its arguments. They may be accompanied by optional adjuncts, which may or may not appear in the same IU as the core. The adjuncts do not constitute the clause in the same way as the core arguments and the predicate do. Also observed was the existence of other kinds of emergent syntactic constructions, such as unattached NPs.

Despite the tendency for clause cores to be produced as one IU, there were cases in both databases where either of the core arguments was in a different IU from the predicate. It turned out that in both languages, if an argument was produced in a different IU from the predicate, it was more likely to be the object than the subject, thus suggesting on subject - verb grouping on a par with the traditional verb - object grouping. This finding poses problems to the traditional view of constituency, but can easily be accommodated in a more flexible view of constituency.

REFERENCES


1. INTRODUCTION. Recent research in Asian American studies has attempted to resist and dismantle the stereotype of homogenous Asian American communities. Espiritu's (1992) concept of an Asian American 'panethnicity' takes into account various cultures, histories, and languages, which make up richly diverse, multi-ethnic, multi-generational, and multilingual communities. Others have described how the social practice of racial categorization, resulting in what Omi and Winant (1994) call racialized identities, can place limits on Asian Americans who wish to identify themselves in non-ethnic terms. This diversity within Asian America suggests that a study of linguistic practices may also reveal dynamic social, historical, political, as well as cultural processes occurring. Referring to Hymes' definition of speech communities as those 'sharing knowledge of rules for the conduct and interpretation of speech' (Hymes 1974: 51), the term becomes less useful when applied to emerging communities that may not share a common code of conduct and interpretation of speech. Moreover, this assumption may actually gloss over the potential for dynamic change and, in fact, obscure the motivations for and the processes involved in these changes.

According to Lowe (1996), recent studies in the processes of racialization and assimilation suggest that the making of Asian American culture may be a much less stable process than unmediated vertical transmission of culture from one generation to another. The making of Asian American culture includes practices that are partly inherited, partly modified, as well as partly invented (65).

What Lowe suggests goes against notions of Asian American communities as stable, homogenous, or fixed. Part of how this 'Asian American culture' is constructed can be seen in the interactions between members of emerging
heterogeneous communities. Gumperz (1997) outlines how defining speech communities in terms of knowledge-based, extralinguistic categories presents problems for understanding how community boundaries come to be defined and changed (187ff). Instead, he proposes an interactional sociolinguistic approach to the study of discourse as a means of understanding lexical and grammatical knowledge as well as cultural norms that are framed in how we produce and interpret talk. This method seems to offer the flexibility of dealing with the cultural variability present in interactions between recent immigrants, long-time residents, and what Tuan (1998:2) calls 'Asian ethnics', or multigenerational Asian Americans born and raised in the U.S.

2. Heterogeneity within one ethnic group. While Lowe offers compelling evidence of a heterogeneous Asian America, I would argue that heterogeneity exists even within one Asian ethnic group. This paper examines one Korean social service group and the members who, in their interactional linguistic practices, negotiate relationally positioned identities. Since they are all of the same race and ethnicity, members are not positioning themselves in terms of these broader categories, but as different ways of being 'Korean', a category that has taken on a range of meanings for different members. In the course of their meetings, they negotiate and produce local linguistic ideologies of what it means to be 'Korean' and 'Korean American' in their interactions with one another.

2.1. Data. During the summer of 1996, I conducted ethnographic research among a group of over thirty volunteer camp counselors of a Korean cultural camp in the northern California Bay area (which I will call Camp HPH). During meetings throughout the summer, these ethnically Korean counselors, ranging in age from 17-25, planned and prepared camp activities for over one hundred campers. The meetings were frequent, and the main language used was English. Discussions sometimes centered on identity issues, especially Korean identity, since the cultural camp offered classes on Korean language, etiquette, and drums, among others. But when the discussion turned to the purpose or goal of the camp, relational identity issues, such as what it means to be Korean American versus Korean, emerged in ideological terms.

In one particularly long and emotionally charged meeting of this diverse group of 1st, 2nd and 1.5-generation camp counselors, counselors construct at least two opposing social categories: 'Korean American' (or 'American') and 'Korean'. While several issues are raised in the course of the meeting, counselors discuss certain practices, stances and ideologies by linking them to the opposition of these social categories. For example, while some counselors emphasize the importance of teaching Korean culture, others are solely focused on the mentorship aspect of
being a counselor and hope to ‘give what I have to the kids’. The counselors, through their discursive practices, associate and articulate these philosophical stances with notions of being ‘more Korean’ (emphasis on teaching Korean culture) or ‘more American’ (emphasis on mentorship), respectively. The subtle ways in which speakers indexically link social actions to ideologies of relational identity demonstrate that ‘being Korean’ is anything but stable, homogenous, or fixed.

3. WHAT A KOREAN CAMP SHOULD BE. After an invited speaker from a Big Brothers program has given a workshop on mentorship, the meeting continues as some counselors wish to discuss the workshop and their preparation for the camp, which is less than two weeks away. In the course of the discussion, many topics and debates arise, but by a later point in the meeting, the issue of why counselors are doing the camp becomes associated with counselors’ ideologies about what a ‘Korean’ camp should be.

The camp director, Mark, who describes what he sees as the ‘core’ of the camp, makes the first mention of social categories in the discussion. For him, the camp is about the teaching of Korean culture, which he opposes to a ‘quote unquote American culture’ in Excerpt 1.¹


¹ All excerpts are transcribed using a modified version of the transcription conventions described in Du Bois et al. (1993). Intonation units are not transcribed.
Mark: (omitted talk) I don’t even think I have, to a certain extent, on a group setting I have expressed what my goals were, this year’s camp was, and I-- and I try to do that to a- to a- somewhat at uh, at the retreat but...uh, as I was listening to Mr. Logan, I- something hit me in the sense that, when he- when he gave that example about him taking, uh, this kid to a football game, to another scenario that- that’s how I see HPH. Uh, lot of these kids that grew up in this uh this quote unquote American culture, they don’t necessarily see certain aspects of what Korean culture is about. And I’m not saying that this HPH is- is uh a totally Korean? uh but that’s, I think, what we strive to do? For six days out of a year, I think, we’re there to, not only interact with the kids but maybe, provide them the opportunity for these kids to see how other Korean Americans, or how uh Koreans? they interact to each other- how they treat each other? Uh, maybe get to take a look at a performance or a cultural event that they never had a chance to see? Maybe learn about uh, uh a Korean history that they never had a chance to learn in history in their uh in their...uh junior high, in their high school? Uh, these things, I think, for one week out of a year, uh, we’re trying to show them, what uh, trying- trying to impute these uh imbue these kids with su- such, uh, I guess, identity in terms of being- being able to be proud of- of your identity. I- if it’s if it’s if you feel that you’re Korean, you know, be proud of that, be- if your- if you think you’re Korean American, then be proud of that. I think, these- we’re just trying to expose these kids of different...types of...I guess uh, activities? or, interactions? so theys- these guys- these kids can uh, somehow uh, form an idea- form an opinion about what they think uh their identity is (omitted talk).

Mark uses the term ‘Korean’ in opposition to the ‘quote unquote American culture’ in a way that suggests that these terms have racial implications. Given that ‘American’ is often used interchangeably with ‘white’ in mainstream discourse and the metalinguistic ‘quotation marks’ that Mark uses in his speech suggest that he knows the problematic equation of ‘American’ with ‘white’ but somehow still finds the term useful. ‘Korean’, then, is also cast as a racial term, a category that is somewhat given, stable, and based on ancestry regardless of how one acts or perceives of oneself. This is only one particular usage of the term, ‘Korean’, as we will see further below.

Mark chooses his words carefully to make a distinction between Korean Americans and Koreans, recognizing that some counselors would not consider themselves to be just ‘Korean’. In line 399, he emphasizes that Camp HPH is not
'totally Korean' and then must struggle for the category he wishes to specify in lines 402-403, when talking about the way Koreans interact. He first uses 'Korean American', perhaps trying to be more inclusive of those who may not consider themselves exclusively 'Korean' in a cultural sense, but then self-repairs with the term 'Korean', recognizing that what he really means is the codified social behavior that Koreans engage in (referring to practices of addressing elders) and not any kind of codified 'Korean American' way of interacting. This associates Korean culture with interactional practices like using kinship terms for older peers (see Table 1), which is a practice taught at the camp as part of learning Korean etiquette. Younger siblings and peers use these terms in place of given names, which vary according to the gender of the speaker and the referent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term for older male sibling</th>
<th>Term for older female sibling</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female speaker</td>
<td>oppa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male speaker</td>
<td>hyeng</td>
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Table 1. Korean kinship terms for older siblings by gender of speaker and referent

3.1. 'AMERICAN' VERSUS 'KOREAN' CULTURE. Mark's opposition between 'Korean' and 'American' is based on the similarities that all campers and counselors share: the experience of growing up 'Korean' within mainstream 'American' society. His difficulties in articulating the precise social categories in talking about particular groups of people betrays the numerous oppositions that can be made between 'Korean', 'American', and 'Korean American'. This is also seen in his switch in pronouns, from 'we' (referring to the counselors) in line 400 to 'they' (referring to 'Koreans') in lines 402-403. Mark encounters a discursive watershed where he must choose a pronoun to refer to the category of people who engage in a certain codified behavior. Whereas he had cast the counselors as part of one group in opposition to 'Americans' earlier on, his mention of 'Korean American' and 'Korean' have implicitly introduced problematic categories that force him to choose whether or not to include himself in the category, 'Korean'. By his use of 'they' in lines 402-403, Mark constructs his own social category as 'Korean American', perhaps in order to preserve a perceived shared status among the camp counselors. By line 407, Mark returns to the use of 'we' to refer to the camp counselors as a group and stress their unity. In his talk, Mark basically articulates an opposition between 'Korean' and 'American' culture while trying to de-emphasize the distinctions between 'Korean' and 'Korean American'.
One counselor, Ellen, explicitly lays out an alternative conceptualization of social categories while at the same time challenging the practices that are associated with this Korean cultural camp in Excerpt 2.

(2) **Oppa/Enni**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Ellen: I have a similar story to Sara, why I kept coming to camp and why I always come, you know? and like, I had the exact same revelation she did cause I grew up with a white crowd, right? I think every year that we have like- every year that we have camp there’s always a conflict to what the emphasis is gonna be, more Korean, more Korean American, more American, you know? And everyone comes with different ideas, right? And like, right now, I disagree with oppa enni and I can hang with that, just, you know, whatever, and I’ll do it? but it’s like, we all have different ideas, you know? And like as she said, no one’s discussed the ideas? but it just comes out with our opinions? when we argue like this, you know? and it didn’t just come out, we didn’t like lay out exactly what we’re here for. And I’m here more on maybe the American side, not American side, but more of like a different- a different angle than some other people come here for, you know? And I think that that doesn’t show unless we argue about like this, but we never just flat out said, I’m here because this is what happened to me as she just did right now.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Ann: And then, it didn’t even keep to that. I mean, it turned into arguments again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Ellen: About discussion and XX. (SHRUG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Ann: Yeah. I mean it- She just got disregarded, her feelings, right there, you know?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ellen’s talk demonstrates how claiming a ‘more American’ relational identity can also mean rejecting Korean modes of interaction that embrace social hierarchies, like showing respect for elders through the use of the kinship terms oppa and enni. She positions herself within the tripartite opposition she introduces using a pronounced list intonation in uttering lines 73-74. It seems that Ellen does not use ‘American’ in the same vein as Mark does in Excerpt 1, as synonymous with ‘white’, but rather suggests that counselors like herself can also be ‘American’. This positioning allows her to come to the camp for a ‘different angle’ than some others (presumably those who position themselves as ‘Korean’ or ‘Korean American’) do. Her categories do not seem to be entirely linked to given qualities based on ancestry, but rather, based somewhat on beliefs and motivations that can
be associated with joining this camp. By mentioning specifically the practice of using kinship terms, Ellen also associates a linguistic practice to ideologies of social interaction and hierarchies that she herself does not espouse.

Ellen makes a very insightful observation that feelings and biases about identity do tend to emerge during arguments about seemingly unrelated topics, like committee work, or how best to prepare for the camp itself. There also seems to be a gender dynamic occurring, which I will not have time to discuss here, since most counselors who explicitly advocate talking about these issues and sharing and valuing feelings about the camp are female, and most counselors lobbying for a delay in this discussion are male. This dynamic, as well as others, like age, adds another vital layer to the multiplicities (Lowe 1996) involved in the articulation of heterogeneity in this ‘Korean’ organization.

3.2. ‘KOREAN’ VERSUS ‘KOREAN AMERICAN’ MOTIVATIONS. What becomes apparent when counselors share their reasons for doing the camp (the ones who choose to speak, anyway) is that they all stress the importance of being around Korean Americans, of being there for the kids, and reasons of imparting ‘Korean culture’ are not high priorities for them. Jeff, in Excerpt 2, explicitly states that his intentions are very different from those of KAC, the sponsoring organization of the camp, which Mark has explained in Excerpt 1.

(3) Why I’m doing camp [Mentor8; 00:20:81-01:42:64]

JEFF: I just want to say a couple of things, first, you know, why I am at camp. Um....to be quite..blunt about it, or, to be quite, you know, simple as can be, I just love kids, and um, I just wanna, you know, give what I have to the kids. I mean, um, I think maybe K- KAC’s you know quote unquote mission statement I guess is to spread Korean pride to these kids or- or to you know make sure we have these performances, so on and so forth, t- to experience, so the kids can experience Korean things that they haven’t experienced before. My intentions are are very different. Um, I think that ma- you know by me being there being as a mentor as a Korean American in that I can instill that pride, my basically-basic intention is just to be there for them, you know, what Mr. Logon or Logan or whatever what you call it, said. I mean, a lot of kids don’t have that- that mentor, the older brother or that father or what have you that we could provide them, if not for six days. I mean. hopefully. if we could- if we could really show that we do care, in those six days. we really can extend that beyond that.
And that's why I'm here. It's, I mean, I guess I'm saying just to let people know that I- I really do care.

In stating his reasons for going to the camp, Jeff explicitly denies that the spread of Korean pride or providing experiences of things Korean are his priorities. Instead, he places the mentorship of kids and 'just to be there for them' as the main reasons for going to the camp. He also emphasizes his role as a Korean American as opposed to a Korean who is intent on spreading Korean pride. Jeff articulates a different kind of opposition than Mark has laid out, which was the opposition between 'Korean', or 'Korean culture', and 'American', or 'American culture'. Here Jeff introduces the category of 'Korean American' in opposition to the category of 'Korean' (unlike Mark in Excerpt 1, who de-emphasizes this opposition), simultaneously introducing a different usage of the term 'Korean'. Here, 'Korean' is not used as a given quality based on ancestry but as a social category based in practices and beliefs. Jeff's use of the term 'Korean American' allows him to distinguish himself from those who would be concerned with spreading Korean pride while positioning himself as a Korean American counselor whose main goal is to serve as a mentor to the campers.

Jon, like Jeff, is a seasoned counselor. He has attended the camp as a camper and as a counselor for many years. Jon also places the ideology of mentorship in opposition to the teaching of Korean culture as the main reason why he is going to the camp.

(4) 'I don't know anything about the KOREAN CULTURE'

Jon: You gotta be able to understand what this kid wants. What he needs from you. What she needs from you. And if you can't do that, you shouldn't be at the camp. I don't want KCC to take it personally either, but, I don't know how to play the drums, but I can play the drums? you know? I don't know anything about uh uh the KOREAN CULTURE, those traditions and etiquettes. but I think I know something about kids. I think I know what they need. Because I've BEEN there. Had those experiences. And I can talk to em. And that's just a- that's just a matter of information. What those things are offering. That's- that's, you know, that's- that's just, you know, a matter of information. If I went to KCC I could learn the drums. And then I would have that as a resource. That doesn't mean no
While Jon recognizes that teaching drums is linked to being ‘Korean’, he challenges this association by suggesting that he himself (someone who can’t play the drums) could go to the cultural center (called KCC) and learn to play. He questions why this practice must be linked to only one social category while at the same time confirming that such an association does in fact exist.

What is interesting to note is that there is no explicit discussion that addresses the possibility of a ‘Korean’ counselor positioning him/herself as a mentor. What this suggests is that, rightly or not, some counselors conceive of the goals of the camp as an exclusive choice between emphasizing Korean culture and mentorship of ‘the kids’. And mentorship has been constructed as a value that is removed from any sense of what ‘Korean culture’ is for these counselors. Their choices are highly personal and often resonate with their own experiences of working through relational identity issues. This has a strong influence on how they see their own roles as counselors and mentors for the campers who will be attending the camp.

3.3. A BALANCE OF BOTH CULTURES. For the counselors there are very practical consequences for the associations that are made between social categories of counselors and the goals of the camp itself. Because there are more counselors than spots available at the camp, the camp director must decide who can attend the camp. Some potentially good counselors have had to be cut, and there has been some criticism over the selection process since many ‘Korean American’ counselors have been let go in favor of some ‘Korean’ counselors. Thus the disagreement as to the main focus of the camp has potentially serious repercussions in how certain decisions are made. Some of the self-designated ‘more American’ counselors clearly feel that Korean American campers need mentors who are able to help them with their identity issues more than they need classes on Korean etiquette. This ideological stance poses problems for the director, who is charged with putting on a cultural camp with all its amenities, while at the same time, faced with a growing number of eager counselors who may not have this kind of cultural knowledge to pass on to young campers.

In response, the director, Mark, states that he has had to look for a balance between Korean and Korean American counselors who can offer different skills
and qualities. Some counselors see this as a kind of 'commodification' of counselors that is in direct opposition to and in competition with qualities of mentorship as the most important criterion in choosing a counselor. He makes his case for a 'balance of both cultures' and gets the following responses:

(5) ‘A balance of both cultures’ versus ‘How much you care’

Judy: No, I know. I have no problem with that? but then I also feel like, you shouldn’t try to have everything be so balanced because, you’re forcing like all these different kinds of like, you know, I have to have a couple of people on this kind of- on this extreme and some people on this extreme just to get like the full broad picture of like all the different types of Korean Americans that there are, you know? It should be based more on who’s like how much willingness they’re willing to put into this, you know what I mean? It’s not like even though he may not be as Koreanized as someone but I mean, that shouldn’t even be a factor. I mean, I don’t think that should be as big a factor as you’re thinking, you know what I mean?

Sara: I don’t- I don’t this thing should be measured by how Korean or how American this is? you know? I mean, I mean it’s- it’s how much you care, you know, I don’t think that should be as big a factor as you’re thinking, you know what I mean?

Jeff: [It’s about] the kids.

Sara: It’s, yeah, it’s- it’s, I mean, it’s not even necessarily the hundred campers that are gonna be there, it’s just how much you care about your- like your community, I mean, not to sound like you know, so, not to like sound like a broken record or whatever. It’s like, how much- I don’t know because, the way I’ve seen it, I don’t know if it’s necessarily a program, or how many Korean um performances you had, how many American whatever that you had? It’s more just like, as a whole, like, you know, how much are we giving of ourselves. You know? It’s how much of- how, you know, at the same- I mean….it’s like….it’s- you know what I mean?

All: [@@@]

Hank: [<> How do we know what you mean? @>]

Sara: it’s just how much you care].
Both Judy and Sara disagree with Mark that one’s degree of ‘Korean-ness’ or ‘American-ness’ should not have any impact on being considered as a counselor. Because Korean culture does need to be taught at this camp, the director finds himself caught between the ideologies of mentorship and caring espoused by these counselors and the practical concerns of teaching Korean culture at the camp.

4. POSITIONING THROUGH DISCOURSE. The linguistic practices enacted here display aspects of what Bhaba (1990: 211) calls ‘third spaces’, or a place in the process of hybridity where new positions are being created, that propels the negotiation of relational identity in the historic moment of this camp counselors’ meeting. The discussion polarizes notions of being a Korean counselor (associated with the opposition of ‘Korean’ versus mainstream ‘American’ and the teaching of Korean culture) and being a Korean American counselor (associated with the opposition of ‘Korean’ versus ‘Korean American’ or ‘more American’ and the importance of mentorship) that becomes cast as a deterrent to finding a common purpose for the camp. The fact that the term ‘Korean’ is used in such diverse ways and in opposition to various categories perhaps makes it an ideal tool for the negotiation of ethnic identity (Chun, p.c.). The counselors are participating in the challenge of creating those spaces vital to the survival of this camp as it evolves to embrace new aspects of what will be called ‘Korean culture’ through interactional linguistic practices.

