CHAPTER 2

CO-OPTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Dialogic Rhetoric of the Self

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If [the individual] does not somehow act to tell himself (as his own audience) what the various brands of rhetorician have told him, his persuasion is not complete.

—Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives

Perhaps I’ve insisted too much on the technology of domination and power. I am more and more interested in the interaction between oneself and others, and in the technologies of individual domination, in the mode of action that an individual exercises upon himself by means of the technologies of the self.

—Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self”

JUST AS THE ROLE OF SUBJECTIVITY IN LANGUAGE IS ATTRACTING INCREASING ATTENTION FROM AN ARRAY OF DISCIPLINES RANGING ACROSS LINGUISTICS, COMMUNICATION, ANTHROPOLOGY, HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND OTHERS, THE THRUST OF THIS INTEREST APPEARS TO BE HEADED IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION FROM AN AGENDA THAT WOULD PLACE RHETORIC AT CENTER STAGE. RHETORIC IN ITS CONVENTIONAL GUISE HAS BEEN DEEMED A QUINTESSENTIALLY PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, ORIENTED TO THE MARKETPLACE OF PROPOSITIONS PROJECTED TO APPEAL TO OTHERS. IN THE MARKET SQUARE OF CIVIL DISCOURSE, SELLERS OF IDEAS INVITE PROSPECTIVE BUYERS TO CRITICALLY TEST THE PROFERRED WARES FOR PLAUSIBILITY AND PERSUASIVENESS. IN CONTRAST, SUBJECTIVITY AS POPULARLY CON-
ceived makes its home in an interior personal world of unassailable privacy. In this quiet realm, the individual reigns alone, with no one to please or persuade but oneself. The ancient critique of rhetoric as appeal to base emotion seems dated now, as rhetoric and subjectivity in the modern world are pulled apart by centrifugal forces tending to divergence, polarization, even alienation. The last place one would expect to witness a meeting of public rhetoric and private subjectivity is in the intimate realms of the self.

But from another point of view, a rhetorical path from sociality to self is just what we should have anticipated all along. The individual encounters sociality in daily life, and must come to terms with its demands, on both personal and ideological levels. Conversely, sociality is reproduced in and through the individual, within whom the two poles must be brought into some meaningful relation. To discover how this works in practice, it is necessary to develop a strategy for navigating the difficult domain of sociocognitive relations, where complex processes linking subjectivity and intersubjectivity construct the sociocultural frameworks that mediate the individual’s cognitive-affective participation in sociality. To locate the nexus of self and sociality is to identify the individual’s private terms of engagement with the public project of constructing intersubjectivity (defined roughly as the relation between my subjectivity and your subjectivity). By taking a sociocognitive perspective on this traditionally psychological domain we advance the view that the subjective cannot be defined in relation to the self alone, nor alone to the objective. Rather, subjectivity must be framed from the start to include reference to intersubjectivity as well.

Going a step further, it is only when intersubjectivity is itself examined in light of its relation to concrete practices of face-to-face interaction that a realistic analysis of the construction of sociocognitive relations can begin to emerge (Du Bois 2007, 2009; C. Goodwin 2007; M. Goodwin 2006; Kärkkäinen 2006). For the sociocognitive project to achieve its potential, it is necessary to challenge the casual invocation of intersubjectivity as a given on which the foundations of social life rest—neatly, peacefully, effortlessly. The time has passed when intersubjectivity could be assumed as a passive, taken-for-granted attribute of the static cognitive organization of whole classes of persons, whether configured in social groups, memberships, classes, communities, or cultures (Schegloff 1992). Rather, intersubjectivity must be problematized from the beginning as a contingent achievement of social actors engaged in interaction and, potentially, contestation. Drawing on their strategic capacities for dialogic engagement, social actors strive moment by moment to connect and contend with one another, thus linking modes of interpersonal organization to motivating forces from the personal realms of feeling and being, among others. Intersubjectivity must be recognized as a challenge involving the dynamic construction of the sociocognitive relations, including subjectivity, that bind
social actors and their motivations (Tyler 1978). Only then will we be able to appreciate the work that participants, and theorists in their wake, must perform to come to terms with the meaningful organization of the sociocognitive arena of sociocultural life.

Still, what role the self should play in this process remains a puzzle. One clue comes from the suggestion, persistent in Western intellectual history, that the self is itself forged in sociality (Bakhtin 1981; Dewey 1925; Hobson 2002; James 1950; Mead 1934; Peirce 1931–1958; Tomasello 1999; Voloshinov 1973; Vygotsky 1986). The social formation of the self contributes in turn to its in-built readiness to re-enter the social fray at any time, as an active participant shaping at once the world of social consequence and the sociocognitive environment within which it must live. Pursuing public projects of social action, the self plays the card of its own subjectivity. But this is a subjectivity already calibrated in public space, framed to engage with the displayed subjectivities of co-present Others. To bridge the apparent gap between self and sociality, it is evidently necessary to get beyond a purely interior conception of subjectivity (Mead 1934; Voloshinov 1973; Vygotsky 1986). The construction of sociocognitive relations must be resituated in relation to the active sociocultural practices of calibrating subjectivity in relation to intersubjective engagement. This points to a central concern with the dialogic practices by which individual social actors expose and modulate their respective subjectivities, as they mediate the ongoing public production, calibration, and contestation of intersubjectivity in interaction. Reversing the trajectory, the individual in solitude also confronts issues of subjectivity and even intersubjectivity when she directs her attention inward, attending to the management of her own sensibilities. Among such inner-directed practices, Foucault has called attention to what he calls “the technologies of the self,” which are brought into play in “the mode of action that an individual exercises upon himself” (Foucault 1988). Left unresolved by Foucault is the question of how these self-directed actions relate to Other-directed actions as realized in public contexts, such as the pursuit of intersubjective alignment in conversation. In coming to terms with the role of the self in interaction, a critical issue to be addressed is the possibility of identifying techniques for crossing the boundary between inner and outer embodiments of sociality: for projecting subjectivity into the public arena, where intersubjectivity apparently holds sway, and for projecting intersubjectivity back into the private realms of the self.

A further challenge, as articulated in the present volume, is to frame these issues in terms of the oft-overlooked connections between culture and rhetoric (Burke 1950; Heritage and Greatbatch 1986; Miller 1994; Plett 1999; Potter 1996; Riffaterre 1990; Shoaps 1999; Shotter 1993; Tyler 1987). If rhetoric is to rise beyond its popular reputation as a matter of mere sleight-of-words, it must
be by way of acknowledging its fundamental role as a mode of sociocultural action, with enduring consequences for social life. The same issues that concern rhetoric culture define critical parts of the context within which stance is realized (Du Bois 2007). Specifically, the rhetorical implications of prior discourse accumulate to produce the historical layering of intertextuality that plays a significant role in defining the sociocultural field (Ochs 1996). This sociocultural field in turn functions as a contextualizing frame that shapes the interpretation of every act of taking a stance. The role of rhetoric in constructing the sociocultural field for stance becomes evident once we look at how stance is realized as social action (Du Bois in progress-b). Stance invites analysis as social action because it entails asking how the dialogically engaged structures of evaluative action in discourse contribute to organizing the joint construction of both the enduring cultural frames that organize our lifeworld and the local ephemeral moments of intersubjective alignment that motivate our affective engagement with it. Within the broader purview of rhetoric culture, the present work calls attention to a domain that has been relatively neglected until now, concerning the embodied dynamics of social interaction. Projecting the questions posed by rhetoric culture into the dynamic flux of interaction, it is stance-taking that most effectively encompasses the moment-by-moment interplay of persons and values, persuasions and convictions, acts and consequences. If anything, it is against the background of rhetoric culture in its public manifestation that the links between stance, intersubjectivity, and the dialogic self come to the fore.

In the unavoidable human condition of rhetoric culture, the production of discourse is always framed within rhetorical practice, and always realized dialogically. This conjunction suggests the utility of examining the issues raised by rhetoric culture from a dialogic perspective. A dialogic rhetoric is called for not only because speakers sometimes cajole one another via verbal moves manifestly designed to motivate the other’s convergence to one’s own stance. More subtly, even the mildest and most innocent utterance acts may activate the issue of stance alignment between dialogic co-participants. The ever-present orientation to intersubjective alignment unleashes a cascade of consequences, intended or not, that ultimately frames the positioning of all co-present participants within the sociocultural field. What is surprising, perhaps, is that the compulsion to rhetorical relevance is felt even when no one else is present. In the privacy of thinking or speaking in solitude, we answer the objections of those who are not there. More surprising still is that in these very circumstances, intersubjectivity too remains a live issue.

This chapter begins with the consideration, below, of the relation between the self in sociality and the self in solitude. The two terms of this opposition, often taken to represent opposed or even antithetical domains, have been ad-
vanced by different groups of authors as candidates for a locus of social reality. One group of theorists advocates for the exterior sociality of the public situation (Goffman 1964, 1974; Sacks 1992), while another group acknowledges the interior sociality of the dialogic self (Mead 1934; Vygotsky 1986). To evaluate the respective roles of sociality and solitude, the chapter takes up the analysis of some instances of recorded discourse in which these issues become relevant. It then proceeds to examine one instance of discourse that seems to combine aspects of speaking in interaction with aspects of speaking in solitude. The empirical question addressed here is whether discourse in private may resemble, in certain key respects, the public discourse of conversational interaction. The line of argument then moves to a more theoretical level to consider what it would mean to co-opt intersubjectivity, and what the implications are for the attempt to construct a dialogic perspective on rhetorical aspects of the self. Finally, the chapter concludes with a consideration of the theoretical consequences of linking dialogicality and intersubjectivity, seen as two facets of a common analytical enterprise, and an evaluation of the potential of this approach to clarify specific processes of the construction of socio-cognitive relations.

Sociality and Solitude

One can talk to oneself.—If a person speaks when no one else is present, does that mean he is speaking to himself?

—Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*

What makes the social situation social? Specifically, are you social when you’re solitary? The conversational situation is commonly conceived as inherently public, requiring two socially engaged persons as its minimum criterion (Clark 1996; Goffman 1964). In contrast, the situation of an individual alone in a room, engaged in thought (or even in speaking), is typically imagined as starkly isolated, withdrawn from social engagement. As opposed to multi-party speaking, single-party thinking is construed as taking place in a private psychological domain, hidden from public view in a world apart from overt displays of sociality, isolated from social others. For the outside observer it appears as opaque and even, perhaps, ultimately unknowable.

But this is not the only way to imagine the individual in solitude. There are in fact two prevalent views on the matter, equally widespread if sharply at odds with each other. In contrast to the view just described, holding that the social situation is constituted only when social others are co-present, the opposing view holds that sociality penetrates even into the interior of the individual, ef-
fectively shaping the structures and processes that govern a person’s thinking and acting even when alone. The following sections take up in turn the two opposing perspectives, which we may gloss as exterior versus interior sociality.