In their designation of certain counselors being more ‘Korean’ or ‘Korean American’, these counselors are themselves facing the danger of contributing to the homogenization of relational identities, creating fixed notions of ‘Korean’ and ‘Korean American’ while at the same time trying to introduce new associations, practices and ideologies that one may link to being a Korean camp counselor (the potential for learning to play Korean drums as opposed to already knowing how, for example). We see that this group of counselors are struggling with their own group’s ‘cultural identity’ in the sense of Stuart Hall, who defines this as ‘one, shared culture, a sort of collective “one true self”’ (1990: 223) which is constantly ‘becoming’, for the counselors as well as for the institution of the Korean cultural camp. This heterogeneous positioning within this Korean American organization offers an attempt at possible meanings and cultural hybridities that could not be accessed within the model of a homogeneous speech community. And it is the recognition of this new positioning that will allow counselors and directors to articulate the ways in which the camp will inevitably continue to change.
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1. INTRODUCTION. Linguistically, expressions of stance, or speaker attitude, position, or standpoint, have been said to include grammatical and lexical devices (marking epistemic/evidential stance, attitudinal stance, style of speaking, and so on) as well as paralinguistic and non-linguistic devices (cf. Biber et al. 1999, Martin 2000). Recent linguistic research has demonstrated that spoken language contains a high frequency of especially epistemic/evidential stance markers, of the explicitly personalized or subjective type *I think* and *I don't know* (Biber et al. 1999, Scheibman 2000b, Thompson and Hopper 2001, Thompson 2002, Kärkkäinen to appear), which are indices of the general subjectivity of everyday conversational language (Iwasaki 1993, Dahl 1997, Scheibman 2000a, 2001).

Even these most recent treatments regard stance from the point of view of the individual speaker, i.e. stance taking is viewed as a static and isolated mental position or interior state of the individual speaker, who in expressing his/her stance draws from a more or less definite set of (primarily) grammatical and lexical markers. The role of prosody in the expression of stance has been paid scant attention to, let alone stance as embodied action, or the role of gaze, gesture and other body behavior in stance taking (but see Haddington 2002 for the role of gaze direction). However, Hunston and Thompson (2000:143) observe that "the expression of attitude is not, as is often claimed, simply a personal matter – the speaker “commenting” on the world – but a truly interpersonal matter in that the basic reason for advancing an opinion is to elicit a response of solidarity from the addressee". Yet even this notion does not go far enough in that the very construction of an opinion, assessment, or evaluation has been shown to be interactional in nature: Goodwin and Goodwin (1992) draw attention to performing an assessment as a structured interactive activity, whereby the co-participants show heightened involvement and participation within the assessment activity. Pomerantz (1984:58) also views assessments as products of participation.

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1 I dedicate this paper with great affection to Sandy Thompson, with whom I have even had a chance to discuss it in a motel room in Santa Barbara on a spring day. Thank you, Sandy, for all your good suggestions and comments – I'm afraid I am still working on some of them. Many thanks are also due to Jack Du Bois for discussing this article with me and for giving such inspiration for the ideas presented in it.
in social activities, as ‘occasioned conversational events with sequential constraints’.

On the basis of my observations of conversational data, assessments as one type of action that involves taking up positions and making evaluations indeed often come, not only in pairs, but in longer strings, with each speaker constructing a stance by building on, modifying, and aligning or disaligning with the immediately co-present stance of a dialogic partner (cf. Du Bois 2000b). Stance is very often established and negotiated as an interactional practice, and the articulation and differentiation of stance is a joint activity between discourse participants, i.e. it essentially involves the recipients’ co-participation. There is then a need to move away from studying an individual speaker’s stance, towards examining stance taking as an interactive activity. In this paper I will outline how we might undertake to do this: instead of starting from pre-established linguistic manifestations of stance, the focus is on the participants’ engagement and participation in evaluative activity in some recurrent sequential slots or environments in talk-in-interaction. I will propose that one such activity environment that frequently involves joint negotiation of stance is at points where conversational stories come to completion: this environment will be termed ‘concluding assessments initiating stance negotiations’ (section 3). I will first examine this activity environment from the point of view of the interaction that takes place between participants (section 4). Then I will concentrate on the linguistic resources used in stance taking (section 5); these will be examined within the framework of dialogic syntax as proposed by Du Bois (2001). But first, in section 2, I will show that participants in fact display an orientation towards involving their co-participants in stance taking in general, not just in the above sequential environment.

Some terminological points need to be made here. I will use the terms ‘assessment’, ‘opinion’, ‘evaluative utterance/turn’, and the stance encoded therein somewhat interchangeably. Assessments have been defined by Goodwin and Goodwin (1992: 155) as actions being produced by single individuals. The same goes for opinions and evaluative utterances, and stance insofar as it is manifested in assessments, opinions or other types of evaluative turns. However, Goodwin and Goodwin (1992: 155) also state that assessments can be organized as an interactive activity that not only includes multiple participants but potentially also types of action that are not themselves assessments. The focus in my paper is precisely on stance taking as a sequential activity rather than an individual action, or in the terminology of Goodwin and Goodwin, on ‘assessment activity’ rather than ‘assessment’. I will therefore include in the analysis any turn or action that forms part of the stance negotiations (e.g. a simple Yeah.), even though it does not include any overt stance tokens or assessment signals.

My data come from Part I of the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (Du Bois 2000a), which consists of 14 conversations or six hours of digitized audio and transcriptions. I focus on four tapes, Lambada, Cuz, Raging Bureaucracy, and A Tree’s Life, which represent informal everyday conversation. The corpus data were transcribed using the conventions in Du Bois
et al. (1993, cf. appendix 1). The data are transcribed into intonation units, or stretches of speech uttered under a single intonation contour, such that each line represents one intonation unit.

2. PARTICIPANTS’ ORIENTATION TO RECIPIENT INVOLVEMENT IN STANCE TAKING. In this section I offer proof for the claim made above that stance taking is essentially an interactive activity. Pomerantz (1984:61) has argued that when a speaker assesses a referent that is also accessible to a recipient, the initial assessment provides the relevance of the recipient’s second assessment. However, it is sometimes evident that speakers actively pursue second assessments from the recipients, and more specifically their alignment with the stances they themselves are taking. Speakers express an initial assessment or evaluation (which in itself is occasioned by the contingencies of the specific interaction, as will be seen below), but when there is no uptake, no second assessment or opinion, they end up repeating and rephrasing their initial assessment, and the stance encoded therein, until uptake occurs. In this sense we may say that recipients not only provide second assessments as a matter of course, but that first speakers also display an orientation towards involving the recipients in such activity. Let us look at the following example.

Jamie and Harold, a married couple, and their guests Miles and Pete are involved in an after-dinner conversation in the hosts’ living room. On the wall are some Indonesian masks, portraying male figures. Miles volunteers as his opinion that one of the figures looks like a certain black person that he has in mind; this person had been performing at a dance club that he frequently goes to. The boldface type in the following excerpts highlights the various rephrasings of the opinion expressed by Miles, be they overtly elicited in the sense of doing other-initiated repair (as in 2 below) or responding to a first pair part such as a question (as in 3), or unelicited in the sense of appearing as initial actions in other sequential slots, such as first pair parts of adjacency pairs (as in 4-7 below).

Example 1 (Lambada):

1. initial opinion
   MILES: ... But the thing is,
   that second one looks like the guy who was in one of the Oba Oba skits.
   (5 lines omitted)

2. overtly elicited opinion
   HAROLD: ... The little what?
   MILES: ... Looks like,
   .. the second &
   PETE: <X Why X>,
   MILES: & one from the top looks like a guy who was in the Oba Oba k- skit.
   (7 lines omitted)
3. overtly elicited opinion

PETE: [Look like] --

% a real --
an actual person doing it,
or some kind of masks they had,
or,

MILES: No=

Uh=

the guy [looked like that].

PETE: [Or there's a guy looked] like that.

(7 lines omitted)

4. unelicited opinion

MILES: [I mean] that looks kinda like a Black person.

(7 lines omitted)

5. unelicited opinion

MILES: ... % But that person looks Black.

(11 lines omitted)

6. unelicited opinion

MILES: I look at that and think,
yeah,

that looks like a brother.

(33 lines omitted)

7. unelicited opinion

MILES: I just glanced at that,

PETE: [Hunh].

MILES: and I [immediate]ly saw this guy=s face in Oba Oba.

PETE: [Yeah].

Hunh.

<P That's inter[esting P>3].

MILES: [He looks] like .. that guy.

JAMIE: ... Poor guy,

HAROLD:.. That is [really] [interesting].

JAMIE: [@] [2@@@2]

PETE: [2@@@2]

JAMIE: .. @(H)=

PETE: Yeah.

As we can see, the opinion offered by Miles is not really taken up by the co-participants. In part this is due to the fact that the recipients do not have similar access to the main referent, i.e. the guy at the club, or to certain other referents whose identities are established in the discourse that follows (e.g. what is an Oba Oba skit, was it an actual guy or a mask that Miles had seen at the club, which one of the four Indonesian masks are they talking about). Yet, Miles ends up proffering essentially the same opinion, that the Indonesian figure in the mask looks black, in all three times (at points 4–6), without getting any overt uptake.
Miles is not successful in securing alignment from the others, who do not for one reason or other wish to engage in offering opinions concerning ‘typical racial characteristics’ of a black person – maybe because Miles is African-American himself, but the other participants are not.

The following example, taken from the same conversation as example 1, shows that participants also display an orientation towards recipient co-participation as a means of concluding the topic. Jamie has been telling an animated story about the children of one of their neighbors, who regularly make a lot of noise outside their window.

Example 2 (Lambada at 6 min 40 sec):

1 JAMIE: ... Yeah right.
2 ... Probably be like,
3 <VOX shut up you ki- VOX>,
4 you know,
5 XX?
6 Oh= Go=d.
7 ...(2.8) I feel --
8 I s- feel like such an old lady.
9 But I --
10 they just really annoy me.
11 ...(2.5) (SIGH) [kay],
12 MILES: [Hunh].
13 JAMIE: New subject,
14 @@
15 PETE: Hm.
16 JAMIE: @@ (H)
17 HAROLD: Well it's cause they have no <HI ^respect HI>,
18 JAMIE: <P Yeah,
19 I guess so P>.
20 ...(4.5)

The story is brought to completion on line 5, and when none of the recipients offer any appreciation of the story (cf. Lerner 1992:266–267), Jamie herself produces her own concluding evaluation on lines 7–10, combining a self-deprecatory remark with a complaint about the negative feelings that the children provoke in her. But no subsequent evaluations or assessments from any of the co-participants follow (2.5-second pause on line 11), but only a rather minimal acknowledgement token from Miles (Hunh.), which does not offer any overt support to or alignment with Jamie. It also overlaps with Jamie, who now displays that she considers the topic closed by Kay, new subject. Yet she very likely expected others to make a fuller contribution and to possibly align with her view or at least to show some appreciation of how she feels; this is reflected in Jamie’s embarrassed laugh tokens on lines 14 and 16. Still no uptake follows but only another acknowledgement token, this time from Pete (Hm.).
Now it appears that Harold also orients to Jamie's concluding assessment as requiring subsequent evaluations, as he then produces a delayed second assessment or opinion after Jamie has already proffered to change the topic. It is worth noting that he as Jamie's spouse has first-hand experience of the events in the story (in fact he has been a co-teller) and that the story was told primarily to inform and involve Miles and Pete. But since Miles and Pete only show minimal understanding, Harold jumps in to offer a display of solidarity himself; he aligns with Jamie by producing his own assessment and capturing the gist of the story (cf. Lerner 1992 on story consociates) on line 17: *Well it's cause they have no <HI 'respect HI>... The way that he designs his turn conveys that there is something misplaced about it: the initial *Well* signals some trouble in the smooth flow of discourse, and there is clear emphasis on *respect*, which is said in a louder voice and with a wide pitch range (high falling intonation). The prosodic cues seem to emphasize that this is an obvious conclusion to draw, but the utterance may also be designed in response to Jamie's earlier comment about feeling old, as if to act out an old person's typical statement both verbally and prosodically.²

Jamie then immediately acknowledges Harold's attempt to come to her rescue, and displays, through a markedly lowered volume on *Yeah, I guess so.*, that the assessment activity and the topic is now brought to a close (cf. Goodwin and Goodwin 1992:169). Such an interpretation also finds support in the observation made by Goodwin and Goodwin (1992:170):

> [A]ssessments are one of the characteristic activities used to exit from larger sequential units in talk such as stories and topics. Indeed one frequently finds strings of assessments at such places.

Notice also that Jamie had already expressed similar opinions earlier in the story, which were not taken up by those co-participants for whose benefit the story was told (even though her second attempt is taken up by the story consociate Harold when he says *It's so bad, they make us feel so old.*).

1\textsuperscript{st} attempt (at 4 min 54 sec)

JAMIE: *Those ki=ds are [just] --*

2\textsuperscript{nd} attempt (at 5 min 30 sec)

JAMIE: @(Hx) @I [felt like] such an old lady.
PETE: [@@]
HAROLD: It's so [2bad,
JAMIE: [2With those ki=ds2],
HAROLD: they make us feel2] [3so ol=d3].
PETE: [3How many of them3] are there.

² I am thankful to John Du Bois for pointing out this interpretation to me.
3rd attempt (at 6 min 21 sec)

JAMIE: ... They're terrible.
      ... [Really].

We may thus conclude that it is of relevance for participants in interaction that they get their 'co-participants to co-participate' in offering opinions, evaluations, and assessments, and eventually to align with their own positions and the stances that they are in the process of taking. This is no wonder, as assessments are said to be one key locus of social and cultural norms regarding 'the good, the true, and the beautiful' (Schegloff 1996:171). In the above example, the social norm at the heart of Jamie's story was, obviously, that children should behave in a respectful way towards adults.

3. ACTIVITY ENVIRONMENT IN FOCUS: CONCLUDING ASSESSMENTS INITIATING STANCE NEGOTIATIONS. Conversational storytelling has been shown to be a collaborative and interactive activity throughout its course (cf. Lerner 1992, Mandelbaum 1993). Mandelbaum (1993:252–253) observes that recipients usually show their understanding of what they make of the story, but participants may in fact work out together what the story is about. One frequent type of activity environment or sequential position, then, from which we might start identifying patterns of joint stance taking is what can be called 'concluding assessments initiating stance negotiations'. In prior discourse, one participant has typically told a story, related some series of events, or described some state of affairs or some persons (often through being embedded in activities, i.e. through a story). The teller has typically portrayed the protagonist(s), event(s) or state(s) of affairs as assessables, i.e. s/he has provided more or less explicit evaluation already during the telling, or has built into the telling a stance or a point of view. This is followed by a concluding assessment or evaluation, often after a longish pause or some other prosodic boundary in the discourse. One participant, usually one of the recipients but sometimes also the storyteller him/herself, then offers a candidate interpretation or understanding of the story or some aspect of it. Such post-positioned assessments initiate a sequence, a string of assessments, during which the co-participants negotiate a congruent stance towards the story, thereby closing the topic (even though it is possible that the participants resume the topic even after the negotiation sequence). Concluding assessments can be seen as inviting the co-participants to engage in such negotiation.

4. INTERACTIONAL PRACTICES OF STANCE TAKING. I will illustrate, by way of three examples, what kind of interactional practices are at play when participants negotiate a shared stance towards aspects of the prior discourse, typically some protagonist(s) in a conversational story. Generally, the co-participants indeed do join in and indicate their agreement and alignment, as also varying degrees of disagreement and non-alignment.
In the following example two cousins are talking about a mutual relative, Lisabeth. Alina has just told Lenore about Lisabeth’s recent encounter with Mom, during which Lisabeth had complained that Mom now has a whole other life after her husband’s death and does not seem to need her any more.

Example 3 (Cuz at 4 min 45 sec):

1. ALINA: Mom said I do.
2. LENORE: [(H)] [ Poor Lisabeth].
3. ALINA: you've hur[2t my feeli=ngs2], and bu[3=h3] Q>.
4. LENORE: [3(H)3]
5. ALINA: [Mom's go-4] --
6. LENORE: [4' Maybe she's just4] kind of ^dense. 'Hunh,
7. ALINA: (H) .. 'Well,
8. LENORE: .. she 'wants everything on her ['‘terms'.
9. ALINA: [(H)]
10. LENORE: [You 'know2].
11. ALINA: [2 Is she ' vicious or ^dense2].
12. LENORE: [4's a <LO ^dope LO>.
13. (H)
14. LENORE: [@[@@]]@
15. ALINA: [So],
16. LENORE: [@ <@ 'Expects that @>.
17. [@@@@]
18. ALINA: [@[@@] <@ 'Exactly @>.
19. (H) So],
20. t- Mom said,
21. you know,
22. % she goes,
23. when can I see you.

Alina has built in a clear negative stance towards Lisabeth during the telling, portraying her as the primary person responsible for the lack of communication between her and Mom: she never calls her. Mom’s rather unsympathetic reply to Lisabeth on line 1, reported by Alina with a ‘curt’ prosody and clear falling intonation, and Alina’s subsequent malicious and very loud laughter can be heard by Lenore to invite evaluation and appreciation of the story. Lenore indeed projects that the story is now being brought to possible completion and produces an assessment of the protagonist: (H) Poor Lisabeth. ‘Maybe she's just kind of ^dense. ‘Hunh,. She also happens to start the assessment simultaneously while Alina still continues to talk and to act out Lisabeth’s imaginary reply to Mom (lines 3, 5, and 6), which makes it more reasonable that Lenore’s projection misfired. She displays some uncertainty (maybe, kind of; hunh), however, as to whether this is the right kind of conclusion to draw (that
Lisabeth just does not ‘get it’ that Mom can do without her support). She also builds in a token of sympathy towards the protagonist, poor Lisabeth. Yet, even though Alina is not done with the story, she joins in the assessment activity, i.e. she momentarily stops the telling to engage in joint evaluation of the protagonist. That Alina does interrupt her story and offers a second assessment or opinion, .. Well, .. she 'wants everything on her ‘terms. You ‘know., is of course also made particularly relevant by the design of Lenore’s first assessment, which ends in an interrogative tag ‘Hunh, (cf. Pomerantz 1984:61).

Now, as the negative stance towards the protagonist that Alina has built into the story has not been received with an unequivocal and equally negative appreciation by Lenore (who had shown some sympathy towards Lisabeth), Alina’s subsequent evaluation is not in absolute alignment with Lenore’s assessment. Alina starts with ‘Well, a potential disagreement preface (cf. Pomerantz 1984, even though well may here also mark the fact that Alina was interrupted in her storytelling), and produces an assessment with rather high contrastive stress on ‘terms, that now portrays Lisabeth as a domineering, rather than stupid, person. The relevance of this is not immediately obvious to Lenore, who in turn confronts Alina by asking: ‘Is she ‘vicious or ‘dense. We may argue that being simply ‘dense’ is perhaps more socially acceptable than being ‘vicious’ in the sense of domineering, and it is therefore rather important to establish which of the two Alina thinks applies to Lisabeth. Alina’s ‘She’s a <La ‘dope La>. does not really choose either one of Lenore’s assessment signals as such. As it is roughly synonymous with dense, however, Alina could be seen to give in and align with, and even escalate the stance in, Lenore’s initial assessment on lines 9–10. But she differentiates her stance somewhat precisely by choosing a third assessment signal instead of one offered by Lenore. Her pitch also falls markedly on ‘dope. These choices appear to be doing something in addition to simply offering an answer: they indicate that for Alina they have now reached a shared stance and that she wishes to resume the telling of the story (notice So, on line 19). Lenore appreciates the curtness of Alina’s turn and readily accepts that they are done with the evaluation: she laughs and makes a metacomment that indicates that she, too, is ready to give in, @ <@ Explains that @>. Even this turn design still gets a symmetrical ‘matching’ contribution from Alina: laughter followed by <@ Exactly @>. These turns achieve at least a working consensus of the characteristics of Lisabeth, and the assessment sequence is brought to a close. Alina can now continue her story starting at line 23 with a conjunction so.