**Exterior Sociality: The Public Situation**

The exterior view of sociality is built into the deepest assumptions of some of the most influential observers of social life, including Erving Goffman, Emanuel Schegloff, and others. Commitment to the fundamental role of publicly observable behavior (aka conduct) is so strong that it is introduced at the foundational moment, as the stage is being set in the very definition of the initial context for inquiry into human sociality: the social situation. In Goffman’s (1964) seminal words, “I would define a social situation as an environment of mutual monitoring possibilities, anywhere within which an individual will find himself accessible to the naked senses of all others who are ‘present,’ and similarly find them accessible to him. According to this definition, a social situation arises whenever two or more individuals find themselves in one another’s immediate presence, and it lasts until the next-to-last person leaves.” Mutual monitoring is conceived literally as involving the sensual perception of and by other co-present bodies (Clark 1996), leaving little room for extending the conception to what happens when a fully socialized individual is alone in a room. Interestingly, Goffman goes on to connect his framing of the social situation to the organization of talk through turn-taking: “I am suggesting that the act of speaking must always be referred to the state of talk that is sustained through the particular turn at talking, and that this state of talk involves a circle of others ratified as coparticipants” (1964). In positing turn-taking as a paradigm criterion of the social situation, Goffman sets the stage for a form of sociological inquiry that would be embraced by later workers in sociology and beyond, coming to fruition especially in Conversation Analysis. The emphasis on co-presence and mutual monitoring as defining the “state of talk” leads Goffman to specify certain exclusions from the norm: “(Such a phenomenon as talking to oneself, or talking to unratified recipients as in the case of collusive communication, or telephone talk, must first be seen as a departure from the norm, else its structure and significance will be lost)” (1964). While Goffman’s goal of distinguishing normative from deviant forms of speaking may have some merit, it is curious to see telephone conversation treated on a par with “talking to oneself.” The evaluation of telephone talk in subsequent research has generally been less dismissive, and this form of electronically mediated interaction has at times been elevated almost to a defining context for talk in interaction (e.g., in Conversation Analysis; see Schegloff 1968, 2007).
But Goffman’s frank assessment underscores his insistence on the co-presence of persons as a fundamental criterion of the prototypical social situation, assigning a critical role to the potential for full mutual monitoring.

Goffman’s reliance on the criterion of mutual monitoring by co-present others has been endorsed by a number of other social scientists (e.g., Clark 1996). Coming from a rather different place, a prominent linguist arrives at a similar assessment, stating, “talking to yourself … [is not an instance] of communication” (Blakemore 1992). The issue of telephones aside, the focus on publicly accessible speech by multiple interactants has effectively been promoted to a central principle for delimiting the analytical and theoretical scope of Conversation Analysis. Laying out the scope of the research enterprise, Schegloff begins with an explanation of a shift in the very name that defines the identity of the field: “[Instead of the word ‘conversation’] … we have begun using the more ample and neutral term ‘talk-in-interaction.’ This is an empirically and analytically bounded domain, generous in its inclusiveness, yet not including everything, and thus not a merely terminological convention” (1999). Like Goffman, Schegloff delimits the boundaries of “talk-in-interaction” to effectively exclude speaking in private: “On the other hand, not all talk falls within this boundary [of talk-in-interaction]. For example when I read out, in my study at home, a draft of the text of a talk which I am scheduled to deliver so as to hear what it sounds like and to ensure that it fits within my assigned time limits, this is not talk-in-interaction, although it is surely talk” (1999). This seems reasonable enough on the face of it. Why should talk performed alone in a room be deemed to involve interaction? All the more so if it is being rehearsed just “to hear what it sounds like.”

But we might well ask whether that’s all that’s going on in that room. The solitary speaker’s concern with what the utterance sounds like (to whom?) may offer a clue to what kind of activity is likely to be in progress. Here it is useful to consider possible parallels with face-to-face interaction. One such parallel might arise if the solitary speaker gives evidence of attending in some way to the potential response of imagined social others. For example, listening to oneself as a prelude to speaking before an audience may trigger certain purposeful activities, such as last-minute corrections in which the speaker pauses while deploying the editorial blue pencil, with the goal of heading off potential objections from future audience members. The imagined audience may be more or less vividly conjured up, complete with names, faces, and indeed facial expressions, not to mention attitudes; and the solitary speaker’s text may be reframed accordingly. In such a (self-generated) context of virtual interaction, the rehearsing author’s seemingly solitary activity of self-editing can be considered a form of self-repair in anticipated response to the (potential) critiques of imagined social others. In dialogic terms, this is what Bakhtin calls ad-
dressivity (1981). As an empirical project, such a study would naturally invite comparison with the forms of repair established in research on face-to-face conversation, in which social others are actually co-present (Fox et al. 1996; Hockett 1968; Jasperson 2002; Schegloff et al. 1977; Schegloff 1992). Though obviously speculative, this scenario is only one example of the possible contexts for the use of language in solitude that have suffered empirical neglect, in part for theoretical reasons.

While there are obvious methodological challenges to be met in order to gain access to private events, they are not insurmountable. What is intriguing is the potential for parallels between solitary speaking and the more familiar organization of discourse in face-to-face interaction. A key question to ask is: Does the discourse of solitude display the same structures as have been identified in the benchmark case of conversation with co-present others? If not, this would tend to argue that speakers in solitude are in a novel environment that is sufficiently unlike that of dialogic interaction to preclude the use of the forms of sociality that operate in face-to-face conversation. But if similarities are found, this can be argued to reflect the existence of fundamental commonalities between the public and private practice of discourse.

**Interior Sociality: The Dialogic Self**

While the obvious appeal of an “exterior sociality” grounded in public interaction makes it a perennial favorite in the history of social science (enhanced presently by the attractions of straightforward access to repeatable observations by way of audio or video recordings of public behavior), equal importance has been accorded by other scholars to the dimension of “interior sociality.” Interior sociality may be defined, provisionally, as a set of practices taking place within the limits of the individual psyche that are similar in some way to the kinds of interactions that characterize exterior sociality. Many scholars have recognized a role for interior sociality, whether explicitly or implicitly, in taking the position that the capacity for interior dialogue derives from prior experience with exterior dialogue. Milton Singer refers to “the so-called monologue, which is always a dialogue with an imagined other” (1984, cited in Attinasi and Friedrich 1995). Dennis Tedlock and Bruce Mannheim, referencing Roman Jakobson, state, “The traces of dialogic interaction so permeate the structure of language that they are present even when people talk to themselves” (1995). Even Herbert Clark, who stands with Goffman and others in vaunting the priority of face-to-face conversation, observes, “In talking to ourselves, we are making as if we were talking to someone else. Private settings are based on conversational settings” (1996). Indeed, the idea that public
dialogic exchange precedes inner dialogic thought has a long history, extending back at least to Socrates (see discussion below). Any number of modern philosophers, social scientists, and literary theorists have registered their awareness of the actively dialogic processes of the cognitive interior, and some have treated it as quite central to their theory and even their methods of inquiry (Bakhtin 1981; Dewey 1925; James 1950; Mead 1934; Peirce 1931–1958; Voloshinov 1973; Vygotsky 1986). John Dewey succinctly sums up the basic version of this position: “Soliloquy is the product and reflex of converse with others” (1925: 170).

But once we admit the reality of “the virtually constant inner dialogue experienced by virtually everyone” (Fields 2002), we must go on to ask: What consequences follow from the individual’s capacity to manage on the interior both sides of a dialogic engagement? Despite widespread convergence on the basic idea that at least some forms of thought involve inner dialogue, modeled on prior experience of exterior dialogue, the theoretical conclusions that are to be drawn are diverse, and not necessarily agreed on. For the present enterprise, the kinds of implications that will most concern us are those involving the dynamics of rhetorical relations among the utterances, so to speak, that alternate within interior dialogue. These issues arise especially in relation to what look like stances taken by contending voices, raising further questions as to the nature of the voices that (seem to) articulate the stances, and the stance acts of (interior) positioning that may construct some kind of authorial identity (Foucault 1977).

But before even attempting to arrive at such a catalog of voices, it is preferable to focus first on understanding the dynamics of inner discourse. The vitality and social character of inner discourse is reflected in the first place in a pervasively dialogic discourse, raising the question of how the various voices—disregarding for the moment their origins and identities—interact and contend with each other. As Michel de Montaigne observes, “There is as much difference found between us and ourselves, as there is between ourselves and others” (1603), and it is the dynamics of the organization of interaction that a dialogic model is best equipped to address. How does dialogicality see the rhetorical dimension of developing textual experience, the possibility of difference and change in a contested field of meaning? The dialogic conception of discourse is one that refuses to be reduced to a mere registry of neutralized particles of information, without consideration of ideology (Crapanzano 1990; Kroksrity 2000; Schieffelin et al. 1998). Discourse comes in voices, and those voices are able to say different things, and say them from different positionings. If such a diversity is present among the voices which speak within us, this implies a powerful role for a rhetoric within. If a repertoire of voices inhabit our inner sociality, this is fertile ground for a rhetoric of the self, to sort...
out the stances proposed by contending voices speaking from their distinctive positionings. Kenneth Burke, attuned to the normative socializing forces that rhetoric at times seek to harness, put his finger on the problem thus: "If [the individual] does not somehow act to tell himself (as his own audience) what the various brands of rhetorician have told him, his persuasion is not complete. Only those voices from without are effective which can speak in the language of a voice within" (Burke 1950, emphasis added). Recognizing the caution of the well-defended individual who must contend with the rhetoric of public discourse, Burke argues that social theorists need to recognize the critical connection of rhetoric to issues of moral socialization. He points to "the ingredient of rhetoric in all socialization, considered as a moralizing process. The individual person, striving to form himself in accordance with the communicative norms that match the cooperative ways of his society, is by the same token concerned with the rhetoric of identification. To act upon himself persuasively, he must variously resort to images and ideas that are formative. Education ('indoctrination') exerts such pressure upon him from without; he completes the process from within" (Burke 1950). Among the questions to be mastered by the rhetorician of the self is how the dialogic processes of internally distributed cognition can be mobilized to control the alignment of stance and voice, and affect and identity, through processes that link the individual to the social. This must be addressed alongside the more inward-looking questions posed by Foucault in his later writings, especially in his discussion of the "technologies of the self" as a kind of moral work that the individual performs to shape himself in relation to the cultural codes of morality that govern the individual in society (Foucault 1988; Robbins 2004).

These observations point to a multi-faceted role for the dialogic self, embracing cognitive, affective, and moral dimensions. These are large questions, to which we will return in due course. But none of this work will get very far until we first address some basics, which must include the seemingly simple, yet absolutely fundamental, task of identifying voices.

**Whose Voice?**

What matter who's speaking, someone said, what matter who's speaking.