What becomes clear from the above example is that involving one’s co-participant in assessment activity is interactively important, and that co-participants indeed do join in, even at points where storytellers have not yet done with their story. Thus, it is not so much that once a conversational story is told, with a more or less clear stance becoming obvious in its course, that the recipients are able to offer the ‘right’ kind of understanding or appreciation of the story; they may display uncertainty about its import or upshot, and wish to involve the storyteller in the assessment activity. On the other hand, the storytellers themselves may wish to guide the kind of understanding that their story receives
and do not simply let the recipient’s initial assessment pass. It is also important to establish at least a working consensus of the kind of stance that is being jointly constructed (cf. Lenore’s question *Is she vicious or dense* and Lenore’s reply *She’s a dope*), i.e. participants display an orientation towards reaching a common understanding and a shared-enough stance (for the actual linguistic design of such turns see section 5). And finally, such activities have to be brought to completion somehow before relevant next actions can follow.

The next example shows some similar stance negotiation patterns. Sharon has recently been hired as a teacher in a bilingual (Spanish-English) classroom in Houston. She has just told Carolyn and Kathy, her sisters, about her generally very negative experiences: despite frequent attempts, she has been unsuccessful in securing a free lunch ticket for one of her pupils, because the school bureaucracy prevents her from finding out whether the girl’s application form has been filed in the first place. The story is in effect an example of troubles talk (Jefferson and Lee 1981), and in answer to yet another piece of advice from Kathy (*You gotta go in and talk to the principal about this.*) Sharon finally presents the situation as a case of ‘raging bureaucracy’ that she has no way of tackling.

Example 4 (Raging Bureaucracy at 7 min 52 sec):

```
1  SHARON: What kind of fucking @law [2is tha=t2].
2  KATHY:  [2@@@@@@@@]
3  SHARON: (H) that you're gonna tell me=,
4  that,
5  you know,
6  this kid [might have] to wait,
7  CAROLYN: [(H)]
8  SHARON: another month and a half,
9  to c- have any lunch,
10  (H) Because you can't access,
11  .. you know,
12  .. her fo=rm?
13  CAROLYN: ... (TSK)
14  SHARON: <P What's the deal=, P>
15  CAROLYN: [(H) They're just 'giving --
16  KATHY: [Unbelievable].
17  CAROLYN: I 'think],
18  it 'sounds,
19  like,
20  to 'me,
21  they're 'giving you a lot of ^sh=it for no ^@reason.
22  SHARON: (H) .. 'Well they 'really are 'picking on the 'fact that I'm 'new,
23  like,
24  .. y- --
25  uh,
26  [It's really ^annoying].
27  CAROLYN: [The 'fact that you're ^new],
28  'uh=,
```
Throughout the story Sharon had presented herself as a rather active agent. Carolyn makes a concluding assessment on lines 15–21: (H) they're just giving - - I think, it sounds, like, to me, they're giving you a lot of sh=it for no ^reason., which presents her sister somewhat as a victim of some unwarranted acts of ill will on the part of the school personnel. However, her laugh token on @reason can be interpreted in different ways: it can be heard as projecting that there is more to it and that Carolyn probably has a certain reason mind, but also that she does not have a clear idea at this point of a reason and that she is a little embarrassed by her formulation (which in effect excludes all reasons). Sharon then offers a second assessment which is not in full alignment: to her these are not unprovoked acts but can be accounted for by the fact that she is a new teacher at the school. Now Carolyn in turn disaligns with Sharon's assessment by repeating what to her is the problematic part in it, The fact that you're new., and by adding two distinctive 'uh=',... 'uh=', tokens which strongly project that she is not going to accept being new as an adequate reason and that some third accounting factor will follow. But she only ends up hinting at what it could be by saying 'I would go further than that. This prompts Sharon herself to immediately offer 'the real reason': I'm not certified. Carolyn accepts this with an emphatic ^Yeah, and some laughter (lines 36–37).

It is significant that the two participants jointly came to the conclusion that the underlying reason for Sharon's maltreatment is the fact that she is not a qualified teacher. This had not emerged from Sharon's troubles sequence in any way, however, nor was it explicit in Carolyn's first assessment in lines 15–21. It emerged in the course of the joint stance-taking sequence that the participants were engaged in. Story reception is thus not a straightforward and simple issue for participants, but they may work out together an understanding of the gist or upshot of the story.

While Sharon now continues to further relate her negative experiences at the school, now specifically to Kathy or Coop, Carolyn can be heard to say an=d,
The full significance of this unfinished utterance cannot be deciphered with certainty, but at least one interpretation is that Carolyn was going to convey that it is indeed not possible for a non-certified teacher to take an aggressive role in the face of an injustice. Notice that in lines 1–14 Sharon had just presented her aggressive reaction to the school official who had been uncooperative with the little girl’s form. Yet it is unclear whether that is what Sharon had actually said to the official, or whether she had just thought so – in other words, whether we have Sharon’s direct reported speech or only her reported thoughts or the reaction that she would have liked to present but did not. But Carolyn appears to have interpreted Sharon’s words as only her inner (non-verbalized) reaction, in which case we can see her as showing understanding towards Sharon in lines 40 and 42. In all, she has now led Sharon to the heart of the matter, to recognize that the problem lies not in being a new but a non-certified teacher, and therefore in a situation with less power over her working conditions. The two co-participants have reached a mutual stance towards this issue.

The conversation between the three sisters shows in some detail how the social values concerning the education of immigrant children, a group with very little power in society, are played out locally (Schegloff 1996:171). Earlier in the interaction, Sharon had expressed as her view that many of the poor and uneducated parents, who have migrated from South or Central America, are uninterested in the education of their children, too lazy to come and fill out the forms so that their children can have free lunches, and only wait for the children to start manual labor as soon as possible. This has been challenged by her sisters. In the extract above the focus shifts towards Sharon as the unempowered member of the school community. On this it is possible for at least Carolyn and Sharon to reach an understanding (Kathy may have to be persuaded yet, and Sharon indeed directs her subsequent speech to her in line 41).

In the next example, finally, we can see that stance taking can be an interactional activity to the point that a co-participant can provide the stance for the first speaker, or engage in collaborative production with him/her (cf. Lerner 1991, 1996, Szczepk 2000a, 2000b). Alice has just complained to her sister Mary about the problems involved in sharing a house with their younger brother Tim and his wife Mandy. She has expressed her opinion that if something is bothering a person, s/he should go and do something about it. To illustrate this, she tells Mary about her recent experience: she had been asked to teach math classes in a school where she normally works as a tutor, and upon agreeing to do so she had asked for a pay raise.

Example 5 (A Tree’s Life at 3 min 53 sec):

1 ALICE: But I went and I asked.
2 ...(1.5) Now if i--
3 You know if you .. put a situation like that to Tim or Mandy,
4 ...(1.0) cause not because they're ...(1.5) they're weak in character
5 or anything,
Alice herself provides the upshot of her story in lines 2-6 as none is forthcoming from Mary (note the 1.5-second pause on line 2). She has trouble finding an apt evaluative term to finish off her assessment (something in the same semantic field with ‘weak in character’), and Mary completes the turn for her: They’re babies. Such a collaborative production is a powerful interactional resource for not only agreeing with a previous speaker’s assessment, but actually displaying such agreement (cf. Szczepanek 2000b). The stance that is displayed by Mary is immediately accepted by Alice (.. Yeah.). There does not appear to be any need for similar stance negotiation as we have seen in examples 3 and 4. Yet, Alice does not simply accept babies as an adequate description of Tim and Mandy, but displays her understanding of what ‘being a baby’ means for her, that such people do not show self-initiative. Notice that she even asks Mary to align with this rephrasing (.. You know(H)?) and Mary indeed does so (..(1.0) Yeah=.).

Again, we can see the participants rather carefully negotiating the stance that they are constructing together, namely whether they have similar understanding of what ‘being a baby’ means and whether this applies to the referents in question. As it happens, ‘being a baby’ may at first blush be heard as somewhat synonymous with ‘being weak in character’, and this similarity in semantic meaning may explain the need to overtly establish how the two attributes differ. Simultaneously, the co-participants are negotiating a deeper social norm, that people should fend for themselves and take on an active role in life.

5. LINGUISTIC PRACTICES OF STANCE TAKING. In this section I will highlight some linguistic practices that participants in interaction resort to when jointly taking positions and negotiating stances. I will present two of the above stance negotiations in diagrammatic form, by mapping the relevant intonation units produced by different speakers onto each other (roughly) according to syntactic structure (cf. diagraphs within the theory of dialogic syntax in Du Bois 2001). Such representation makes visible the pervasiveness of (at least) two frequent dialogic practices of stance taking, namely initial framing of stance in individual speakers’ contributions, and the high degree of parallelism at various levels of linguistic structure across speakers and speaking turns.
Diagrap of example 4 (Raging Bureaucracy):

C: They’re just giving—
   *I think,*
   *it sounds,*
   *like,*
   *to me,*
   *they’re giving you a lot of shit for no reason.*
S: ‘Well they’re picking on the fact that I’m new,
C: ‘I would go *further than* that.
S: ‘I’m not certified.

As can be seen from this diagraph, and for which evidence can be found in many recent studies (Biber et al. 1999, Anward 2000, Thompson 2002, Kärkkäinen to appear), stances tend to be *framed initially*, i.e. before the actual issue or question at hand, which is expressed later in the turn. For example, Carolyn in the above example ends up aligning several epistemic stance markers as separate intonation units, *I think, it sounds, like,* and *to me,* and the actual assessment is pushed until later in the turn. Their abundance and separate encoding here is due to the self-repair that Carolyn is engaged in, because she had initially overlapped with Kathy (on line 16 in example 4 above). It is much more usual for especially epistemic stance markers to pattern intonation-unit initially (Kärkkäinen to appear). Initial framing in itself can be seen as interacionally motivated: establishing stance *before* the upcoming utterance helps recipients to align themselves to what is coming.

As was stated above, emphasis in much linguistic research has indeed been on these initial and more established stance markers, but there is a lot of regularity to be observed in the patterns of stance taking beyond that. Notably, in conversational interaction one speaker often constructs a stance based partly on the immediately co-present stance of a dialogic partner: ‘Words and structures and other linguistic resources invoked by the first speaker are reused by the second, whether the second speaker’s stance is parallel, opposed, or simply orthogonal to the first’s.’ (Du Bois 2000b). This may result in considerable structural parallelism in language as manifested in the repetition of words, phrases, syntactic structures, or prosodic patterns (Du Bois 2001, cf. also Tannen 1989). A quick glance at the above diagraph reveals that this is indeed the case. Even though in their first turns Carolyn and Sharon take slightly different positions and focus on slightly different issues, being harassed for no apparent reason vs. for being a new teacher, their utterances *resonate* both syntactically and lexically (Du Bois 2001). The clauses *they are giving you a lot of shit* and *they really are picking on X* have parallel syntactic structure: they have the same subject pronouns, the verbs are in the present perfect tense, and both predicates contain an intensifier. The two utterances also resonate semantically, as the predicate verbs are synonymous. The differentiation of stances comes at the level of the adverbial clause, *for no reason,* vs. object of the verb, *the fact that I’m new.*
What is more, Carolyn's second disaligning turn is directly built on the structure and meaning conveyed in Sharon's previous turn, by extracting a syntactic segment, the object *The fact that you're new*, out of it. We might in fact ask if Carolyn's choice to make a first-person statement instead of a second-person one (e.g. saying directly *You're not certified.*) is a 'conscious' choice on her part to enable Sharon herself to produce the real reason. Sharon indeed produces it by similarly using a first-person statement. Now Bybee and Hopper (2001:7) make the observation:

Most utterances are evaluative in the sense of either expressing a judgment or presenting the world from the perspective of the self or on [sic] interlocutor.

This claim is clearly substantiated in the studies of Thompson and Hopper (2001) and Scheibman (2001). Thompson and Hopper (2001:25) found that in American English conversation the speakers do not talk much about events or actions, but rather display their identities, express feelings and attitudes, and check their views of the world with their community-mates. The authors found that the favorite grammatical constructions in conversational English are in fact intransitive verbal clauses (*I forgot*), copular clauses (*it was confidential*) and epistemic/evidential clauses (*I don't think it's workable*). Scheibman's study (2001: 86) also shows that most common in interactive American English discourse are 'those subject-predicate combinations that permit speakers to personalize their contributions, index attitude and situation, evaluate, and negotiate empathetically with other participants'. In the light of these findings, then, it is not surprising that such material resonates across speakers as well.

We can also make some rather tentative observations of the prosodic features that resonate across speakers. The way that the two noun phrases *the fact that I'm new*, and *The fact that you're new*, are produced is almost identical in terms of stress and final intonation contour (continuing intonation). The same goes for the next two utterances or the I-statements in *'I would go 'further than that.* and *'I'm not 'certified.*

Let us then move on to the diagraph made of example 3.

Diagraph of example 3 (Cuz):

L: *'Maybe* she 's just kind of 'dense.
A: *'Well* she 'wants everything on her own 'terms.
L: *'is she* 'wants 'vicious or 'dense.
A: *'She 's a 'dope.
L: *<@ Explains* 'that @>.
A: *<@ 'Exactly @>.

In this diagraph we can again see repetition across speakers of the syntactic frame, *she is X or is she X*. Also the semantic meanings in *dense* and
dope resonate, even though, as we saw above, the very choice of a dope instead of dense by Alina has the effect of differentiating her stance from Lenore's. Indeed, Du Bois (1999) draws attention to the fact that salient departures from identical repetition may entail a pragmatic differential, or an implicit differentiation between pragmatic stances across speakers.

What is also striking in the above example is the degree of phonological recycling and sound similarities involved in the choice of lexical items: dense and dope are not just similar semantically, but they also show alliteration and contain the same number of syllables (even though they represent different parts of speech); the same holds for Explains that and Exactly. Anward (2000) has pointed out that speakers may cling onto each other's phonological sound material and resort to prosodic recycling and matching of sounds in their turn design. In addition, we have seen that laughter as a non-verbal device is used almost symmetrically by the two speakers here. These non-verbal and prosodic cues may be argued to contribute to an opposite effect, towards a convergent stance, than the choice of different lexical items (dense and dope) by the speakers per se.

6. CONCLUSION. In this paper I have shown that stance taking is essentially an interactive activity. A careful analysis of the interaction between participants in one type of activity environment, recurrent upon story completion, reveals that stance taking is an interactive activity engaged in by co-participants in conversation, rather than an isolated mental activity of an individual speaker. When making a concluding assessment of the preceding story, speakers display an orientation towards involving recipients in the assessment activity, and recipients generally join in to negotiate a shared stance towards, and an understanding of, the story or some aspect of the story. But such joint stance taking is not only a form of participation in the reception of a story, it is often simultaneously a negotiation of some underlying social norm or value implicit in the story. Because assessments and evaluations involve taking up a position, and assessor can be held responsible for the positions they state (Goodwin and Goodwin 1992), participants in interaction want to make sure that the stances they advocate, and the understandings that they jointly reach, are such that they can be accountable for them. It is therefore understandable that at least a working agreement is often negotiated before the topic is closed.

Once stance is approached as something jointly oriented to by the co-participants, we can hope to observe linguistic patterns of stance taking that go beyond individual grammatical or lexical devices. As was seen above, patterns become obvious that show a resonance between contributions by different speakers, such as resonance of syntactic structures and semantic meanings. Such patterns have not been examined in any detail in linguistics so far, simply because they cannot be observed without attention to a larger context.
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Appendix 1: SYMBOLS USED IN TRANSCRIPTION
(From Du Bois et al. 1993)

UNITS
Intonation unit {carriage return}
Truncated intonation unit --
Truncated word -

TRANSITIONAL CONTINUITY
Final .
Continuing ,
Appeal (seeking a validating response from listener) ?

SPEAKERS
Speech overlap [ ]
(numbers inside brackets index overlaps)

ACCENT AND LENGTHENING
Primary accent (prominent pitch movement ^
carrying intonational meaning)
Secondary accent
Unaccented
Lengthening =

PAUSE
Long and medium ...
Short (brief break in speech rhythm) ..
Latching (0)

VOCAL NOISES
e.g. (TSK), (SNIFF), (YAWN), (DRINK)
Glottal stop %
Exhalation (Hx)
Inhalation (H)
Laughter (one pulse) @

QUALITY
Loudness
Forte: loud <F F>
Piano: soft <P P>

Pitch
Higher pitch level <HI HI>
Lowered pitch level <LO LO>
Parenthetical prosody <PAR PAR>

Tempo and rhythm
Allegro: rapid speech <A A>
Lento: slow speech <L L>
Arrhythmic: halting speech <ARH ARH>

Voice quality
Whispered <WH WH>
Breathy <BR BR>
Creaky <% %>
Crying <CRY CRY>

TRANSCRIBER’S PERSPECTIVE
Uncertain hearing <X X>
THE TALKING OBLIQUE: HUMAN REFERENTS IN OBLIQUE CASES IN FINNISH CONVERSATION

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1. INTRODUCTION. Given the widely observed and strongly supported features of prominence of human referents in discourse and grammar, namely that they are likely to be topical and agentive (Kuno 1976, Dixon 1979, Comrie 1978, Silverstein 1976, 1981) and that they are consequently likely to appear in core grammatical roles, especially as subjects (Du Bois 1987, Ashby and Bentivoglio 1993, Thompson 1997, Nakayama and Ichihashi-Nakayama 1994, Kärkkäinen 1996, Helasvuo 1997, 2001), this study sets out to investigate mentions of human referents in oblique case roles. Are human mentions equally distributed among all the oblique cases? What are their pragmatic and semantic characteristics? Do they take on the typical discourse profile of obliques in that they are likely to be new, unidentifiable and unlikely to be rementioned, or do they still get treated like other human referents in that they are identifiable, given and further tracked? What are the semantic features of NPs used for oblique mentions of humans in discourse?

The results of this study strongly confirm the centrality of human referents in grammar and discourse. Oblique human mentions in my data show features of syntactic prominence in that they are not equally distributed among all the oblique cases but instead cluster in only a few cases, namely those which occur in constructions with grammatical rather than local meaning. Further, human referents mentioned in oblique case roles are still pragmatically and semantically strongly human, in terms of being participants in speech events, in being identifiable, given, and further tracked, that is, continuous topics in discourse, and in being lexically specified as humans.

2. DATA. The data for this paper consist of spontaneous conversations in Finnish between co-workers, family members and friends. Some of the conversations were taped and transcribed by myself, while others come from corpora developed at the University of Turku and the University of Helsinki.

3. THE CATEGORY ‘OBLIQUE.’ As discussed by Nichols (1983), the term oblique was originally used to refer to those cases which were morphologically marked, in contrast to direct cases which bore no such marking, combined with the distinction between case marking due to verbal government (rection) vs. other marking not due to government. Nichols notes that out of these distinctions evolved the mainstream structuralist position that cases can be divided into two sets: core cases, which express more abstract (grammatical) relations, and oblique cases, which express more concrete (semantic, or local) relations.
However, this binary division turns out to be problematic when one considers that there may not be any fixed set of criteria for distinguishing between core and oblique NPs crosslinguistically (Thompson 1997). In addition, in languages of the world, oblique cases, like other locative elements, tend to develop more abstract, grammatical meanings (Heine et al. 1991), suggesting significant interaction on the diachronic dimension between the core and oblique categories. Finnish is a case in point: several oblique, originally locative cases have developed grammatical meanings, often retaining alongside their new functions their original local meanings (for a summary, see Helasvuo 1997, to appear).

Thompson (1997) offers a functionalist alternative to the structuralist position and suggests that, like many other key distinctions in language, the core-oblique distinction, seen as a distinction between types of grammatical roles rather than types of case marking, is non-discrete. She explores the motivations behind the distinction and suggests that it is based on information flow characteristics of referents in discourse. Acknowledging the semantic and cognitive motivations identified by others in the functional literature, she proposes that the distinction between core and oblique NP arguments can be explained by the fact that the cognitive parameters outlined by Croft (1991) and DeLancey (1984, 1985) are integrally related to the parameters independently required by an adequately rich theory of information flow. In particular, the ‘initiators’ and ‘endpoints’ of events are those that humans talk about the most and which they want their listeners to keep track of, or which are centrally involved in events, and are accordingly those to which the grammars of natural languages assign core grammatical roles. ... As, Ss, and Os can be predicted to show tendencies towards being Given, Identifiable, and Tracking, while OBLs can be predicted to be rarely Given, Identifiable, and Tracking.