—Samuel Beckett, *Texts for Nothing*

One of the routine but indispensable facts about speaking, to which participants regularly attend in any conversational interaction, is the question of who says what. (To whom they say it is surely also a question of legitimate interest,
but specifying a definite recipient for an utterance in a multi-party conversation is often far more elusive for both participants and analysts than determining the speaker, due to ambiguities in the constitution of the addressee role that we need not go into here.) Participants monitor the apparent speaker (i.e., the animator, who is usually also the author) of each utterance using a variety of means, which may include not only the obvious task of identifying the speaker’s distinctive quality of voice, but also observing lip movements and any other visible movements of speech articulators, coordinating visible peaks of hand or head gestures with audible peaks of vocal prosody, locating spatial coordinates for the source of the sounds being made, and so on. As relevant as it is to participants in conversation, nailing down the identification of speaker attribution is equally important to analysts, who necessarily approach the task on a more conscious level. Not surprisingly, most scholarly traditions that take seriously the task of representing conversational discourse have found it salient and indeed inescapable to specify, in their conventional transcription practice, how each utterance is to be attributed to a particular speaker.

But the practice of identifying voices—attributing words to the speakers who speak them—is about more than getting the transcription right. On a deeper level it is about attributing the stances that are embodied in the words to the social actors who enact them and bear the responsibility for them. Identifying voices is an issue not just because two or more different people are speaking, each of whom deserves to have their words rightfully credited to them. It is because the participants are engaged in all kinds of delicately coordinated social actions, in which the identity of social actors matters. Some coordinated actions are performed simultaneously, others in structured alternation. Some actions are crucially dependent on being performed by a particular social actor, while others can only be achieved through joint action by certain configurations of actors.

Participants are engaged in more than merely speaking in sequenced turns, one after the other. Given the sequential structure of conversational activity, for example, the speaker who initiates a sequence finds that she is already effectively constrained by the larger activity so evoked, to the extent that she must orient in advance to how the next speaker is likely to respond to her utterance (Goodwin 1981; Schegloff 2007; Vygotsky 1986). Introducing a dialogic perspective (Bakhtin 1995; Voloshinov 1973), the matter becomes still more complex. In dialogic terms the question of how voicing is to be interpreted and attributed encompasses a recognition that at any moment a multiplicity of voices may be brought into play, in one way or another. This complex interaction and even lamination of voices within a single individual is a decisive indicator of what is meant by dialogicality. Dialogic engagement is
a two-way street, in which the author of any utterance endeavors to articulate relevant connections between their words and the words of other speakers. But this dialogic engagement can be seen as a practice that points in two directions at once—extending out from the present moment of discourse towards the past, to the horizons of prior discourse, but extending also into the projected future, in anticipation of how one's current utterance will fare when it has left one's lips and is subjected to the unpredictable contingencies of its dialogic reframing by the next speaker. As social actors, conversational participants continually manage their response to the structure and content of the prior and subsequent utterances, whether audibly realized or only potential. These dialogic processes operate through the realization and interpretation of meaning, form, and social action that at times depend on the personal identity of the speaker, but at other times blur or erase it. At any moment the current speaker may need to frame their next utterance to respond to the utterances with which it engages dialogically. As they speak, social actors both presuppose and indexically create aspects of their vocal identity (Agha 2005; Bucholtz and Hall 2004, 2005; Günthner 1999; Silverstein 1976).

To manage this kind of multidirectional engagement along retrospective and prospective directions, participants need to know who said what, but this means more than just knowing names. It is prudent to know not only what kind of social actor one is engaged with in the socially risky game of discourse, and what is understood as the identity of the actors, but also the character of the voices they invoke. Different voices can engender seriously different social consequences (Agha 2005; Rampton 2006; Shoaps 1999). We get some sense of the importance of speaker attribution when the labels representing it are left out of a transcription. Sometimes this is done purposely, for example in certain kinds of transcription of a monologue or an interview in which the applicable ideology of discursive representations treats the identity of the speaker as obvious (or alternatively, assumes that recipients will arrive at the relevant identity based on contextual cues such as a familiar face in a photograph, or a name in the caption beneath it). At other times the omission is more careless, as when speaker identity is simply treated as unimportant, e.g., when the name of a sociolinguistic interviewer is elided as if they were not a consequential participant. (Ideologies of transcriptional representation [Bucholtz 2000] are in play here too, of course.)

To ground our discussion of these issues, it is useful to take up some simple instances of dialogic exchange. As noted above, the question of who is speaking is naturally of perennial interest, and in the following examples we follow the typical analytic and representational practice of attributing each utterance to a particular speaker.
1. (SBC045: 1613.017-1616.343)
   CORINNA; Ugh, so nasty.
   PATRICK; Why is it nasty.

2. (LSAC 1432-01)
   DANA; I don't know if it actually ate it or what.
   LOU; Yeah it's hard to know.

3. (LSAC 1658-01)
   ALEX; I make them uncomfortable.
   KIM; Gee, I wonder why.

In 1, the first speaker voices an evaluation of something as “nasty,” to which the second speaker responds by asking why it is so. In 2, the first speaker voices uncertainty about a state of affairs, while the second generalizes about the difficulty of answering such questions. In 3, the first speaker describes a problematic social situation, to which the next speaker responds by asking why. (Though the two why cases exhibit different interactional framings, this need not concern us here.) If we venture to generalize across the three cited examples, we might note that in each case the second speaker finds something in the prior utterance that warrants, indeed elicits, a response. For example, a prior speaker who issues a strongly affective evaluation may be asked by the next speaker to provide an account of the basis for the evaluation; or a speaker who describes a problematic situation may find that the next speaker expresses curiosity about why the situation is that way. In such cases it has become commonplace to point out that part of what is at issue for the participants is what kind of action can be projected to be appropriate as the next action, given the discourse trajectory of the interactional sequence up to this point (Goodwin 1981; Lerner 1991; Schegloff 2007). And along with the projected framing of an appropriate paradigmatic class of next actions comes the question of who the next actor ought to be.

Absent any speaker labels, we may be left wondering who did what, or we may try to reconstruct for ourselves the missing information about the voices we hear, drawing on our intuitions about how the utterance we encounter is most likely to have come to its present form. The effect can be interesting. As a kind of exercise for the reader, all speaker attribution labels have been suppressed from the following three excerpts. (The excerpts are drawn from my own transcription of a not-yet-published recording, destined for a future volume of the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (Du Bois/Englebretson 2005), titled Strange Dreams. The transcription is considerably simplified here, for expository purposes.)
4. Needed that.
   Hard to know what you need. Very hard to know what you need.

5. Oof, horrid.
   Can’t imagine why it was so horrid, really, there was nothing bad that happened.

Despite the fact that the speaker attribution labels have been (temporarily) suppressed here, we feel we can almost “hear” the alternation of voices. In example 4, the first voice evaluates something as needed, setting up the basis for the second voice to counter this with a generalization that it is difficult for anyone to be sure what they need, by implication challenging the prior utterance. In example 5, the first voice emits an expressive “oof” and evaluates something as “horrid;” in response, the second voice questions why the evaluated entity should be experienced as horrid, given the absence of negative consequences.

At this point it is necessary to introduce a key piece of information about the discourse under examination, which I have been withholding until now. All the voices in examples 4 and 5 belong to one person. In other words, this is the discourse of a man who “talks to himself,” in the commonplace but limiting cliché. Speaking in solitude—the formulation I prefer—is for this individual a regular practice. Elsewhere I have analyzed at some length an event in this same recording in which the same individual performs a private devotional ritual (Du Bois 2009). I made this recording for the Santa Barbara Corpus, with the full consent and cooperation of the speaker. I set up the tape recorder in advance, using a portable digital tape recorder that would record for four hours without stopping. I asked the speaker (who I will call Daniel) to turn it on by himself, since I would not be present, and to wear it as he goes about his daily business. He followed this procedure three times, on three successive days. On the eve of the first day of recording, I carefully explained the sequence of buttons to be pushed to begin the recording. But at the end of the day, when Daniel brought the recording device back to me, there was nothing at all on the tape. For a second time I went over the procedure. The next day, the result was the same: a failed recording, for technical reasons. On the third day, the recording succeeded. The result was a verbatim documentation of the beginning of Daniel’s day. Ironically, it is partly due to the initial failures, I believe, that the recording in the end achieved a fair degree of naturalness. By the third day he had become habituated to the presence of the recorder, and was presumably somewhat desensitized to the process of being recorded.

As the recording begins, Daniel has just awakened from a night’s sleep, at an hour which he considers late. He comments on how much he needed the rest. Among his first utterances are those presented in examples 4–5, repeated now with speaker labels in 6–7. The speaker labels come with a twist, how-
ever. They are not yet the conventional ones (e.g., with the name “Daniel”), but instead try to capture a more general aspect of the dialogic differentiation of alternating voices, as deployed in turn by the speaker. (The examples are given in a slightly less simplified transcription, now with the intonation units marked. As in the usual convention, each intonation unit is here written on a separate line by itself.)

6. *(Strange Dreams 48.065-60.299)*

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27ME;</td>
<td>Needed that.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>(2.7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29ME2;</td>
<td>Hm.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>#Hm.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>#Hard to know what you need.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Very hard to know what you need.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I have somewhat irreverently introduced the speaker labels “ME” and “ME2” to distinguish the two voices. George Herbert Mead speaks broadly of the “I” in dialogue with the “me” (1934), but in his scheme it is not always clear how to tell which voice is which (Caton 1993). Really what these labels indicate are two facets or phases of the same self, rather than audibly distinct voices as such: listening to the recording reveals no consistent difference in voice quality. It is rather the point of view taken in the two utterances that distinguishes them as indexing two different self-positionings. In effect they presuppose different voices belonging to two somewhat distinct personae, or phases of the self. The next example (in somewhat simplified transcription) again documents two distinct stance positionings, perceived as coming from two voices or aspects of the self:

7. *(Strange Dreams 64.897-69.817)*

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36ME;</td>
<td>Oof,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>horrid.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39ME2;</td>
<td>Can’t imagine why it was so horrid,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>really,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>there was nothing bad that happened.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first voice is vivid, laconic, and emotionally transparent in its affective subjectivity. It expresses a direct evaluation of an unmentioned experiential situation, first via an expressive sound (“oof”) and then via a single evaluative adjective (“horrid”), but still without introducing any grammatical apparatus to index the personality of the speaking subject. Containing no first-person
pronouns, no tense, no negation, and no inflections of any kind, these utterances are reminiscent of Lev Vygotsky’s “speech almost without words” (1986, cited in Cohn 1978), and of Gregory Bateson’s “primary process” language, largely bereft of indexes of a self-conscious personality (1972). In contrast, the next utterance, as produced by the “responding” voice (ME2), reflects a more sophisticated and nuanced metapragmatic take on the previous evaluation, reframing the claims of the prior voice as too simplistic. This utterance is clothed in the full raiment of grammar, including verbal inflectional morphology, negation, and most of the other standard indexes of a full-blown grammatical apparatus, eliding only the first person pronoun at the beginning. It is noteworthy that, because language and thus stance are inherently reflexive, the use of language and the taking of stances always carry the possibility to extend the complexity of dialogic organization by drawing on the potential of reflexivity (Lucy 1993). In both (6) and (7), Daniel exploits the reflexive potential as he embeds elements of his own immediate prior utterance into his meta-stance commentary.