In this paper, for purposes of coding, I have used both morphological and syntactic criteria to define the category ‘oblique.’ I have counted as obliques human mentions made in the genitive case, the internal locative cases (the inessive, elative and illative), the external locative cases (adessive, ablative and allative) as well as the general locative cases (essive and translative); that is, in cases other than the nominative, the accusative, and the partitive (although I did include those partitives which were complements of adpositions; only one of these occurred in the data). Thus left outside the category, and considered core

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1 The genitive is included here in the oblique category because complements of many complements of adpositions are genitive, as are adnominal possessors. Also in the genitive case are arguments of verbs of necessity and obligation; these have been called subjects by many analysts (Laitinen 1992). However, if we restrict the category of subject to prototypical ones, NPs which trigger agreement in the verb (as done in Helasvuo 1997, 2001), then genitives cannot be subjects. There were no abessive, instructive or comitative case mentions of humans in my data. The general local case mentions are rare as well: there was only one essive mention and two translatives.
arguments, are As, Ss and Os, as well as predicate nominals and complements of existentials.

Thus defined, the oblique human mentions in my data form a set of counterexamples to Thompson’s (1997) predictions discussed above, since they have the information flow characteristics of core arguments rather than those of typical obliques; however, on another level they also confirm Thompson’s findings, since they tend strongly to cluster in just those cases which occur in constructions with grammatical, rather than purely locative or semantic, functions and meanings. In this sense, these findings also lend support to the position that the distinction between core and oblique cases is not binary, but rather non-discrete, given the types of grammaticized constructions in which oblique human mentions occur.

4. CHARACTERISTICS OF OBLIQUE MENTIONS OF HUMAN REFERENTS. In this section I will discuss the properties of human mentions found in my data. I will first present an example to illustrate those properties in a general fashion. Then I will discuss the syntactic, pragmatic, and semantic properties of the human obliques.

Consider the following example, taken from a multi-party discussion. The participants, all women, work at the same pharmacy. The topic in this part of the conversation is a recent all-female party at the summer home of one of the participants.

(1)
JS: Mää istusi yhre lastentarhanopettajan ka,
   1SG sit-PST one-GEN kindergarten-GEN-teacher-GEN with
I was sitting with a kindergarten teacher,
   viärekkäin kuule ja,
next.to.RECIP listen-2sG.IMP and
   sit mää ,
then 1SG
   then I,
   koiti hänelleki sanoo et
try-PST 3SG-ALL-also say-1INF that
   tried to say to her also that
   jua sää vaan kato
drink-IMP 2SG PRTCL look-2SG.IMP
   you just go ahead and drink
   kyl sää sen kestäät minkä määki kestän.
yes 2SG 3SG-ACC tolerate-2SG REL-ACC 1SG-also tolerate-1SG
I’m sure you can take what I can take.
The two bolded oblique human mentions in this example illustrate well the common properties of such mentions in my data. They are made in the genitive and the allative, two of the three most frequently occurring cases in the data. Both are tracking mentions; the referent of hänelleki ‘to her also’ is both given and identifiable. The referent is also a participant in a reported speech act. The other oblique human mention in the example, yhre lastentarhanopettajan ‘a kindergarten teacher-GEN,’ although new, is followed by further mentions of the same referent. It is also lexically specified as a human mention.

4.1 CLUSTERING OF HUMAN MENTIONS IN ONLY A FEW CASES. As noted above, human mentions in my data are not equally distributed among all oblique cases. Instead, they cluster in the adessive, allative and genitive cases. NPs in these three cases make up 84% (175/208) of all human obliques in the data, while they made up only 42% of all oblique mentions in Helasvuo 1997, where all obliques mentions, human and non-human, were counted. Table 1 below compares the distribution of human mentions among oblique cases in these data to the distribution of all obliques (non-humans and humans) among different cases as reported in Helasvuo 1997.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Number of human NPs</th>
<th>%age in these data</th>
<th>In Helasvuo 1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adessive</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allative</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genitive</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elative</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inessive</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ablative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Distribution of human mentions across the oblique cases in my data cf. to the distribution of all types of referents (humans and non-humans) in the oblique cases in Helasvuo 1997.

Table 1 shows a much more even distribution of oblique mentions among the cases when all mentions, human and non-human alike, are counted, as done by Helasvuo (1997), compared to the clustering of the human mentions in certain cases. The clustering reflects grammaticized uses of the oblique cases in certain types of constructions. The largest number of mentions, 80/208, or 39%, were made in the adessive case. The adessive case has been grammaticized as the case of the possessor in possessive constructions in Finnish (Huumo 1996, Helasvuo 1997, 2001). Helasvuo notes the important role that human referents have played in this process, in which a locative NP in an existential construction was reanalyzed as a possessive; it is not difficult to see how the fact that the referent of the locative NP was human would lead to such an interpretation of the expression. Example (2) is an example of a possessive construction with an adessive.
The 'literal' or locative meaning of (2) might be 'On him was gray hair,' but the fact that the referent is human, apart from the formulaic nature of the expression, makes the interpretation of possession, that is, that the hair in question is the hair of the person mentioned in the adessive case, rather than some hair deposited on top of the person, the only one possible. The large majority of the adessives in the data, 66/80, or 83%, appeared in possessive constructions.

Allatives, which were half as frequent as adessives, and the third most frequently used case in the data, code the important thematic role of recipients, or benefactives, the endpoints of events in terms of Croft (1991). The range of verbs which appear in the data with allative human mentions is larger than with the adessives, but the verb *sanoa* 'say' is the most frequent one; it appears seven times in the data (see example (1) above). There are seven other speech act verbs, and two other verbs which imply the transfer of information, *opettaa* 'teach' and *osoittaa* 'show, demonstrate.' Thus humans as recipients of speech or information represent the largest category of allative mentions in the data at 40% (16/40).

The external, local case mentions of humans in my data outnumber the internal local case mentions of humans by more than five to one: there were 124 external local case (adessive, ablative, and allative) mentions, and only 22 internal local case (inessive, elative, and illative) mentions. As can be seen from Table 1, obliques in general are evenly distributed among the two types of local cases; in Helasvuö’s (1997) data, which included NPs with both human and non-human referents, 34% of the obliques were in external local cases and 35% were in internal local cases. Uneven distribution in these cases seems to be particular to human obliques only. Kotilainen (1999) had a similar finding in his study of human mentions made in the local cases in written Finnish. Kotilainen explores semantic features of the cases and suggests that humans mentioned in the external local cases are more agentive and in general have a more active and controlling role in events than humans mentioned in the internal local cases. For example, Kotilainen exemplifies this with two verbs, *syöttää* 'feed,' which takes an allative human recipient argument, and *pistää* 'poke (with a sharp object, such as a needle),' which takes an illative one. He points out that although both verbs may involve an event where something is inserted by someone else into another person's body, one has considerably more control over one's mouth than one's epidermis (1999:105), and suggests that this difference in control is reflected in the case distinction that the argument of each verb is expressed in. This contrast can also be demonstrated with speech act verbs. Consider the following two examples from my data.
Although the bolded human mentions in (3) and (4) are in separative ('from') cases, the recipient (addressee) argument of *kysy* 'ask' as in (3), is expressed in the ablative, an external local case, while the patient argument of *puhua* 'talk,' as in (4), is in the elative, an internal local case. An addressee is clearly more centrally involved and at least potentially more agentive than the person under discussion. While agentivity and control do not explain all contrasts involved in the use of internal and external local cases for human referents in Finnish, as Kotilainen notes (1999:106), nevertheless the clustering of human mentions in the external cases looks very interesting from this perspective, because it would indicate that even in the local cases, the distribution of human mentions would be motivated by agentivity and control.

The genitive is the second most frequently used case in the data after the adessive. There were 55 genitives, which can be divided into three groups: adnominal possessives, complements of adpositions, and arguments of verbs of obligation. In an interesting way, genitive NPs are neither core arguments nor very good obliques. The adnominal genitive has a clear semantic motivation of possession or other type of adjacency\(^2\), so genitives resemble obliques in this respect, but the case can be argued to be syntactically motivated by the relationship between two nominals which would govern the use of the genitive. Genitives without a head noun are problematic for this argument, however, unless one assumes the head has been ellipted. There were 19 adnominal genitives in my data.

The largest number of genitives, however, were complements of adpositions; the data contained 22 of these. Most of them, 16/22, or 73%, were complements of *kanssa* 'with.' These genitives had referents which were fairly centrally involved in events, since they functioned to introduce or remention a co-participant. The first bolded NP in (1) is an example. While complements of adpositions are clearly obliques, their case can be argued to be grammatically motivated as well, as it can be said to be governed by the adposition; see, however, Laury (1999), which argues for a semantic and pragmatic motivation for case assignment on complements of adpositions.

The third type of genitive in the data is different from the other two in that its case assignment has to do with its association with a type of verb. Genitive

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\(^2\) Susanna Cumming has pointed out to me that the semantic relation between the genitive and its head noun is rather complex, and should not be characterized as being prototypically related to possession. She is, of course, quite right.
arguments of verbs of obligation and necessity (also called necessitative verbs) have been considered subjects, and hence core arguments, by many Finnish grammarians (see Laitinen 1992). Laitinen identifies these genitives as an ergative pattern. In her spoken data from a number of Finnish dialects, the higher an NP is on the animacy hierarchy (Comrie 1981, Silverstein 1976, 1981), the more likely it is to appear in the genitive, while NPs low on the animacy hierarchy may appear in the nominative even with this class of verbs. Such divisions along the animacy hierarchy are typical of ergative split languages (Silverstein 1976). Perhaps the most intriguing part of Laitinen’s research are her findings concerning the role of personhood and speech event participancy in case assignment with necessitative verbs. She suggests that the genitive case in these constructions is an index of participancy in an earlier speech event which has relevancy for the present situation; what is at issue in the expression of modality is the fulfillment or lack of fulfillment of expectations expressed or at least created in the minds of speech participants at some earlier point (1999:263-269). This is especially evident for the verb *pitää* ‘be supposed to, should,’ which was by far the most frequent necessitative verb in my data; 11/14 of the verbs of necessity and obligation in my data were forms of *pitää*, and they occurred in either the past tense, conditional or past conditional, not in the present tense, which would indicate present obligation or necessity. See the next example, which illustrates the way the verb was used in my data. JS is describing travel plans made by a group of her friends which were changed due to inclement weather.

(5)

**JS**

*Ja heiän piti moottoril tulla*

and 3PL-GEN be.supposed.to-PST motor-ADE come.1INF

*sit sinne [meiä] uurel laituril [kokoo],*

then there 1PL-GEN new-ALL pier-ALL together

And they were supposed to come together by motorboat to our new pier,

**EK**

[Joo].

PRTCL

Yeah.

[2PRTCL]

Yeah

**JS**

*se oli iso kalastaja oike semmosen,*

3SG be-PST big fisherman really such-GEN

It was a big fishing [boat] really like,

*Kon ulkomerel me käyty,*

REL-be-3SG.PRES out.sea-ADE 1SG visit.PST.PPLE

That we’ve taken to the open sea,
**Ni semmosen kans piti tulla.**

so such-GEN with be.supposed.to-PST come.1INF

That's what [they] were supposed to come with.

**EK**

*Nii,*

PRTCL

That's right.

**JS**

*Mut sit ku rupes satamaa ni he,*

but then when begin-PST rain-3INF-ILL so 3PL

But then when it began to rain they,

*Tuli sit autojen kanssa vaa.*

Come-PST then car-PL-GEN with only

Just came by car.

The bolded mention of JS's friends in the first line of the example, *heiän* 'they-GEN' is a subject-like argument of the complex verbal *piti tulla* 'were supposed to come.' The modal *piti* expresses that the plans to come by boat had been made previously and had been communicated to JS, although, as explained by JS, they were unrealized. Here, the genitive case on the pronoun *heiän* functions as an index of the role that the friends had in the earlier speech act in which the plans were communicated. Laitinen's (1992) data show that human arguments in these constructions are very rarely nominative, and when they are, they do not express involvement in the earlier speech event in which the intentions were communicated or formed.

So far, we have seen that oblique mentions of human referents cluster in certain cases, namely those which occur in grammaticized constructions such as the possessive and necessitative construction, where do not express local or semantic meanings otherwise associated with the oblique cases. They also cluster in the external local cases which express greater agentivity and control than the internal local cases. In addition, we have seen that personhood and participancy in speech events has been a motivating factor in the grammaticization of the constructions where human mentions frequently occur. These facts show that there is no clear dividing line between the grammatical or 'core' cases and semantic or 'oblique' cases; rather, different cases are grammaticized to different degrees, and grammaticization occurs in particular constructions with a constant semantic and pragmatic import, which cannot be derived from the individual meanings of the lexical and grammatical morphemes involved.

The next section concerns speech act participancy of the oblique human mentions in my data.

### 4.2. Human Mentions in Oblique Roles as Speech Act Participants

More than half of the oblique human mentions in my data, 57% (119/208), referred to speech act participants either in the current speech situation or in a reported speech act.
Most of these, 81 in all, were mentions of participants in the current situation. Of these, 56 were mentions of speakers, 18 were mentions of the addressee(s), and seven were mentions of participants in the current situation who were neither speakers nor addressees for the particular utterance.

Most of the mentions of participants in the current speech situation were done with speech act pronouns. A typical example is the one below, where a group of men are discussing whether they wear, or even own, a wedding ring. Oblique mentions of speech act participants are bolded.

(6)
VM: Ai **sull** ei ole.
   PRTCL 2SG-ADE NEG be
   Oh you don’t have [one].

*Ilmanks.*
without-Q-CLTC
No wonder.

*Kuule* hei.
Listen-2SG.IMP PRTCL
Hey, listen.

**Ei oo ollu** mul- --
NEG be be-PST.PPLE 1SG-ADE
I haven’t had [one] --

MI: **Miull** ei **oo koskaa sit,**
   1SG-ADE NEG be ever 3sg-PRT
   I never have it,

   **s-**

   **raaskin[na]** pitää.]
   be.willing-PST.PPLE wear-1INF
   wanted to wear [it ](because it’s too precious)³

³ The syntactic complexities of this turn do not show up fully in the gloss. The first line by itself could be understood and glossed as a possessive construction: ‘I never have it on,’ but the second part of the turn shows that it is actually syntactic blend. The main verb in the last line is *raaskia,* one of a set of verbs which express different degrees and types of ability, possibility and willingness. This verb implies (un)willingness to do something despite the fact that (or because) someone or something might be hurt or damaged or otherwise negatively affected. However, it takes a nominative subject, and the first-person pronoun in the first line of the turn is in the allative. The past participle form of *raaskia,* however, relies on the negated form *ei oo* ‘haven’t,’ which is ambiguous between two interpretations as a copula in a possessive construction or an auxiliary to the past participle form *raaskinu.* Further, the pronoun *sit* at the end of the first line of the turn can be interpreted as either the possessed object in the possessive interpretation, or as the object of *pitää* ‘wear,’ but in the free gloss, the English word order does not allow it to be placed preverbally in the ‘wear’ interpretation.
Although mentions of speech act participants in the first and second person are probably the unmarked choice, and certainly the most frequent practice, such mentions can also be done with third-person forms. Two such mentions in the data referred to addressees. Consider the next example, which involves an interchange between a restaurant customer and a waitress. This excerpt comes from the same conversation as example (6) among a group of men having dinner in a restaurant banquet room.

(7)
VM: Mä huomaan että rouvalla on hyvin valitut
   1SG notice-1SG that madam-ADE be well choose-PASS.PST.PPLE-PL
   sanat täällä.
   word-PL here
   I notice m’lady chooses her words carefully here (lit. has well chosen words here).

TA: Kuinka niin?
   how so
   What do you mean?

VM uses a third person form, rouvalla ‘madam-ADE,’ to address the waitress; the waitress’s response confirms that she is indeed the addressee of the turn. This same word is used with names in a manner equivalent to the English term Mrs., but it can also be used independently to refer politely to a mature woman. Although the ages of the men are given on the transcript, the woman’s exact age is not; she is only characterized as ‘young.’ Given this, the excessively polite term customarily used for older women has a teasing undertone. The third person form is thus used here to achieve a particular type of contextual effect (see Laury 2002).

Third person forms can also be used for participants in the speech situation who are not addressees for the current turn. There were seven such mentions in the data. In the following excerpt from the restaurant conversation, one of the men is discussing future plans pertaining to himself and another participant.

(8)
UM: Me menniiiin Melaan kans syömää n.
   1PL go-PASS M-GEN with eat-3INF-ILL
   Mela and I are going to get something to eat (lit. We’re going to eat with Mela)

---

4 The concept of ‘addressee’ is a more complex and problematic one than is often acknowledged; see, for example, Goodwin (1984), Lerner (1996), and Seppänen (1998) for discussion. I am treating it here as the person or persons to whom an utterance is addressed in the sense that they could respond to it, or in fact do. At the same time, I fully realize the limits of such a definition.
The person referred to as Mela in the first line of the example is a participant in the conversation and has been taking regular turns. However, UM's announcement about his and Mela's plans has as its audience the other men, not Mela, who presumably already knows about the plans. Thus Mela is a 'non-addressed recipient' (Goodwin 1984) for UM's turn. The construction in which the oblique mention occurs is one which is frequently used in referring to knowing co-participants in interaction; the initial first person plural includes within its reference the speaker and the person mentioned as the complement of kanssa 'with' (Seppänen 1996), exclusive of any other participants or non-participants. In these constructions as well, then, like on arguments of necessitative verbs discussed in the previous section, genitive marking, this time in an adpositional complement, is associated with speech act participancy.

In addition to the mentions of participants in the current speech situation, there were also 38 additional mentions of participants in reported (past and future) speech acts. A fourth of these (10/38) involved a double role in both the current and reported speech act, as in the following example.

(9)

EK Hän sanos mulle et kuule,
3SG say-PST1SG-ALL that listen-2SG.IMP
She said to me listen

pyysi oike et et,
ask-PST really that that
Really asked me,

kui mää noin rumasti sul sanoinkaan.
how 1sg so ugly-ADV 2SG-ALL say-PST-2SG-CLTC
Why did I speak to you in such an ugly way

In this excerpt, EK is both the current speaker and the reported addressee of a past speech act. The first person form mulle 'to me' in the first line reflects her role in the current speech situation, but in the quote in the last line, the second person form sul 'to you,' which also refers to EK, reflects her role as the addressee of the reported speech act.

When speech act participancy and case are compared, an interesting pattern emerges. The oblique cases where human mentions cluster are also the cases where the largest proportion of NPs refer to speech act participants. Consider Table 2 below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Type</th>
<th>Total # of mentions</th>
<th>SAPs</th>
<th>% age of SAPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adessive</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allative</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genitive</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elative</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inessive</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ablative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Percentage of speech act participants in different cases

Almost three fourths of the adessives and allatives in my data refer to speech act participants, as do almost half of the genitives, while only a third of the elatives, none of the inessives, and none of the NPs in the other local cases (illative, essive, translative and partitive NPs) refer to speech act participants. Thus 73% of the NPs in the external local cases (91/124) refer to speech act participants, while only 31% (9/29) of the NPs in the internal and general local cases do. In other words, the NPs in local cases with grammaticized functions and with meanings that reflect a great degree of agentivity and control are more likely to refer to speech act participants than NPs in cases without such functions and meanings.

If the genitive category is taken apart, a similar picture emerges. 57% (8/14) of the genitive subjects of necessitative verbs referred to speech act participants in either the current speech situation or in a reported speech situation, while only 41% (9/22) of prepositional complements and 32% (6/19) of adnominal genitives did. Again, we see that oblique NPs in constructions with grammaticized functions are more likely to refer to speech act participants than other obliques.

4.3. INFORMATION FLOW FEATURES OF HUMAN OBLIQUES. The information flow features of human mentions in the oblique cases resemble those of core arguments rather than other obliques in that they are very likely to be identifiable, given and tracking.

Identifiable NPs are ones whose referent the speaker assumes the addressee can identify, while unidentifiable NPs are ones whose referent the speaker assumes the addressee cannot identify. The linguistic correlate of identifiability is definiteness: definite NPs are used for identifiable referents, and indefinite NPs for unidentifiable referents. Givenness, on the other hand, has to do with the addressee’s assumed state of consciousness rather than his state of knowledge: given referents are those which the speaker assumes the addressee is already conscious of, while new referents are ones the speaker assumes the addressee is not conscious of before they are mentioned. Given referents are

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5 My count is conservative. As mentioned above, the genitive marking on subject-like arguments of necessitative verbs is itself a marker of speech act participancy. However, it is a covert category. My count was based on overtly expressed or actual speech act participancy in the current or reported situation.
generally, though not always, expressed with pronouns and other minimal forms, while speakers mostly use full, lexical noun phrases to mention new referents. Tracking NPs are ones whose function it is to introduce and track referents in discourse; non-tracking NPs have other functions such as predication and classification. For more detailed discussions of categories of information flow, see Chafe (1976, 1987, 1994), Du Bois (1980), and Thompson (1997). In this paper, I have considered those NPs given whose referents were mentioned previously in the discourse, and I have considered those NPs tracking which were mentioned subsequently in the discourse. Thus my coding for these two information flow features was slightly different from Thompson’s (1997) study, but it was similar to the one used by Helasvuo (1997). Thus my results are also more comparable to Helasvuo’s results than they are to Thompson’s results.

Nearly all the oblique human NPs in the data had identifiable referents. Out of the 208, only eleven were unidentifiable to the addressee, and for another seven of the NPs, identifiability was not relevant because the NPs were non-referential. This means that 91% of the oblique human mentions in my data were identifiable. No clear pattern of distribution among the different cases emerged, except that 100% of the adessives had identifiable referents. Otherwise the unidentifiable mentions were evenly scattered among the cases. In this respect, the obliques in my data resemble the core arguments in Thompson’s (1997) study, in which 95% of the As, 90% of the Ss and 87% of the Os were identifiable, while only 58% of the obliques were.

The oblique human referents in my data are more likely to be given and tracking than referents of oblique NPs in general. While only 57% of all obliques in Helasvuo’s (1997) data were given, 78% (162/208) of the obliques in my data were. Out of the obliques in Thompson’s (1997) study, only 35% were given, while 89% of the NPs in the A role, and 65% of the NPs in the O and S roles were given. Thus the NPs in my data resemble the core arguments in Thompson’s data more than they resemble the obliques in either Thompson’s or Helasvuo’s study with respect to givenness. As can be seen in Table 3 below, the adessive, allative and ablative mentions were most likely to be given, followed by the elatives. Genitives and all the other oblique case mentions were slightly less likely to be given.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Given NPs</th>
<th>Total NPs</th>
<th>% of given NPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adessive</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allative</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genitive</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elative</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ablative</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Givenness
Regardless of case, the human obliques in my data are highly likely to be tracking mentions. 176 of the 208, or 85%, are tracking, while only 25% of all obliques in Helasvuo (1997) and 26% of the obliques in Thompson (1997) were. In Thompson's data, 98% of the As, 90% of the Ss and 83% of the Os served to track referents in discourse. These percentages are very similar to the percentages in my data. Table 4 below shows a breakdown of tracking NPs according to case. Genitives have the lowest proportion of tracking mentions, but even that figure, 73%, is far above the figure for tracking mentions for all obliques found in the other studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Tracking NPs</th>
<th>All NPs</th>
<th>%age of tracking NPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adessive</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allative</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genitives</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elatives</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ablative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Tracking mentions

In this section we have seen that human mentions in the oblique cases have discourse profiles very unlike those attributed to typical obliques in earlier studies. They tend strongly to be identifiable, given and further tracked in discourse, and thus resemble core arguments more than typical obliques.

4.4. LEXICAL FORM OF OBLIQUE MENTIONS OF HUMANS. References to humans made in oblique cases are coded in ways that mark them as specifically human; hence the forms used for mentions of human referents in these data cluster at the top of the animacy hierarchy (Silverstein 1976; Dixon 1979).

Most of the mentions of humans in my data are done with pronouns. There were 140 pronominal mentions, accounting for 67% of the total number of mentions. Of these, 134 were personal pronouns; in addition, there were 6 uses of other pronouns (such as demonstratives and indefinite pronouns). This can be connected to two other features observed in the data: most of the mentions of humans in my data were given, and more than half referred to speech act participants, as already discussed.

In fact, speech act pronouns dominate in the data. There were 69 first-person pronouns and 20 second person pronouns. In addition, out of the 48 third-

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6 The number of first- and second-person pronouns does not correspond in a direct way to the figures accounting for speech act participancy presented in the previous section. This is because first- and second-person pronouns do not necessarily refer to speakers in the current, or even reported speech situation. For example, the first-person plural pronoun me 'we' is sometimes used for large groups of people, and in the oblique cases, for places where they live. In the data, meillä 'we-ADE' was used in ways almost equivalent to 'in Finland'. Further, lexical nouns, as shown here, can also be used to refer to speech act participants.
person pronouns in the data, 23, almost half, were uses of *hän/he, which have traditionally been considered specifically human. However, more recent studies have shown that these are logophoric pronouns, used to refer to the speaker within (indirect) reported speech, as shown in the following example.

(10)  
EL  
Sitää Steffan koko aja selittiki et.
3SG-PRT S. whole time-ACC explain-PST-CLTC that
That’s what Steffan was saying the whole time,

<Q Hän on  vilpittömästi
3SG be-PRES sincerely
He is sincerely

kiitolen tästä syvästä luottamuksesta
grateful this-ELA deep-ELA confidence ELA
grateful for this deep confidence

jota hänelle on osoitettu. Q>
which-PRT 3sg-ALL be-PRES show-PASS-PST.PPLE
which has been shown toward him.

The bolded *hänelle ‘to him’ in the last line of the example, as well as the nominative form of the same pronoun in the second line, refer to Steffan, the purported speaker of the quote. Most Finnish dialects use this pronoun in just this way, to index speech act participancy (although some dialects, such as the dialect spoken in Turku where some of the data come from, use it more widely). If the 23 uses of *hän are included in speech act pronouns, then 112 of the oblique mentions of humans in my data, just over half (54%), were done with speech act pronouns.

Most lexical mentions of humans in oblique cases also specify them as humans. Of the 68 lexical mentions in these data, 30 were proper names and eleven were kinterms. Of the 27 remaining common nouns, eight were occupational titles and almost all of the rest were also ones which could only be used to refer to humans such as *lapsi ‘child’, *mies ‘man’, *muija ‘woman, old woman, wife’. Out of the common nouns, only five were nouns that could be used to refer to non-human referents, three of them uses of the noun *ryhmä ‘group’, one use of *ruotsalaiset ‘Swedes’ and *suomalaiset ‘Finns’.

Altogether 175 of the 208 oblique human mentions, then, were done with forms that could only be used to refer to humans. Placed on Silverstein’s (1976) animacy hierarchy, the forms used cluster at the left, more animate end of the scale, as can be seen below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st/2nd</th>
<th>3rd p.pro</th>
<th>&lt; p.pro</th>
<th>&lt; pn</th>
<th>&lt; kinterm</th>
<th>&lt; human cn</th>
<th>&lt; animate cn</th>
<th>&lt; inan. cn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Animacy hierarchy (Silverstein 1976) and forms used
5. CONCLUSION. This study of oblique human mentions in spoken discourse has revealed that such mentions cluster in only a few of the oblique cases, namely those that have grammaticized uses and those that are semantically associated with agency and control. In terms of their information flow features, human obliques resemble core arguments more than typical obliques in that they are predominantly identifiable, given, and tracking.

The results of the study confirm Thompson’s (1997) hypothesis that the core-oblique distinction is a continuum, not a binary division. Although the NPs studied here are clearly not core arguments, they appear mostly in constructions which have grammatical, and not semantic or local, meanings and functions. They also have the information flow features of core arguments. Thus, in terms of their grammatical and discourse characteristics, they have features of both oblique and core arguments.

We have also seen that speech act participancy is a central feature of human referents that are mentioned in the oblique roles. This is manifested on both the syntactic and the lexical level. Two constructions which involve oblique mentions of humans express participancy in speech events, namely the allative (allative human mentions tend strongly to be recipients of talk, that is, addressees in speech events) and the genitive arguments of necessitative verbs (the genitive marking is an index of participancy in an earlier speech act). In addition, the cases in which human oblique mentions were most likely to occur were also the most likely ones to code speech act participants. Finally, the majority of the oblique mentions of humans were made with speech act pronouns. Being a participant in communication with other humans is a central feature of humans in grammar and discourse.

REFERENCES


MANIPULATION OF ARGUMENT STRUCTURE: A CASE OF 'POSSESOR RAISING' IN NUUCHAÑULTH

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1. INTRODUCTION. This paper will examine the strategies of expressing possession in Nuuchahnulth, a Wakashan language spoken on the west coast of Vancouver Island, B.C., Canada. In this language possession of an entity is expressed with the possessive suffix -uk - ?a·k attached on the possessed nominal along with a suffix indicating the person of the possessor.

1. (1) ḫawituk·it paacjniʔatḥ.
   ḫawit -uk -it -Ø paːɕiːna -'atḥ
   chief -poss -PAST -3 Pachina -residing
   'the former chief of Pachina people' [CANOE 123]

2. (2) makışwasuk·intʔi
   mak* -u·w -'as -uk -int -Ø -ʔi· Johnmit
   trading -place, for -outdoors -poss -PAST -3 -DEF John -mit
   'John's store' [JA/GL.11]

3. (3) ḥismisukʔi
   ḥismis -uk -Ø -ʔi· muwač
   blood -poss -3 -DEF deer
   'deer blood' [WOLF 91]

The first- and second-person possessor forms also contain a subordinating mood suffix: the SUBORDINATE (SUB) mood for first person and the RELATIVE (REL) mood for the second person.

* This study is based on textual data, mostly narratives, collected from the Ahousaht and Tseshaht dialects. Field work activities where the Ahousaht data were collected were made possible by generous cooperation of native speaker consultants including the late George Louie, Caroline Little and Katie Frazer. The following abbreviations are used in this paper: CAUS = causative; COND = conditional; DEF = definite; DIM = diminutive; DIST = distributive; DUR = durative; FIN = finite; FUT = future; INC = inchoative; IND = indicative; INDF = indefinite; IMP = imperative; LOC = locative; MOM = momentaneous; MOMCAUSE = momentaneous causative; PL = plural; POSS = possessive; REL = relative; QUOT = quotative; SG = singular; SHIFT = perspective-shifting; SUB = subordinate.
What is interesting about the possessive construction in Nuuchahnulth is that, when a possessed entity occurs as a clausal argument, possession can be expressed in two different ways, either in the nominal argument as illustrated in the above examples, or in the predicate. For example, compare the following examples:

(8) **STRATEGY 1: POSSESSION EXPRESSED IN THE NOMINAL**

?aaphiiʔiš ʔuuʔcmaak̓̓s
ʔa:ʔi-ʔi:̆ʔ ʔuu:cm-a-ʔa·k -qs
kind -DUR-IND.3sg wife -POSS -SUB.1sg

PREDICATE NOMINAL
‘My wife is kind.’ [07-19-94=053]

(9) **STRATEGY 2: POSSESSION EXPRESSED IN THE PREDICATE**

?aaphiiʔaks ʔuuʔcma
ʔa:p -hi- -ʔa·k -s ʔuu:cm-a
kind -DUR-POSS -1sg wife

PREDICATE NOMINAL
‘My wife is kind.’ [07-19-94=052]

Both (8) and (9) can be translated as ‘my wife is kind.’ However, they show notable structural differences. In (8) possession of ‘my wife’ is expressed in the nominal argument itself with the possessive suffix -ʔa·k attached to the possessed ʔuuʔcma ‘wife’ along with a suffix indicating the person of the possessor, i.e. first
person singular. In (9), on the other hand, possession is expressed in the predicate: the possessive suffix is attached to the predicate, and the possessor is indicated by the subject pronominal suffix on the predicate. In this paper I examine the nature of this alternation and the factors that affect the choice of one strategy of expressing possession over the other.

2. The Nature of the Alternation. The alternation between the two possessive constructions is not simply a matter of physical positioning of the possessive suffix. Rather, these strategies differ fundamentally in terms of argument structure. This fact is evident from various grammatical differences that can be observed between the two constructions, including differences in terms of morphological markings, the form of the co-referential pronominal, interaction with the animacy hierarchy constraints, and the form of nominalization.

2.1. Morphological Markings. In Nuuchahnulth the main predicate typically takes suffixes that carry mood and person information. The form of the person suffix is controlled by the subject, as illustrated in the examples below.

(10) **haqqa’itwaʔiš**  
    haqqa’ -it -waʔiš  
    have.good.vision -PAST -QUOT.3  
    mink -son.of

‘Son of Mink had good vision.’ [MINK 9]

(11) **hawišiš.**  
    hawiš -siš  
    chief -IND.1sg

‘I am a chief.’ [ELICITED GL: 91.7.5-81]

When possession is expressed in the nominal argument, it is the possessed that controls the form of the subject pronominal suffix on the predicate and therefore serves as the grammatical subject.

(12) **POSSESSOR=1.SG; POSSESSED=3**  
    kʷaʔa[kayimχ]  
    DUP-kʷa -yimχ -Ø  
    naʔiʔsakitqs  
    -get.broken -on.the.shoulder -3  
    naʔiʔs -ʔaʔ -it -qs  
    -POSS -PAST -SUB.1sg

‘My late aunt broke the shoulder.’ [CL 302]
When possession is expressed in the predicate, on the other hand, it is the possessor that controls the form of the subject pronominal suffix.

(14) **POSSESSOR=2.SG; POSSESSED=3**

histaqsišišikucušišimtii
his -tqš -ši(š) -uk -šiš -šimti
there-come.from -MOM -POSS -IND.2pl name

'Your name came from that region.' [JA/GL.II 18]

(15) **POSSESSOR=1.PL; POSSESSED=3**

ṁawāa�xatuk*ina
ṁawa: -�� -at -uk -ina
hiyiq -tu-p
delivering -FIN -SHIFT -POSS -1pl various -thing

'He delivered our things.' [CL 237]

In this case the shape of the pronominal suffix suggests that the possessor, rather than the possessed, is a grammatical argument of the predicate. Thus, the argument structure associated with the predicate of this construction, as indicated by morphology, is different from that found in the construction where possession is indicated in the nominal.

2.2. **FORM OF THE PRONOUN.** The difference in configuration of grammatical arguments as identified with respect to the morphological indexing finds a parallelism in the form of a co-referential independent pronoun. When possession is expressed in the predicate (and therefore the possessor is morphologically indexed as the subject), an independent pronominal co-referential with the possessor is in the subject form, rather than the possessive form, as illustrated in (16). This suggests that the possessor serves as the subject rather than the modifier of the possessor.

(16) ƛḥūukuks siyā / *siyāas
ƛḥi -uk -uk -s siyā / siyāas
red -DUR-POSS -1sg i / mine

**PREDICATE** NOMINAL
'Mine is red.' [ELICITED CL: 98.3.12-16]
2.3. Interaction with the Animacy Hierarchy Constraints. Grammatical significance of the possessive alternation is evident in the way the constructions interact with the animacy hierarchy constraints. In Nuuchahnulth transitive predications, a participant relationship in which the participant low in animacy acts on the one high in animacy cannot be expressed directly: such a relationship has to be expressed through a construction which I call a PERSPECTIVE-SHIFTING construction. (See Nakayama 2001 for further details.) These constraints are summarized in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Configuration</th>
<th>Use of PERSPECTIVE-SHIFTING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTOR &gt; UNDERGOER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1, 2 &gt; 3</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 &gt; 1, 2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1, 2 &gt; 1, 2</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 &gt; 3’</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3’ &gt; 3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Pattern for use of the PERSPECTIVE-SHIFTING construction

In the PERSPECTIVE-SHIFTING construction, which is formed with the suffix -'at, the argument structure is modified in such a way that the high-animacy undergoer is the morphologically indexed subject.

(17) 1 plural (ACTOR) > 2 plural (UNDERGOER)
ha:<an?qniś si:hał.
ha:<an 2?q-niś si:hał
invite -FUT -1pl you.all
we.will.invite you.all

'We will invite you all.' [ELICITED 7.24.91-77]

(18) 3 singular (ACTOR) > 1 singular (UNDERGOER): PERSPECTIVE-SHIFTING
ha:<an'anits.
ha:<an -'at -it -s
invite -SHIFT -PAST -1sg
he.invited.me

'I was invited; He invited me.' [ELICITED 7.24.91-81]

When the clausal participant is possessed, whether the possessor or the possessed interacts with the constraint depends on the type of possessive construction. In other words, the possessive alternation involves a change in participant that counts as a grammatical argument in application of the animacy hierarchy. Consider examples (19) and (20). In both examples, the third-person actor is acting on the third-person undergoer, which is possessed by the first-
person. In (19) hiyiqtup ‘things’ is possessed by the first-person plural; in (20) ?u:šhyims ‘friends’ is possessed by the first-person singular.

(19) mawa'aKatuk'ina
    mawa: -'aK -'at -uk -ina
    delivering -FIN -SHIFT -POSS -1pl things
    PREDICATE NOMINAL
    ‘he brought our things’ [CL 236]

(20) ?u?uk'ink'iš
    DUP- ?u -k'ink -?iš
    she -converse.with -IND.3sg friend -POSS -SUB.1sg
    PREDICATE NOMINAL
    ‘She is talking with my friends.’ [ELICITED7.8.91-90]

In this participant configuration, the relationship between the actor (third-person) and the possessed (third-person) would not trigger the perspective-shifting construction, whereas the relationship between the actor (third-person) and the possessor (first-person) would. In (19), where possession is expressed in the predicate, the actual sentence is in the perspective-shifting construction. That is, when the possessor is a morphological subject (i.e. the subject pronominal suffix is co-referential with the possessor), it is the possessor that interacts with the animacy constraints, not the possessed. This is clearly in contrast with (20), where possession of the participant is expressed in the nominal and the sentence is not in the perspective-shifting construction. That is, when the possessed is a morphological subject (i.e. the subject pronominal suffix is co-referential with the possessed), the animacy constraint interacts with the animacy value of the possessed, not the possessor.

Examples (21) and (22) provide a further illustration. In (21), where the possessive suffix is attached on the predicate, the possessor interacts with the animacy hierarchy constraint and therefore triggers (since it is the case of third person acting on first) the perspective-shifting. In (22), on the other hand, the possessive suffix is on the nominal, and it is the possessed (third person) rather than the possessor that is ‘visible’ to the constraint: since the grammatically recognized argument configuration is second person acting on third, the perspective-shifting is not triggered.

(21) či?apa'takuts
    či: -'at -ap -'at -uk -s čičiči ta:kta?i.
    pull -off -CAUS -SHIFT-POSS -1sg tooth doctor -DEF
    ‘The doctor pulled out my tooth.’ [ELICITED GL 91.7.17-73]
(22) kiša:p?ick čapacuks.
kiš -sa-p -?ick čapac -uk -s
shatter -MOMCAUS -IND.2sg canoe -POSS -1sg
‘You cracked my canoe.’ [ELICITED GL: 91.8.19-46]

The fact that the animacy hierarchy constraint interacts with the two possessive constructions in different ways suggests that the two possessive constructions differ in which participant ‘counts’ as a grammatical argument. When possession is expressed on the predicate, it is the possessor that participates in the grammatical structuring as an argument; whereas, when possession is expressed on the nominal, it is the possessed.

2.4. SUBJECT NOMINALIZATION. Another grammatical phenomenon that can reveal the grammatical differences of the two possessive constructions is nominalization. In Nuuchahnulth a verbal expression can be turned into a nominal (referring expression) by attaching the DEFinitive suffix -?i. The referent of the nominalized form is the subject of the verbal expression.

(23) siqii?i
siq -i:i -?i-
cooked -make -DEF
‘one who cooks’ [CL 10] cf. siqii ‘he cooks’

(24) waiyaqii?i
wai -yaq -i:i -?i-
go.home -done -in.the.house -DEF
‘one who has gone home’ [WOLF 33] cf. waiyaqii ‘he has gone home’

(25) wi?ak?i
wi?ak -?i-
brave -DEF
‘one who is brave’ [KINGFISHER 11] cf. wi?ak ‘he is brave’

When a verbal expression with the possessive suffix is nominalized with the definite suffix -?i, the referent of the nominalized form is the possessor rather than the possessed. That is, it is the possessor that is chosen as the subject.