It is important to notice that Daniel has first created a separation of voices (whether “ME” and ME2,” or Mead’s “me” and “I” voices), before bringing them back together in the structure of a dialogic engagement. Sometimes differentiation at a basic level is precursor to unification at a higher level (Hobson 2002). Once the multivocal splitting of voices can be discriminated within the discourse of a single individual, the further possibility arises that the two voices may be brought together again, now in the alternating turns of a dialogue. For the private individual, dialogicality represents a way to reflect the multiple voices of individuals back upon themselves. In seeking a way to observe and analyze this process, we hope to witness the voices rhetorically engaged, fulfilling reciprocal roles as co-participants in a discourse. Each voice expresses a distinct and even contending rhetorical stance. It is in this capacity for the re-engagement of the differentiated voices of a single individual that we see the possibility of apprehending the impact of rhetoric in a new domain. If the self can differentiate its voices, and can take the further step of organizing them in dialogic-sequential opposition to one another, it may thereby establish the conditions for the interiorization of rhetorical engagement. For the social actor faced with a problematic question to be resolved, the sorting-out process may on one occasion take the form of a public dialogic interaction with face-to-face collaborators, while on another it unfolds in private, in the interior realm of the psyche (Du Bois 2009). This alternative makes sense only if we recognize the cognitive interior as differentiated along personal lines, populated with contending voices capable of representing differentiated points of view. New dialogue can be generated within the individual, where it is encountered always in a condition of rhetoric.
Returning to the examples we have been discussing, it will be instructive to look at the above utterances in a larger context. We go back a few moments to start from the beginning of the recorded excerpt, shortly after Daniel has awakened and turned on the tape recorder. Rather than attempt to sort out the complexities of the various voices in play, all the utterances below are labeled simply “Daniel,” acknowledging his animating voice. (The transcription is presented here in a simplified version.)

8. *(Strange Dreams 0.000-70.820) ((SIMPLIFIED))*

1 DANIEL; (YAWN) Oh,
2   boy.
3   (YAWN)
4   Ah,
5   Jesus,
6   (1.0)
7   (YAWN)
8   um,
9   (2.1)
10   Well,
11   ((8 LINES OMITTED))
19   #I’m amazed that I could have slept that long.
20   Boy.
21–22   (3.1)
23   #It’s like it’s the middle of the damn day.
24–26   (5.4)
27   Needed that.
28   (2.7)
29   Hm.
30   #@Hm.
31   #Hard to know what you need.
32   Very hard to know what you need.
33   (0.5)
34   Strange dreams.
35   Man oh man.
36   Oof,
37   horrid.
38   (0.3)
39   Can’t imagine why it was so horrid,
40   really,
41   there was nothing bad that happened.
42   (0.7)
That such an “interior dialogue” should be voiced upon awakening is perhaps no accident. It brings to mind the observation of St. Augustine: “And there is yet so much difference between myself and myself, in that instant wherein I pass back from waking to sleeping, or return from sleeping to waking!” (Confessions, Book 10, chap. 30, para. 41). The immediate juxtaposition of these “differences between myself and myself” in this waking moment seems especially conducive to the elicitation of self-dialogue. As Daniel wakes, among his first sounds is the autonomous bodily response of yawning; orienting to the implications of his own actions, he then responds by making an observation on how long he as slept (line 19). This is followed first by the exclamation “boy” (line 20), then by a more self-consciously evaluative commentary (line 23). Skipping over some developments already discussed above, we come to further developments of the just-wakening state, as vivid memories of the recent dream state assert themselves (“strange dreams,” line 34). This elicits an immediate affective expression (“man oh man,” line 35), followed by an abrupt evaluation of the dream (“ooaf, horrid,” line 37). This is followed in turn by a more sophisticated philosophical commentary, which goes so far as to imagine an alternative emotional response to the same experience (39–41).

While it is tempting to sort all these utterances into stances and counterstances, and more importantly into the various voices implied by the authorial positionings (Foucault 1977), limitations of space preclude going further with this than what has already been presented in the discussion of examples 6 and 7 above. I will only observe that these two examples, now situated in their larger discourse context, can be recognized as by no means atypical. The pattern they display, of a cycle of voices alternating between greater and lesser subjectivity, is one that recurs again and again. First the self, in one of its phases, makes an immediate, direct, often affectively loaded response to some experience (or memory of an experience). Then another phase of the self responds to this expressive contribution, usually in a more reflective commentary, with a greater use of the grammatical apparatus that is distinctive of human language. Seemingly, the dialogic self manifests itself in alternating phases, in recurring cycles of subjectivity and objectivity, with observable consequences for linguistic and dialogic-sequential realization. The alternation of what look very much like turns reflect, apparently, different phases of the dialogic self.

But this dialogicality cannot for long remain interior, nor can it remain exclusively in the realm of the subjective—or even the objective. Intersubjectivity cannot be denied, whether the speaker is alone in a room or not. At some point it is necessary for interior and exterior dialogicality to come into contact, and for subjectivity and intersubjectivity to come to terms with each other. The linking of interior and exterior sociality is a fundamental problem. Its implications are only heightened by the further realization that intersubjectivity does
not only travel from exterior sociality to interior psyche, but must make the return trip. This is the problem I take up in the next section.