(26) qaḥšišuk?i iaña.
qaḥ -šiš -uk -?i -iña
die -MOM -POSS -DEF child
‘one whose child died’ [SAPIR #128: 434] cf. qaḥšiš ‘he died’
(27) ūćnaaksīluk?i  
ūć -na-k -śi(Ł) -uk -?i·  ĭtāna
wife -have -MOM -POSS -DEF child
‘one whose child got married’ [ELICITED CL: 98.3.12-23]
cf. ūćnaaksīl, ‘he got married’

Note that there is a potential ambiguity between nominalization of a possessed predicate discussed here and possession of a nominalized predicate as illustrated below:

(28) pawaśiłuk?i
pawat -śi(Ł) -uk -?i·
lose -MOM -POSS -DEF
‘their ones that got lost; ones that they lost’ (instead of: ‘ones whose things got lost’) [SNT #128-445]

(29) ūćnaaksīluk?i
ūć -na-k -śi(Ł) -uk -?i·  ĭtāna
wife -have -MOM -POSS -DEF child
‘one whose child got married’ [ELICITED CL: 98.3.12-23]

Superficially (28) and (29) appear to be the same construction, but semantic differences suggest that they have different internal structures. In the former, the expression refers to the possessor, while in the latter it is the possessed that is referred to by the expression. If we were to use the process metaphor, in nominalization of a possessed predicate, the predicate is possessed underlyingly and gets nominalized to produce the surface form. In possession of nominalized predicate, on the other hand, the predicate is not possessed underlyingly. It is nominalized first, and then gets possessed. Since the possessive is associated with the already nominalized word, it does not affect the choice of subject unlike where the possessive suffix is attached to the predicate to be nominalized.

**Predicate:** pawatiśi < pawat -śi(Ł) ‘it got lost’
- **Nominalize [Predicate]:** pawatiśi?i < pawat -śi(Ł) -?i· ‘one that got lost’
- **Possessive [Nominalize [Predicate]]:** pawatiśi?i < pawat -śi(Ł) -uk -?i· ‘their things that got lost’

**Predicate:** ūćnaaksī < ūć -na-k -śi(Ł) ‘he got married’
- **Possessive [Predicate]:** ūćnaaksī < ūć -na-k -śi(Ł) -uk ‘his [son] got married’
- **Nominalize [Possessive [Predicate]]:** ūćnaaksī < ūć -na-k -śi(Ł)-uk -?i· ‘one whose [son] got married’
The following are additional examples of possession of nominalized predicate:

(30) k*aqaq?i
k*a -q  -ak -?i.
sit -travel.in.. -POSS -DEF

‘his ones who were traveling in the canoe; his crew’ (instead of: ‘one whose people traveling in the canoe’) [SNT #129-89]

(31) hi-suhtak?i
hi - -(c)suhta -ak -?i.
LOC -come.from.woods -POSS -DEF

‘their [girl] who came from woods’ (instead of: ‘ones whose [girl] came out of woods’) [SNT #126-89A]

2.5. SUMMARY. These data show that the two strategies of marking possession of a participant are in essence different choices of a grammatical argument that participates in syntactic patterning: the possessed serves as a grammatical argument when possession is marked on the argument, whereas, when possession marking is on the predicate, it is the possessor that participates in various grammatical patterns.

3. DISTRIBUTION OF THE POSSESSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS. The choice of the different possessive constructions (i.e. the choice of a grammatical argument between the possessor and the possessed) is neither random nor interchangeable. There is skewing in usage according to the semantic and discourse characteristics of the possessor and the possessed.

3.1. HUMANNESS OF THE POSSESSED. One of the factors that seems to affect the choice of the possessive construction is whether the possessed is human or not. The possessed is much more likely to be chosen as a grammatical argument when the possessed is human, especially a kinsman (see examples 32 and 33 below), whereas the choice of the possessor is more likely when the possessed is inanimate (see 34).

?umk  -si  iu:cma-ak  ḥawii -?i.
awoke  -MOM  wife  -POSS  chief  -DEF

‘The chief’s wife woke up.’ [DEER&WOLF 49]
In the current database, there was no example in which a nonhuman possessor is chosen as a grammatical argument.

3.2. Degree of Agentivity of the Possessed in the Subject Position. Another factor that seems to affect the choice of the possessive construction is the degree of agentivity of the possessed. When a participant in the subject position is possessed, whether the possessor or the possessed is chosen as a grammatical argument depends on the degree of agentivity of the possessed. When the possessed represents a highly agentive ACTOR, it is the possessed that is most likely to serve as a direct argument of the predicate. For example in (35), the possessed ACTOR nani:qsakitqs ‘my late grandfather’ is highly agentive, being an instigator of a transitive action making. And it is the possessed that is encoded as a grammatical argument of the predicate.

(35) ?ah?aa:it ?uukii:t naniiqsakitqs
ah?aa: :it -it -s ?u -(k*)ii:t nani-qsu -?a-k -it -qs
then -FIN -PAST -3 it -make grandparent -POSS -PAST -SUB.1sg

------------ --- Predicate ---------- NOMINAL

mahiit akaxum
back.addition

‘Then my late grandfather made an addition at the back of the house.’
[CL 45]

(36) suk*i, hawi?uk xau:uk*i?ath.
suk*i -x hawi?uk -uk xau:uk*i?ath
take -3 chief -POSS Clayoquot

‘Clayoquot chief took him.’ [KINGFISHER 196]

In my current database, 12 out of 16 possessed expressions with a highly agentive role show the possessive marking on the nominal, i.e. the possessed serves as the grammatical argument.

On the other hand, when the possessed subject represents a participant that is low in agentivity, e.g. the experiencer or theme, it is often the possessor that serves as a direct argument of the predicate (43 out of 60).
(37) ħisšiʔats nica.
    ħis -šiƛ -ʔat -s nica
    bleed-MOM-POSS -1sg nose

    PREDICATE  NOMINAL

    ‘My nose is bleeding.’ [ELICITED GL: 91.7-17-58]

(38) witqwitqaʔaʔukʔiš
    REDDUP- witq -(y)a- -ʔiƛ -uk -ʔiš
    unfit -DUR -FIN -POSS -IND.3
    ħuqu:ma

    mask

    PREDICATE  NOMINAL

    ‘His masks are ugly.’ [JA/GL.II 45]

Similarly, in (39), the possessed ACTOR his child is low in agentivity. And again, it is possible to choose the possessor as an argument.

(39) ?ani iucnaaksiʔuk
    that woman-have.. -MOM -POSS -3
    tana.

    child

    PREDICATE  NOMINAL

    ‘... that his son had got a wife.’ [SAPIR #128-221]

3.3. AFFECTEDNESS OF THE POSSESSOR. The third semantic factor that seems to have some significance in the choice of a grammatical argument in a possessive expression is whether the possessor is affected by the state or event. The pattern is that the possessor can be expressed as a direct argument only if the possessor is somehow affected by the state or event described by the predicate. When the possessor is not affected by the state or event, on the other hand, the possessor cannot be expressed as a direct argument of the predicate. In (40) possession in the nominal ‘Bruce’s boat’ is expressed on the predicate, and therefore it is the possessor that is being chosen as an argument. Notice that the possessor, ‘Bruce’, was affected by the event that his boat had stopped working.

(40) ?uyaasɨʕatuk
    unusual -act.like -SHIFT -POSS -3
    muunaa Bruce.

    engine

    PREDICATE  NOMINAL

    ‘Bruce’s engine (the engine on the Bruce’s boat) stopped working.’

    [CL 233]

Compare this with (41). Here the possessor Clayoquot is an agent, but is not affected by the action. Structurally, it is the possessed that is serving as a grammatical argument, as can be evidenced in the fact that possession in ‘chief of Clayoquot’ is expressed in the nominal.
Examples (42) and (43) further illustrate this contrast. In (42) the undergoer 'fish knife' is possessed, and it is the possessor that is chosen as a grammatical argument. In (43), on the other hand, possession of the undergoer 'attire' is expressed in the nominal rather than in the predicate, indicating that it is the possessed that is serving as a grammatical argument.

(42) THE POSSESSOR (THE SPEAKER) IS AFFECTED

\[ ?\text{uuk}^{*}\text{ii}^\text{t} \text{a} \text{tuksa} \quad \text{naniqsakitsks}, \quad \text{čitaq}^{\prime} \text{is}. \]

\[ \text{it} \cdot \text{make} \cdot \text{SHIFT} \cdot \text{POSS} \cdot \text{1sg} \quad \text{grandparent} \cdot \text{POSS} \cdot \text{PAST} \cdot \text{SUB} \cdot \text{1sg} \quad \text{fish.knife} \cdot \text{DIM} \]

\[ \text{PREDICATE} \quad \text{NOMINAL} \]

‘My late grandfather made my small fish knife; My late grandfather made me a small fish knife.’ [CL 107]

(43) THE POSSESSOR (DOG) IS NOT AFFECTED

\[ \mu\text{uči}^{\prime} \text{in} \cdot \text{a} \text{ki} \]

\[ \text{čini} \cdot \text{hañahtu} \]

\[ \text{clothed} \cdot \text{costume} \cdot \text{POSS} \cdot \text{DEF} \quad \text{dog} \quad \text{naked} \cdot \text{MOM} \]

\[ \text{PREDICATE} \quad \text{NOMINAL} \]

‘He took off his dog attire.’ [DOG 35]

If we compare the possessive expressions in these examples in terms of affectedness of the possessor, we see the contrast parallel to what we saw in the previous set of examples. In (42) the possessor, the speaker herself, is the recipient of the fish knife, and therefore is affected by the whole event. In contrast, the possessor dog in (43) is in no way affected by the event. Here the possessor is associated with the possessed in a sort of attributive sense.

Thus, the possessor can be chosen over the possessed as a grammatical argument when the possessor is affected by the event or state, but it cannot when the possessor is not involved in and affected by the event or state.

2.4. DISCOURSE-BASED CHARACTERIZATION. As we have seen, we can give semantic characterizations of the pattern of use of the two possessive constructions in Nuuchahinulth. But the choice of the strategy of encoding possession of a participant is not a matter of semantic structure per se. Semantically comparable sentences can be expressed with different possessive
constructions. Compare examples (a) and (b) in the following pairs. In (a) the possessed is the grammatical argument, while in (b) the possessor is the grammatical argument.

(45)

(a) ?aaphii?iš  "uučmaakqs
   ?a:p-ji- -?i:š  "u:cm-?a·k -qs
   kind -DUR -IND.3sg wife -POSS -SUB.1sg
   ‘My wife is kind.’ [07-19-94=053]

(b) ?aaphii?aks  "uučma
   ?a:p-ji- -?a·k -s  "u:cm
   kind -DUR -POSS -1sg wife
   ‘My wife is kind.’ [07-19-94=052]

(46)

(a) suk*iλ  uyiyčak?i,
   suk*i(λ)  uyiy -ču·  -?a·k -?i·
   take medicine -inside.container -POSS -DEF
   ‘He took his medicine bottle.’ [MINK 158]

(b) suk*i?atuk  ?ux*a:pi  ?atu:mit
   suk*i(λ) -at -uk  ?ux*a:pi  ?atu: -mi-t
   take -SHIFT -POSS paddle beaver -son.of
   ‘He took the paddle from Son of Beaver.’ [MUWAACHMIT 041]

The choice of the possessive constructions, in fact, is based ultimately on dynamic discourse factors rather than static semantic factors. There is a very strong correlation between the choice of grammatical argument and the discourse salience of the possessor and the possessed: that is, the possessor is chosen as a grammatical argument when the possessor is more discourse-salient (in the sense that it is more likely to be tracked in discourse) than the possessed. Below I will show the correlation between ‘discourse-salience’ and the choice of possessive constructions in terms of discourse referentiality and topicality.

2.4.1. DISCOURSE REFERENTIALITY. The choice of possessive constructions seems to interact with discourse referentiality, i.e. whether the nominal expression is used referentially to introduce and track a discourse entity. In possessive expressions, the possessor is observed to be generally referential, while the possessed nominal is not necessarily referential. When the possessed nominal is non-referential, the possessor is chosen as a direct argument. Observe the possessive expression in example (47) below.
Here the speaker did not mention *patquk* ‘personal belongings’ to deploy an entity in discourse, but simply to supplement the meaning of the predicate *mawa*: ‘delivering’. Thus, *patquk* here is not being used referentially. Notice that it is the possessor (first person plural) that is serving as a grammatical argument. The same can be said for the possessed nominals *hiyiqtup* ‘things’ and *?ink* ‘fire’ in (48) and (49), respectively: neither of them is used referentially to introduce a new entity in discourse. And again, it is the possessor that is serving as the grammatical argument of the predicate.

(48)  

\[
\begin{array}{llllll}
?in & mawaa?atuk\text{\textasciitilde{}}ina & hiiq\text{\textasciitilde{}}up.
\end{array}
\]

Because delivering -FIN -SHIFT -POSS -1pl things

‘[He must have made it fine] because he delivered our things.’ [CL 237]

(49)  

\[
\begin{array}{llllllllll}
\end{array}
\]

None.present -POSS -PAST -QUOT.3 fire human long.ago at.that.time

‘Long ago, humans had no fire.’ [FIRSTFIRE 2]

**2.4.2. Topicality.** In addition to discourse referentiality, the factor of topicality, i.e., closeness to the center of the attention in a given context, seems to interact with selection of a possessive construction. Compare examples (50) and (51) below.

(50) \[ \text{TOPIC = I (THE SPEAKER HERSELF)} \]

\[
\begin{array}{llllll}
\text{hayuq?ich?a\text{\textasciitilde{}}its} & q\text{\textasciitilde{}}iyaak\text{\textasciitilde{}}is & q\text{\textasciitilde{}}shi\text{\textasciitilde{}} & ?um?iiqsu.
\end{array}
\]

I.was.ten.years.old when -POSS -INDF.1sg dead -MOM mother

‘I was ten years old when my mother died.’ [CL 17]
In (50) the speaker is talking about herself at the time of her mother’s death, and therefore the most salient participant is the speaker herself. Thus, when we consider the possessed participant ‘my mother’, the possessor is more discourse-salient than the possessed and is coded as a grammatical argument (the subject pronominal index of the predicate q'iyu ‘when’ is coreferential with the possessor). Example (51) occurs in a stretch where the speaker tells about her mother. Here, in contrast to (50), the possessed ‘mother’ is more discourse-salient than the possessor ‘I’, and it is the possessed that is chosen to serve as a grammatical argument (the third-person possessed controls the form of the pronominal suffix on the main predicate u:hwat ‘use ...’, i.e. Ø).

Examples (52) and (53) below illustrate the same contrast: (52) shows the case where the possessor is an argument, and (53) the case with the possessed as an argument.

(52) [DEER KILLED WOLF CHIEF 25-26]

a. suk'i?aixa,
suk'i(λ) -aixa

\[
\text{take}\quad -\text{FIN}
\]

took

\[
\text{took}
\]

?uca?apat

\[
\text{it}\quad -\text{go.to}\quad -\text{MOMCAUS}\quad -\text{SHIFT}
\]

brought.him

\[
\text{They took his little canoe and put across theirs and took him to where they were moving.}
\]

b. ?u:ci?ciixa

\[
\text{they.were.going.to}\quad -\text{REL.3}\quad -\text{PL}
\]

moving.to

\[
\text{move}\quad -\text{DUR}
\]

\[
\text{that.\ which-\ going.\ to}
\]

\[
\text{they.were.\ going.\ to}
\]

\[
\text{move}\quad -\text{DUR}
\]

\[
\text{moving.\ to}
\]

\[
\text{He (Son of Deer) became the slave of the (Wolf) Chief.}
\]

Notice that ka:kin ‘work canoe’ in (52a) is not topical: what is tracked as a topic in this segment is ‘Son of Deer’ and utterances are about what happened to him.
The meaning of the part in question is more like 'he got deprived of his canoe by them' rather than 'his canoe got carried away by them.' Thus, the possessor 'Son of Deer' is more topical than the possessed 'canoe', and the possessor is the subject of the predicate, as evidenced in the placement of the possessive suffix on the predicate.

Now observe the possessive expression in (53) below.

(53)

CONTEXT BEFORE:
Son of Deer made his own knives in preparation for a fight with a trickster. He was so proud of his knives that he was waving them around. Then a stranger came along.

"Well, let me look at these knives of yours," said the stranger.

CONTEXT AFTER:
Son of Deer gave his knives to the stranger, and the stranger took the knives. He (the stranger) started to examine the knives, turning them over and over again.

In this part of the story 'the knives' (the possessed), rather than 'Son of Deer' (the possessor), is at the center of the attention. The possessive suffix is attached on the nominal, instead of the predicate, and therefore it is the possessed či:maˈmɪṉhəχ̓ 'knives' that serves as an argument.

4. CONCLUSION. In this paper I have looked at two strategies in Nuuchahnulth for expressing possession of an entity in a sentence. The structural alternation has to do with different choices of a grammatical argument: that is, either the possessor or the possessed as an argument of the predicate. The observations made about the patterns of argument choice in possessive expressions are summarized in Table 2.
### Table 2: Patterns of expression of possession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanness of possessed</th>
<th>Possessed as the argument</th>
<th>Possessor as the argument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>possessed = human</td>
<td>possessed = nonhuman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agentivity of possessed</td>
<td>possessed = highly agentive</td>
<td>possessed = low in agentivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affectedness of possessor</td>
<td>possessor = unaffected</td>
<td>possessor = affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referentiality of possessed</td>
<td>possessed = referential</td>
<td>possessed = non-referential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topicality</td>
<td>possessed &gt; possessor</td>
<td>possessed &lt; possessor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I have identified five semantic-discourse factors in attempting to bring out the pattern of argument choice in possessive expressions in Nuuchahnulth. In fact, the correlations with respect to these factors can be considered part of a larger regularity based on dynamic discourse salience. Factors of humanness, agentivity and affectedness are known to contribute to the increase in discourse salience. Thus, the possessed is chosen as a grammatical argument when it is high in discourse salience, whereas the choice of possessor as a grammatical argument is available when the possessed is not discourse-salient. It should be noted that the regularity in the argument choice is flexible and context-dependent and that it represents a dynamic decision that the speaker needs to make on the basis of the configuration of information in a given context.

### REFERENCES


1. INTRODUCTION. One of the most curious aspects of language variation is the fact that there are some groups of speakers who, despite constant and copious amounts of acoustic evidence to the contrary, persist in their belief that they speak standard, "unaccented" American English. Several studies have shown, for instance, that speakers who reside in the cities most prominently involved in the Northern Cities Chain Shift (NCCS) (e.g., Detroit middle class whites) are just such a group (c.f. Preston 1989, Frazer 1993 (and the articles therein), Niedzielski and Preston 1999). These speakers, whose vowel systems diverge in myriad ways from what one might consider more standard vowel formant values of Peterson and Barney 1952, and who are surrounded by speakers whose vowels also diverge, often report their speech community is the one of the last bastions of Standard American English (SAE). A respondent from southeastern Michigan quoted in Niedzielski and Preston 1999 demonstrates this:

...I think what...K was talking about was the standard- if you have such a thing as called standard English other than textbook English, it would probably be the language that you're hearing right now. As you listen to the Midwestern. (99)

Several respondents in this same data set made similar statements, often offering opinions regarding national news anchors and television personalities, who use "Midwest voices" (98) or Midwestern English. The linguistic security of the Michigan speaker is thus illustrated.

There are two possible hypotheses about why Northern Cities speakers continue to report that their vowels and the vowels of their cohorts are standard: 1). the chain-shifted vowels of these regions are now considered to be standard, so that these vowel formant values have replaced earlier canonical vowel formant values as what standard speakers use; or, 2). Northern Cities speakers do not perceive (at some level) these chain-shifted formant values in the speech of their fellow speech community members (but must perceive them at another level, since these are the vowels that they produce).

Previous work, which I have reported on elsewhere, provided evidence for the second hypothesis (c.f. Niedzielski 1997, 1999a). In this paper, I present data that suggests that chain-shifted vowels may be becoming more salient to speakers from Detroit (and its immediate environs), but that they are still not salient in the
speech of those people that Detroiters feel belong to their speech community. I will also present an initial attempt at a model of speech perception that presents different perceptual levels to account for 1) the ability of Detroiters to perceive NCCS vowels in order to be able to produce them; 2) the inability to perceive these vowels if a speaker is thought to belong to a Detroiter's ingroup; and 3) the ability to perceive these vowels if a speaker is thought to not belong to a Detroiter's ingroup.

2. THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL FACTORS ON PERCEPTION. In the above-mentioned previous work, I summarize in detail the research that demonstrates that speech perception involves much more than the simple transformation of acoustic information into linguistic categories. Research shows that visual information plays an important part in speech perception (c.f. McGurk and MacDonald 1976), and phonemic categories in a speaker's language play an important role (c.f. the work on categorical perception: Beddor and Strange 1982, etc.; the work on vowel-space calibration: Ladefoged and Broadbent 1957, etc.; the work on vowel discrimination and dialect: Willis 1972, Janson 1986, etc.). In addition, social factors have been shown to influence speech perception. Strand and Johnson (1996) demonstrate that perceived gender has an effect on the perception of certain fricatives. They show that the presentation of a male versus female photograph as the producer of an utterance effects what fricatives subjects perceive, and suggest that speaker normalization (and thus speech perception) is "based on the perceived [gender] identity of the speaker" (25).

My research on perceived nationality in Detroit (Niedzielski 1997) provided evidence for the effect that an a priori category could have on the reported perception of vowel tokens a speaker's speech: the labels "Michigan" and "Canadian," when applied to a sample of recorded speech, had an effect on which synthesized vowel tokens subjects offered as a best match to the speaker's speech. Subsequent research (Niedzielski 1999b) on the categories of 'real speech' or 'synthesized speech' seemed to have an effect on subjects' perceptions of certain fast speech phenomena, since subjects reported noticing such phenomena in recorded speech that they thought was synthesized, but not in speech that they thought was human.

Taken together, these studies demonstrate that several factors, including perceived identity of a speaker, effect the perception of speech, and have the potential to override acoustic information in the processing of a speech signal. They also offer the first piece to the puzzle of how speakers can use supposedly contradictory information about speakers in their own speech community to construct a "standard speaker" identity.

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1 that is, the group of people who, like them, use SAE
3. DETROITERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF SAE REGIONS. There has been ample research showing that white middle class residents of southeastern Michigan believe that they are at ground-zero for standard American English usage: The respondent who was quoted in section 1 above (from Niedzielski and Preston 1999) exemplifies the typical viewpoint of these residents – that their English represents the standard for American English. Additional research demonstrating such language attitudes of Michiganders is presented in, for example, Preston 1987 (which includes hand-drawn maps of subjects showing that Michigan, and only Michigan, receives their highest “correctness” ranking), and Niedzielski 1997 (which includes data showing that 28 out of 30 respondents offered Michigan as an example of where Standard English was found, with Great Britain being the only the location suggested).

Recent language attitudes work which I conducted in the summer of 2000 suggests, however, that such speakers may be becoming more aware of non-standard features in the speech of people who, though still perceived as outgroup members, reside in an increasingly closer area to themselves. For this research, I conducted a written survey of 30 residents of southeastern Michigan, in which I asked questions regarding specific areas close to Detroit, and whether their language varieties differed from their own. I asked them whether or not they would expect to hear dialect differences in speakers from states surrounding Michigan, and to provide specifics about those differences. I included specific questions about Wisconsin and Minnesota, and again asked for specifics.

Results of this study seemed to suggest that these residents are beginning to feel that speakers of non-standard varieties of English are creeping closer and closer. While seven out the 30 respondents stated that there were no differences in the dialects of speakers from surrounding states (most often noting that these states were “accentless” or that there was no accent in the Midwest), 23 out of the 30 stated that there was a definite difference the speech of speakers from the states surrounding Michigan:

-- nine out of these 23 respondents listed Ohio,
-- nine listed Wisconsin,
-- nine listed Minnesota;
-- three listed Illinois (specifically, Chicago);
-- two listed Indiana

Additionally, eight respondents mentioned Canada, and three of these mentioned Windsor, Ontario specifically.

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2 specifically, from the cities of Ann Arbor South Lyon, and several Detroit-area suburbs
3 several respondents listed more than one location
4 Windsor is directly across the Detroit River from downtown Detroit; one crosses this international boundary via the Windsor tunnel under the river, or the Ambassador Bridge over it.
Even more compelling is the fact that even though several questions asked for information about specific states, 14 out of the 23 respondents who noted dialect differences offered some part of Michigan as example of such an area, with 12 mentioning the Upper Peninsula, and the remaining two noting that they expected differences in speakers from the northern part of the lower peninsula (specifically in Houghton Lake and “rural towns north of here [Ann Arbor]”.

Specific features that respondents offer as examples of differences (with features that correspond to those offered in an earlier language attitudes study [Niedzielski 1996] bolded) include:

-- the use of the discourse marker ‘eh’ (for the Upper Peninsula and Canada)
-- the use of /d/ for /Ø/
-- a marked production of /æ/ (which several respondents illustrated by stating “the vowel in ‘dad’” or “the pronunciation of ‘bag’”)
-- a marked production of /o/ (most often illustrated by noting “the ‘o’ in ‘Minnesota’”)
-- a marked production of /s/ 5
-- the use of ‘ya’ for ‘you’
-- the use of ‘soda’ for ‘pop’

In addition, respondents offered subjective differences that included descriptions such as “relaxed,” “lazy,” “hockey voice,” “drawn-out vowels,” “Scandanavian-sounding,” as well as several statements such as “the letters are not pronounced properly,” “words are over-pronounced” and “the grammar is bad/poor.”

Several respondents also noted that the proximity of Minnesota and the Upper Peninsula to Canada led to speakers from those areas sounding Canadian (apparently ignoring the fact that only the Detroit River separates Detroiters from Canadians).

The attitudes survey results presented here seem to suggest, then, that it is not that case that most speakers from southeastern Michigan believe that all Midwesterners (or even all Michiganders) speak SAE -- most of the features that they offer as examples are clearly, for them, non-standard. Rather, this suggests that these residents believe that they are barely keeping the SAE walls from collapsing in, and that non-standard dialects are rapidly closing in on them. The number of people who comprise their ingroup of SAE speakers is relatively small, and the outgroup members numerous.

While it is impossible to state exactly what features the subjective comments refer to, descriptions of the more specific features suggest that at least

5 the respondent merely listed “the letter s” as illustrative of differences found in Minnesota
some of them are found in the respondents’ own dialect. For instance, the three phonological illustrations -- /æ/ -fronting (mentioned by five respondents as characteristic of Minnesota/Wisconsin speech), /o/-monophthongization (mentioned by four respondents as characteristic of Minnesota speech), and /ð/-stopping (mentioned by two respondents as characteristic of Minnesota and Upper Peninsula speech) -- are all commonly found in Detroiters’ varieties. In a quick acoustic analysis of one southeastern male Michigander’s and one male Minnesotan’s speech, I found that both speakers used /d/ in words like ‘there’ and ‘then,’ both speakers consistently produced /æ/ with an F2 of about 2250 Hz (considerably higher than the F2 Peterson and Barney value of 1750 Hz for this same vowel produced by a male speaker), and both speakers produced /o/ without an off-glide. Thus, at least some of the features that these Detroiters mentioned are likely found in their own dialects.

This suggests a second piece of our puzzle: though these speakers do not notice non-standard features in speakers from their ingroup, they do notice them in speakers from areas close to them. They do not filter out acoustic information from all Midwestern speakers – only those who belong to their own perceived speech community, which is presumably shrinking. In other words, they notice NCCS “non-standard” features, but not among members that they assign to their ingroup.

4. A PROPOSED MODEL OF THE PERCEPTION/PRODUCTION LINK. Two features that none of the respondents mentioned (and that none of the respondents in Niedzielski 1996 mention) are features that were in fact different in the Michigander’s and Minnesotan’s speech. In the quick acoustic analysis mentioned above, I found several examples of words that illustrated an o/a merger in the Minnesotan’s speech, and not in the Michigander’s speech, and several examples of /e/ produced with no off-glide in the Minnesotan’s speech, but with an off-glide in the Michigander’s speech. While it is impossible state that Michiganders do not notice these features (they may have simply not listed them on the survey forms or in the interviews), it is tempting to suggest that these features are at least not as salient to Detroiters as those that were reported in these two language attitudes surveys.

I therefore hypothesize here that the fact that Detroiters report the use (in others’ dialects) of the features they produce themselves, but do not report the features that they do not produce, is significant. In other words, the fact that these features are produced by these Michigan speakers is a key to why these features

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6 This study will include many more residents from both places in the non-“working paper” presentation of this research

7 ibid.
are perceived, at least in others’ dialects, and conversely, this may partially explain why speakers do not “perceive,” yet are able to produce, certain phonological features.

Young children acquiring the dialect of their speech community must be able to perceive the features of that dialect – there would be no other way for them to reproduce these features. At this particular developmental stage, there may be a closer match between what a person perceives, what he or she would report perceiving, and what he or she produces. A child able to perform a matching task similar to the one given to respondents in Niedzielski 1997 may not be influenced by the nationality labels as the adults were, for a number of reasons.

First, and most obvious, is that children may not have acquired the social categories that adults have: “Canadian” speaker, for instance, may not be a relevant category for a child (although there is evidence that some social (or biological?) categories such as “male” and “female” speaker are relevant even in infants). Second, and related to the first, a child may not have had any exposure to speakers from these different social groups.

Third, and I suggest that this may be most important, the child may have no social reason to “misperceive” his or her own dialect. Part of the linguistic development of a speaker must include the acquisition of value judgments about certain language variants, which is something that is acquired later than features of the language variants themselves.

Meyerhoff 2001 illustrates how such a process might operate, by appealing to the social psychological motivations of the speaker. She suggests that two of the main motivations for language variation are 1). accruing social capital and 2). minimizing risk. To take the former case, some language varieties index a group’s “access to social or economic capital (62),” or are “metaphorically associated with the trappings of this access,” thus whether they are actual or virtual signs of access is irrelevant. It would seem, then, that giving up the belief that one’s variety is a symbol of such trapping is not a simple or fast process, and it might take an overwhelming amount of evidence to the contrary for one to give up such a belief. At this point in sociolinguistic history, there is very little in, for instance, popular culture that would cause a Detroiter to feel that his or her variety offers anything but direct access to capital, so there is no reason to pay attention to any evidence to the contrary.

In contrast, a strong motivation for the avoidance of producing some variants involves “distancing yourself from behaviours and groups of people associated with the peripheries (63).” There is much in popular culture to tell speakers the cost of using nonstandard dialects, and so there must be a strong motivation to hold on to the belief that one is in no way a part of “the periphery,” until there is compelling evidence for this.
Thus, while Meyerhoff attributes these motivations to the production of certain variants (or, in some cases, their avoidance), I hypothesize that this too is a strong motivation for perception. Unless speakers are forced to give up the belief that they can accrue social capital and minimize risk by using their language variety, then they will continue to believe this despite contradictory acoustic evidence — the cost to believe otherwise is too great.

Additionally, tasks such as those that I required of my respondents automatically highlight ingroup-outgroup distinctions. If such contradictory acoustic evidence is made salient — by for instance the media, or a researcher overtly telling a speaker to evaluate features of a dialect, then the ingroup-outgroup becomes particularly important. When the label that is applied to the test tape speaker corresponds to a respondent’s ingroup, I hypothesize that the speaker is evaluated as a member of the respondent’s ingroup, but on an intergroup level, and that all of the beliefs that the respondent has about his or her own speech are “perceived” in the speaker’s variety. On the other hand, when the label corresponds to what the respondent assigns to an outgroup category, that speaker is evaluated on an interindividual level — the respondent asks, perhaps, how specifically does this speaker’s variety differ from mine? — and thus greater attention is paid to specific features in that speaker’s speech.

5. WHAT SPEECH PERCEPTION RESEARCH OFFERS. There are several aspects of basic models of speech perception that can be appealed to in order to explain the processes that would need to operate in order for such an analysis to be valid.

First, there are several theories that might provide an explanation for the fact that what Michiganders report perceiving corresponds almost exactly to vowel tokens that are often offered as typical of “general American vowels” (such as those found in introductory linguistics or phonetics texts). Johnson, Flemming and Wright 1993 proposes the notion of a vowel “hyperspace” to explain why, when subjects are asked to synthesize a vowel that matches one heard on a test tape they consistently offer a vowel that is more peripheral than the one the speaker actually produced. They contend that what people perceive is closer to “hyperarticulated” versions of vowels (that is, tokens on the periphery of the vowel space), rather than the more centralized versions that people actually produce. They hypothesized that subjects matched tokens to speech based on “reference to a representation of that sound in memory (523),” and that these representations where “hyperarticulated.” I contend that that is what people who are from areas where the “standard” purportedly is used. These speakers, when given the task of choosing tokens that match vowels found in a speaker thought to be in their ingroup (that is, fellow “standard” speakers), refer to a representation of a more hyperarticulated version of the vowel — one that is not centralized,
raised, backed, etc., but rather a token that would be a part of a hyperarticulated system.

Second, speech perception models offer processes that can account for the different degrees of attention that I proposed speakers give to ingroup versus outgroup speakers. I contend that respondents match a token to an idealized representation in the case of a perceived ingroup member, but pay closer attention to actual features in the speech of perceived outgroup members (this accounts for the fact that respondents in Niedzielski 1997 were much more accurate in choosing tokens that match the test tape speaker’s vowels if they thought she was an outgroup member, but not very accurate if they thought she was an ingroup member, for instance). Nusbaum and Schwab 1986 make reference to the parallel of active and passive processes that occur in speech perception, claiming that passive processes should be “automatic,” and active processes should be “cognitive.” The automaticity of passive processes means that passive processing should result in invariance, or at least “a lack of flexibility in responding to a stimulant (123).” If a respondent is appealing to the fixed representation of a vowel token, for instance, then the “perception” should be relatively more invariant. However, active processes require more cognitive effort, and thus more attention. I contend that in allowing respondents to believe that a speaker is a member not of one’s ingroup, but rather an outgroup member, I forced respondents to use more active processing strategies in evaluating her speech, and this led to greater accuracy in token matching.

Finally, I contend the active/passive process distinction may account for preliminary finding of speakers identifying features that they share with “outgroup” dialects more often than features that they do not share. I suggest that at some point during the acquisition of one’s native language variety, the perception of that ingroup variety must involve active processes, even if one is acquiring a dialect that most people believe to be “standard.” I hypothesize that those active processes may increase the salience of non-standard features in the ingroup variety, so that at a later developmental stage, when speakers no longer include these features as part of the their ingroup’s phonological system, they are still able to identify these features, though now as “outgroup” features.

6. "CONCLUSION". The phenomena described here illustrate the very real “working” nature of this paper, in that they produce more questions than answers. Is the hyperspace hypothesis adequate for explaining where our ideas of SAE come from? Is the ingroup/outgroup distinction really what is behind the very different results found when respondents are given different labels for speakers? Does the fact that non-standard features speakers share are more salient have any bearing on the production/perception interface? While work in social psychology and speech perception can offer insight into certain observed behavior, without
overtly testing the models for their applications to expectations and dialect perception, it remains speculation.

It nonetheless seems valuable to continue research on dialect perception by appealing to work in speech perception and social psychology, paying particular attention to the processes found in standard models in those fields. The next round of research in this area of dialect perception will do just that.

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1. Rational vs. Usage-based Approaches to Argument Structure. The term 'argument structure' generally refers to the correlation of semantic and syntactic properties associated with verbal predicates. Much effort in this area has been devoted to the following lines of research: 1) number and types of arguments a verbal predicate can take; 2) identification of obligatory and optional arguments; and 3) alternation patterns and changes of interpretation associated with these patterns (Levin 1993). An insightful and comprehensive critique of the common approaches to argument structure can be found in Thompson and Hopper (2001); suffice it to say here that most current approaches to argument structure can be characterized as rational. That is, researchers generally identify argument structure on the basis of potential associations of verbal predicates with nominal entities. Lexical semantics appears to be the predominant factor in identifying patterns of argument structure (Levin 1993), and the data on which generalizations are drawn typically consist of decontextualized sentences with argument NPs fully specified (Du Bois 1987, Lambrecht 1987). Attention to patterns of actual language use has generally been scarce.

A good case in point is the study of the verb remember by Van Valin and Wilkins (1993). Remember, as a verb of cognition, is often noted for the range of complement clauses it takes. A central concern for syntacticians has been to explain the syntactic behaviors of this verb based on a decomposition of its meaning in isolation. Van Valin and Wilkins (1993) state:

The type of complements taken by a particular verb can be fully predicted by its semantic representation. In such a theory, the lexical entry of a verb will contain only semantic information, which, in conjunction with language-universal and -specific morphosyntactic principles, will automatically determine its argument structure and syntactic properties.

As an illustration, Van Valin and Wilkins use the following decomposition patterns to show how the three types of complements of remember can be deducted from its semantic representation.

\[ \text{Remember: BECOME } \text{think.again (x) about.something.be.in.mind.from.before (y)} \]

Semantic Redundancy Rules for y

something x intends be in mind  
something x perceives be in mind  
something x knows/believes be in mind
In this paper I would like to extend this line of research by showing that not only can discourse usage-based investigations provide a realistic account of argument structure, a usage-based approach is also instrumental in elucidating the varied local patterns that are often confined to individual linguistic entities or sequences in highly specified contexts (Bybee and Hopper 2001). The roles of lexical semantics and discourse pragmatics in explaining linguistic structure are also touched upon. Ultimately I will argue for the view that grammar is nothing but a loose collection of localized frequent patterns of language use, which are subject to constant development, a view that is often referred to as Emergent Grammar (Bybee and Hopper 2001, Hopper 1987, 1988, Fox 1994, inter alia).
2. METHODOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES. The object of inquiry of this study are the two English verbs, *remember* and *forget*. I will compare their use in spoken English and illustrate the individualized patterns associated with each of them.

I choose to compare these two verbs due to the fact that, even though these two verbs are opposite in meaning, they are often grouped together as complement-taking verbs in most major grammars of English (see Quirk et al. 1985). Given what we know about *remember* in discourse, as reported in Tao (2001), it would be worthwhile to look at *forget* and see to what extent it resembles or differs from *remember*. In the literature, both *remember* and *forget* have been identified as 'retrospection verbs' (Quirk et al. 1985), private verbs (Biber 1988), verbs of cognition, or mental process verbs. They are said to have similar syntactic behaviors, e.g., taking a variety of complements, including infinitive and -ing complements; both exhibit a distinction in future vs. past tense (e.g., 'I remembered to do it/I remember doing it'), and so forth (see Jorgensen 1990).

For ease of comparison, the database for this study is the same as the one used in Tao (2001); it consists of three spoken language corpora. (1) Cambridge University Press/Cornell University Corpus (CUP/CU). This is a spoken North American English corpus collaboratively built by Cambridge University Press and Cornell University (Tao and Waugh 1998). For this project I used the first 100,000 words available from the pilot project. The language of the data in this pilot project can be characterized as highly interactive, since all of the transcripts are based on multiparty informal conversations, typically among family members and/or friends. (2) The Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (CSAE). This is a corpus built at the University of California at Santa Barbara (Chafe et al. 1991). I used the 170,000-word sample currently available. The majority of the transcripts from this corpus are based on daily conversations; there are also some transcripts based on university lectures, religions sermons, and business meetings, which make up about 20% of the data; the language of this corpus can therefore be characterized as mainly interactive but not as interactive as the CUP/CU Corpus. (3) Corpus of Spoken Professional American-English (CSPA). This corpus is constructed from a selection of existing transcripts of interactions in professional settings (Barlow 1998). For this study I used only the academic discourse portion, which contains about one million transcribed words. Even though the methods used in building the three corpora differ substantially, they nevertheless represent a diverse sample of present-day spoken North American English.

The corpora turned up a total of 399 tokens of *remember* and 166 tokens of *forget*. The much greater preponderance of *remember* over *forget* will be discussed in Section 6. Below I report the main findings in the corpora.

3. REMEMBER AND FORGET IN SPOKEN DISCOURSE. In this section I report the similarities between *remember* and *forget*; in Section 4 I discuss the ways in which they differ.
3.1. POST-VERBAL ELEMENTS. One major finding is that, just as in the case of remember, complement-taking is also a marginal feature for forget. Evidence comes from two sources. First, there is a large number of non-complements; second, there is a large number of zero objects and simple NPs. Tables 1 and 2 show the results with respect to these post-verbal elements.

**Remember:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-complements</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero object</td>
<td>159</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple NP (including relative clause)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative clause</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Complements</strong></td>
<td>104</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that-complement</td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ing complement clause</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to-infinitive complement clause</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>399</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Distribution of postverbal elements in remember clauses.

**Forget:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-complements</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero object</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple NP (including relative clause)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Clause</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Complements</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that-complement</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ing complement clause</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to-infinitive complement clause</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zero marking complement clause</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>166</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Distribution of postverbal elements in forget clauses.

Comparing the postverbal elements in the two verbs, we can see that the proportion of non-complements for forget is higher than remember: 79% vs. 74%. Both demonstrate a strong tendency not to take complements, or, for that matter, not to take anything at all (zero objects). This is clearly contrary to the common assumptions about the shape of the argument structure of these verbs, and forget aligns with remember closely in this respect.

3.2. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE FOR A SIMPLEX ARGUMENT STRUCTURE. If the above result shows that the argument structure of both verbs is simpler than commonly
assumed, there are other kinds of evidence supporting this finding. Additional evidence comes from the preverbal position and prosodic information.

First, if we expand the scope of investigation beyond the post-verbal position, we find that the pre-verbal position also shows interesting results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Inc. Subjectless+ 'to remember')</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Subject forms of *remember*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Inc. Subjectless+ 'to forget')</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Subject forms of *forget*.

From Tables 3 and 4 we can see that first person is the dominant form for the subject position. Third-person subjects, which are often tactically presented as the most typical form in imagined sentences, are the least frequent form, and second-person (including null subject forms) occupy the middle position. The proliferation of first and second persons with cognitive verbs such as *remember* and *forget* is not particularly surprising given the high frequency of first-person and second-person pronouns and what we know about the intimate connection of first/second persons with cognitive verbs and the expression of subjectivity and involvement in interactive discourse (Biber 1988, Chafe and Danielewicz 1987, Scheibmann 2001).

Beyond the overt forms, furthermore, an important category to note here is that of the null subject forms, i.e. zero forms; they appear with surprisingly high frequency in the data: 28% for *remember* and 29% for *forget*. This category is actually the second most frequent one if treated as an independent category. The fact that nearly one third of the time the *remember*/*forget* clauses are constructed without a subject of any kind suggests a strong preference for both verbs to have a simple argument structure.

Finally, prosodic boundaries are often found to follow the two verbs, suggesting a unit of some sort demarcated by these verbs. Again this is contrary to the complement-taking schema, which would imply that these verbs are embedded as part of a larger unit. Prosody is widely believed to be the primary
packaging device for spoken discourse, and intonation boundaries are an important indication for the organization of information flow and unity of linguistic structure (Chafe 1987, 1994, Cruttenden 1986, Brazil 1997, Tao 1996). As far as the transcriptions can show, it is not uncommon for remember and forget to coinide with an intonation unit boundary. In my data, 134 out of 339 (40%) of remember and 43 out of 166 (26%) instances of forget exhibit this pattern; these numbers might be conservative, as not all of the corpora in the data set are narrowly transcribed and thus do not mark intonation units (especially the one million word CSPA). Below is an example of forget ending with several intonation boundaries (as indicated by punctuation marks).

Ex. 1.

BU: Nobody looked at the two families. Chapter six.
PA: Were we supposed to?
SE: No. I mean, we forgot to assign it.
BU: We forget, I forget.
VOICE: To assign it.
SE: I know I forgot.
(Pause)
BU: Jim.
LE: Well, this is a highly distributed work effort. So I don't have hardly any notes. (Laughter) (CSPA)

Considering the general assumption that these verbs are to be followed by some kind of complex complement clauses, the intonation breaks after these verbs present strong evidence to question such an assumption.

Let us summarize the similarities between remember and forget: The discourse data shows that complement taking is an extremely rare phenomenon for both remember and forget. What is actually common in discourse is that there is often nothing after the verb. Overall the natural argument structure of both verbs exhibits a simplex form: not only is complement a rare element for the two verbs, their subject forms are also simple: first persons and zero subjects, as opposed to third-person full NPs, are common. This suggests that treating remember and forget as complement-taking verbs and focusing much of the effort on this area of grammar is misleading at best. It also suggests that grouping these two verbs with other complement-taking verbs is not the most productive way of understanding English grammar. (And it is conceivable that some of the other so-called complement-taking verbs may not show this property either once they are examined against real discourse data.)

Next, let's look at the differences between these two verbs.

4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REMEMBER AND FORGET. While there has been a lot of effort in classifying verbs into classes or subclasses, there is an increasing awareness among linguists that when grammar is viewed as a loose collection of frequently used constructions, very often one finds that grammatical regularities can be applied only to a limited number of individual lexical entities (Fillmore,
Kay, and O'Connor 1988, Sinclair 1991, Goldberg 1995, Langacker 2000, Bybee 2001). In other words, it is these local structural patterns that form the basis of grammar and which deserve more attention. With regard to remember and forget, despite the similarities that have just been outlined, there are a number of important differences.

1) Subjects. While in remember clauses both first and second persons are dominant, in forget clauses second-person subjects, in overt forms, do not figure prominently. This suggests that in the case of forget the subject is more exclusively associated with the first person - often the current speaker.

2) Tense. With remember, the simple present tense dominates to an extremely high degree.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Simple Present</th>
<th>395</th>
<th>99%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-simple present</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Verb tense in remember clauses.

However, with forget, non-simple present is not as scarce as with remember:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Simple Present</th>
<th>112</th>
<th>67%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-simple present</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Verb tense in forget clauses.

33% of non-simple tense uses suggest that forget clauses deal much more with past events than remember.

3) With regard to placement in the stream of speech, remember clauses are found to appear in a variety of utterance positions, while the position of forget is relatively predictable. As has been shown in Tao (2001), among the many possibilities for remember, the following patterns are common.

-Remember by itself as an utterance: 'Remember,'; 'Remember?'
-Remember is preceded by, or stands alone, with a conjunction: 'so remember,'; 'and remember,'; 'but remember,'; 'because remember,'; 'Yes, because remember, Jay said --you said'.
-Remember is, or is part of, a parenthetical insertion: 'For example, remember, Sharon gave the example'; 'it's an important statement to make because if you remember, that was a relatively new concept.'
-Remember appears at the beginning of an utterance: 'Remember a few months ago I used to go out dancing'
-Remember appears as part of an adverbial clause: 'As I remember', 'if I remember correctly,', 'if I remember right'.
-Remember attached to the end of a completed utterance - 'tag': 'S + remember', 'you see now Luther came to his reformation remember,'; 'I don't think we heard a lot at the public hearing, remember.'
These kinds of flexibility are not apparent for forget. As we will discuss later, this behavior is closely associated with the degree of grammaticization of constructions and as such it constitutes a major difference between the two verbs.

4) There is a larger proportion of simple pronouns after forget than remember. 'Forget it' appears to have become a fixed expression, one which is used to express the speaker's inability to do something, disappointment, and/or frustration. For example,

Ex. 2.

<6> So then I guess like Monday or Tuesday of next week I'll take 'em to the place and get started on them. And then they'll be ready for the conference. And then also I wanted to talk about...
<4> How much <>?
<6> I don't know. I didn't ask. I can check.
<2> I don't like <->.
<4> Well then forget it.
<5> Okay forget it. (CUP/CU)

Ex. 3.

MARILYN: You haven't heard nothing, yet ].
ROY: all ] of the, you know, watery-eyed, .. new age, .. uh, various theories, .. [of --
MARILYN: [Gaia, and all that stuff].
ROY: .. of how it might] .. not .. be that way.
PETE: Right.
ROY: .. You know, .. so,
PETE: Unhunh.
ROY: .. forget it,
.. forget it,
.. [forget] it.
PETE: [Right]. (CSAE)

By contrast, the combination of 'remember it', though possible, is far less frequent than 'forget it', and it does not have the pragmatic connotations similar to what is associated with 'forget it'.

Summary. We have seen that even though remember and forget are often treated as sharing many grammatical features, in actual use they exhibit different grammatical tendencies, as reflected in the subject forms, the object forms
(especially in the case of pronominals), and placement patterns in the speech stream.

5. DISCOURSE-PRAGMATIC FUNCTIONS OF REMEMBER AND FORGET. Now, having outlined some similarities and differences between these two items, some natural questions can be asked: Why do remember and forget behave the way they do? Why should they have different grammars while collectively behaving unlike regular complement-taking verbs? Are there discourse-pragmatic functions that can be said to unify the seemingly disparate surface manifestations of the grammars of remember and forget?

5.1. DISCOURSE-PRAGMATIC FUNCTIONS OF REMEMBER. In Tao (2001) I proposed that remember in spoken English is best analyzed as moving toward a pragmatic particle. Specifically, I argue that remember functions as 1) an epistemic marker, which i) indexes epistemic stance and ii) is constitutive of a variety of interactional acts; and 2) a meta-linguistic device, which functions mainly to regulate participant interaction. Here, I can cite only a few examples to show the discourse-pragmatics of using remember in spoken discourse.

Ex. 4.

PT: and all of this with it. (H) And I -- there were some others. And I can't even remember what they all were. . . But] --

DN: [I know, but it] was Evelyn who did it, and we ought to make her get her notes out again.

[Because sh-] --

PT: [Yes].

X: [@@@]

PT: [2 If you can find <X this X> 2].

LS: [2 She probably re2]mem [3 bers 3].

MN: [2 @@@@@ 2]

JN: [3 Uh Ev3][4ely,]

EV: [4 I don't remember 4].

JN: will you do that a4]gain <@ some[5 time- @>.]

EV: [5 Oh,

JN: @@@@@@@@@

EV: I will remember. <X I just 5] I just X> can't remember what it was. (CSAE)

In most of these cases remember is used without a complement, and is to indicate the speaker's (un)certainty with regard to certain states of affairs (Chafe and Nichols 1986, Ochs 1996). In the following examples, remember clauses are used to regulate participant interaction in conversation.

Ex. 5.

SE: In fact, there will be a new section on -- a new little section within this chapter on that. The chapter is becoming two chapters.
Remember?
BU: Uh-huh. But we're worried now about what's existing here.
SE: Okay. Yeah. I'll just rearrange it. (CSPA)

EX. 6.
GU: Remember, we did something earlier. We have a similar sentence.
And we kind of softened it a bit. I think we made an (Inaudible).
Jack, do you remember? (Sound momentarily lost due to static.)
PI: We took out that phrase 'that could be used to make decisions about'
and simply said 'in cases to returning scores for individual students
was the case.' (CSPA)

In the above examples, remember clauses appear either at turn beginnings or turn endings; they are used either to solicit speaker responses or to call attention to the forthcoming topic. None of them takes a complement, and all of them are simple in argument structure and often stand alone.

5.2. Discourse-Pragmatic Functions of Forget. Forget, on the other hand, does not appear to have been grammaticized to the same extent as remember, as far as its status as a pragmatic particle. Indeed many of the contrastive features outlined above between remember and forget may be accounted for in light of this difference.

A discourse particle, by definition, is a strengthened lexical bundle that has been loaded with pragmatic functions (Schiffrin 1987, Traugott and Konig 1991). Correlating with pragmatic strengthening is usually a drift way from expected syntactic behaviors and semantic referential properties. From this point of view, remember fits the profile of a discourse particle better than forget. While both in discourse exhibit a tendency to avoid a complex full-fledged argument structure, remember is concentrated with simple present tense and is highly flexible in placement behavior. On both counts forget is no match for remember.

However, certain combinations involving forget have developed patterns of their own, showing signs of it leaning toward a discourse particle of some sort. For example, in the 'forget + inanimate third person singular pronoun (it)' combination, we can see some traits of a discourse particle: 'Forget it' is a combination that is usually used without an overt subject form; it has a distinct prosodic pattern with short duration and quick tempo; it also stands alone (or is combined with another particle) as a single utterance or intonation unit; and it has a conventionalized meaning having to do with impossibilities or inabilities, as discussed in Section 4. Here is another example.

Ex 7.
<1> If you drop your keys, forget it man. Cause they're gone. Um...
(CUP/CU)

Forget has also evolved in another direction: it is often used in a subjectless negative environment, giving rise to a 'don't + forget + Infinitive'
construction. This construction is often used to indicate a friendly suggestion, whether it is intended as a true suggestion or not. Consider the following example from the CSAE corpus:

Ex. 8.

WENDY: So are you moving in the beginning of November?
KENDRA: ... Yup.
WENDY: Just drag your birthday out.
[That's what I would do].
MARCI: [(TSK) Don't forget] to buy yourself a cookie sheet, .. before you go to make cookies,
WENDY: [Yeah,
KEVIN: [And don't forget] to take the Tupperware out of your oven,
WENDY: you] --
KEVIN: before you turn it [2 on 2].
WENDY: [2 Sh 2]=ush up.
MARCI: ... @@@[3@@@@@@@@@@@@] (CSAE)

In this extract several family members are teasing Kendra, who is about to move out of her parents house. The 'don't + forget + to' constructions are presented as if they were friendly suggestions, which are of course designed to intimidate Kendra in this conversation extract.

What we have seen, then, are some highly specific patterns of forget with pragmatically loaded functions. Overall these patterns are quite different from those associated with remember clauses in terms of both form and function. As far as formal properties are concerned, we can see that while remember tends to develop pragmatic functions without other forms bundled together with it, forget tends to evolve, as it does in some cases, in conjunction with other forms – either with a preverbal negative or with a post-verbal pronominal. Each develops in seemingly its own natural direction.

5.3. THE LINK BETWEEN DISCOURSE PRAGMATICS AND ARGUMENT STRUCTURE / GRAMMAR. The above analyses show that there are differences in formal properties and discourse pragmatics between remember and forget. I propose that there is some link between the grammar of remember and forget and discourse pragmatics. The correlations can be summarized as follows.

Remember: an epistemic marker and a metalinguistic device, whose syntactic behavior features: 1) first- and second-person subjects; 2) simple present tense; 3) flexible positions in the speech flow.

Forget: a verb of introspection, whose syntactic manifestations include: 1) first-person subjects; 2) both present and past tense; and 3) relatively stable positions. At the same time, certain combinations involving forget can be considered fixed expressions, which occur in the form of zero subjects and third-person singular pronominal objects.
Overall, the major correlation patterns and differences between these two entities can be captured by stating that the more a form has developed pragmatic functions, the more flexible and attenuated in morpho-syntax it will become (Bybee 1985, Bybee and Hopper 2001). In this regard, not only does remember differ from forget, but in addition, not all forget constructions are alike.

6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. I began my discussion with a profile of the use of remember and forget in actual discourse, and found that it is misleading to treat them as primarily complement-taking verbs, as the data show that complement-taking does not present itself as a central feature of these two items. Furthermore, there are highly recurrent patterns with these verbs that are difficult to imagine with intuition, including zero objects, zero subjects, flexible syntactic positions, and the preferences of certain types of subjects and tense forms.

I then compared the differences between remember and forget, and found that on one hand, forget lacks the placement flexibility seen in remember but allows more tense options, and on the other hand it has its own pragmatically strengthened patterns in such combinations as 'forget it' and 'don't forget to'.

These exercises may be helpful in demonstrating some of the ways in which discourse can be brought to bear on grammar. First, discourse data can help achieve a realistic account of the argument structure of a verbal predicate, a position which, though important, needs no further elaboration here. Secondly, by looking at the totality of speech forms in discourse, we can get a better sense of the workings of linguistic structure. That is, rather than looking at a specific position, in particular the post-verbal position, as previous researchers have tended to do, I have looked at the many aspects of the verbal predicates: subject and object positions, subject and object forms, tense, prosody, and placement in the speech stream. Such an integrated approach proves to be useful not only for characterizing the usage patterns of remember and forget in discourse, but also critical in describing the differences between them. Lastly, this study shows once again that linguistic structure can acquire specialized functions in highly specific environments, and these specializations can provide us with important information about grammar and grammaticization, or the emergence of linguistic structure (Bybee and Hopper 2001). Thus, even though on the whole the degree of grammaticization in forget can be said to be less than that of remember, we can nevertheless see frequent and idiosyncratic constructions associated with this verb. There is obviously a great need to document this area of context-based grammar.

Finally, there is the non-trivial question of why remember is more frequent than forget and why remember develops faster than forget in terms of the process of pragmatic strengthening. At this point I can offer only two speculations. One has to do with the markedness features of the two lexical entities. In a sense remember can be seen as an unmarked form as opposed to forget, which is marked, since forget can be analyzed as containing two sense components, representable as NEGATIVE + REMEMBER, i.e. a negative element plus a 'remember' component. As negative and marked forms are more constrained in use (Greenberg 1966, Jakobson 1980, Zipf 1935), it is not surprising that forget
has a lower frequency and is slower in acquiring pragmatic contents and usage. The other factor for the more restrained use of forget is that under certain circumstances forget can be more face-threatening than remember, especially in the cases of second person subjects (e.g., 'you mustn't forget').

While this speculation may have left some with an impression that lexical semantics is after all the determining force in language use and language change, and as such should be considered the primary factor for explanation, the reality is far more complex than this. In particular, it is one thing to note that differences in semantic propensity may have some bearing on the syntactic behaviors of lexical entities; it is quite another to say that syntactic behaviors of lexical entries can be automatically deduced from semantic features (Hopper and Thompson 1993). Hopefully the comparison of the results of my investigation of the uses of the two lexical entities with that of some previous studies has made this point clear. Furthermore, it may be noted that marked and unmarked forms have their respective advantages and disadvantages when put to use. For example, while it may be more natural for remember to develop toward a discourse marker and have flexible placement patterns, it is difficult for it to take a pronominal form as its object and at the same time to develop the whole combination into a discourse marker. Thus the string 'remember + it' is not a frequent phrasal construction with any specialized meanings. For forget, the opposite is true: while there are many constraints on its use, combining it with a negative element ('don't + forget + to') with development into a fixed expression can not be easily exchanged with a positive form of 'remember to' – which would have been the semantic equivalent of the string 'don't forget to'. Similarly, the pragmatic forces associated with the combination of forget with a postverbal pronominal object ('forget it') cannot be achieved with a 'do not remember it' substitute. In short, whatever their development patterns and however we might best characterize them, it is hardly a simple matter to predicate their syntax by deriving it from, or, as is commonly done, decomposing, their meanings out of context and hope to achieve a realistic explanation. Such explanations, though often precise and convenient in theory, are also often at variance with speakers' discourse practice. Only by integrating semantic propensities with careful analysis of naturalistic discourse data can linguists hope to yield the best possible approximation to the nature of linguistic structure and structural evolution. In other words, semantics, especially of the rational or label-centric type, can not be considered an autonomous level of explanation; it is to be best regarded as subordinate to, and forming an integrated whole with, discourse pragmatics (Hopper and Thompson 1993).

To sum up, I hope to have demonstrated that it is not the case that argument structure and syntactic behaviors of verbal predicates can be deduced automatically from a rationalized semantic structure as far as discourse behavior is concerned. Attention to natural use of verbal predicates in real speech situations continues to be proven an effective strategy for linguistic analysis. Another point made in this paper that I wish to highlight is that while heuristic approaches that focus on classifying linguistic entities into general categories or groups may be a useful endeavor at certain levels of abstraction, it ought to remain a top priority

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1 Thanks are due to Michael McCarthy for this observation.
for linguists to work out the local, contextualized patterns of linguistic structure which often exhibit idiosyncratic properties in form and function and for identifiable discourse reasons.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to thank Michael McCarthy for his very helpful written comments on a draft of this paper. I am alone responsible for any shortcomings in this paper.

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Symposium on Functional Approaches to Grammar: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations

7/13-7/14, 2001
Linguistics Conference Room
Linguistic Institute, UC Santa Barbara

7/13 (Friday)

9:00 Registration and Welcoming remarks

9:30-10:30
Hongyin Tao (UCLA)
Rational vs. Usage-Based Approaches to Argument Structure: 'Remember' and 'Forget' in Spoken English

10:45-11:45
Robert Englebretson (Rice University)
In search of Indonesian complements: non-evidence from juxtaposed clauses

11:45-1:30 Lunch

1:30-2:30
Michael Ewing (University of Melbourne)
The emergence of argument structure in conversation: the case of two forms of 'give' in Javanese.

2:45-3:45
Tsuyoshi Ono (University of Arizona) and Ryoko Suzuki (Keio University)
The Primacy of Topic Constructions in Japanese Conversations

4:00-6:00 General discussion

7:00 Dinner

7/14 (Saturday)

9:00-10:00
Toshihide Nakayama (Montclair University)
"Manipulation of Argument Structure: A Case of 'Possessor Raising' in Nootka"

10:15-11:15
Ritva Laury (CSU Fresno)
The talking oblique: Human referents in oblique case roles in Finnish conversation

11:30-12:30
Nancy Niedzielski (Rice Univeristy)
Chipping away at the production/perception interface

12:30-2:00 Lunch

2:00-3:00
Kumiko Ichihashi-Nakayama (Montclair University)
"Beyond 'Directionals': -k and -m in Hualapai"

3:15-4:15
Marja-Liisa Helasvuo (University of Turku)
Shared Syntax: The Grammar of Co-Constructions

4:30-6:00 General discussion and Concluding remarks

7:00 Dinner