**Co-Opting Intersubjectivity**

If the intersubjectivity that is supposed to characterize public relations among co-present, sociocognitively organized persons is somehow captured by the dialogic self, brought into the psychic interior, and put to its own uses, this might seem to qualify for the term "co-opting intersubjectivity." But that is not yet all there is to it. To understand what is at stake in the business of co-opting intersubjectivity, it is necessary to follow the dialogic self as it navigates between the world of solitude and the world of public interaction, traveling in both directions. To illustrate this kind of development I turn to a different discourse, this time drawn from a more obviously rhetorical exchange. The scene is a lively intellectual debate between a man and a woman, a couple who are conversing in bed. (I have given a more detailed analysis of the excerpt below in Du Bois in progress-b). The two are discussing a book about death that she is reading with interest, while he questions whether anything of value can come of reading such a book. In an attempt to defend her position, she invokes an apparently telling argument—which unfortunately she soon realizes is a two-edged sword:


53 PAMELA; You haven't read the book, one.
54  You haven't read the book,
55  so you don't know.
57  (0.3)
58  (H) (0.3) [I haven't read the book so I don't know,
59 DARRYL; Yeah but I do know,
61  it's it's an awfully presumptuous thing,
63  to sit down and write a book about death,
65  when you haven't died.

In his rush to respond to Pamela’s critique of his ignorance, Darryl seeks to change the terms of epistemic evaluation by emphasizing what he does know (that “it's an awfully presumptuous thing to sit down and write a book about death when you haven't died”). But in the process he overlooks a key concession by Pamela, which she has uttered in overlap with him (line 58). Pamela effectively counters her own earlier argument ("You haven't read the book, so
you don’t know,” line 55–56) with the acknowledgment that she herself can be challenged on this point (“I haven’t read the book so I don’t know”). The latter point is certainly inconvenient for her rhetorical agenda, but she may conclude that it is better for the critique to come from her than from Darryl. (In any case, she loses no practical advantage because Darryl, preoccupied with other points of his own, takes no note of her concession.)

To represent the dialogic interplay of voices within Pamela’s own turn, we can construct a diagraph, a type of representation drawn from the theory of dialogic syntax (Du Bois 2001, 2007). The diagraph displays the structure of resonance relations between corresponding elements in dialogically juxtaposed utterances, as the resonant elements are aligned vertically in columns. (Interestingly, the concept of dialogic resonance applies meaningfully both between speakers and, as here, within the speech of single speaker. In the latter case, the practice may be termed auto-dialogicality.) Using the diagraph framework, we can effectively display the relation between Pamela’s two voices, the protagonist voice (PRO) and antagonist voice (ANT), as follows:

10. Diagraph

55–56 PAMELA=PRO; you haven’t read the book | so you don’t know
58 PAMELA=ANT; I haven’t read the book so I don’t know

Pamela effectively mobilizes two voices here. The protagonist voice advances arguments in support of her position, while the antagonist voice critiques it. At first glance this might seem like a self-defeating strategy, but a moment’s reflection reveals the nature of its strength: better that Pamela should discover the weak points in her argument than Darryl. The phenomenon can be related to what Bakhtin calls addressivity, the speaker’s tendency to respond in advance to the imagined, but unspoken, objections of his or her interlocutor (Bakhtin 1981). Drawing on resources characteristic of the dialogic self speaking in solitude, Pamela takes the intersubjectivity she has co-opted and made her own—a domestication in the psychic interior—and projects it back into the public social arena. What the dialogic self has practiced in privacy serves it well in the context of public engagement with another. In the heat of a rhetorical contest with her partner, Pamela exploits her own array of co-opted intersubjective voices in the rhetorical service of her public discourse.

As I use the phrase here, the idea of co-opting intersubjectivity refers to speakers’ strategies of appropriating the intersubjective organization of dialogic interaction in order to put it to use in their own projects. As noted earlier, one context for co-opting intersubjectivity involves an individual alone in a room, speaking in solitude. Here the practice may be reflected, for example, in a speaker performing an expressive evaluation of an affectively loaded ex-
erience, followed by a response by the same speaker to their own prior utterance. This kind of evaluative embedding of prior affective stance in a reflexive meta-stance was illustrated in the discussion of examples 4–8 in the previous section. A second type of context for co-opting intersubjectivity is the one evidenced in example 9 of this section. Here the speaker’s strategy of managing both sides of a dialogic exchange is pursued even in the presence of others. In this example, the motivation for auto-dialogicality appears to be the strategic assessment of rhetorical risk, as Pamela pre-empts the rhetorical potential of a rebuttal by Darryl.

In my use of the term, *co-opting intersubjectivity* represents the strategic capacity of individuals to mobilize the structure of dialogic interaction in the service of their own projects, with consequences for the management of subjectivity and ultimately intersubjectivity. Dialogic structures otherwise requiring the participation of multiple parties engaged in interaction are appropriated as resources to be deployed by a single individual, who effectively animates multiple roles within the relevant dialogic structure. Often, a single individual alternately animates two distinctive voices, each expressing a distinct subjective positioning. The two voices may express, for example, contrasting affective self-positionings of their implied speakers. Since many of these resources are the same as are used in public contexts for intersubjective alignment, the individual’s capacity to mobilize these resources on their own has profound implications for understanding the interplay of personal subjectivity with the social dimensions of empathy and other intersubjective processes. The individual’s ability to mobilize alternative subjectivities and project them into distinctive voices organized in dialogic relation to one another raises more questions than it answers about the individual’s capacity for participating in intersubjective processes. These issues remain largely mysterious, and invite further inquiry. For now, it can be acknowledged that co-opting intersubjectivity represents an important capacity of socially adept actors, allowing them to assert a degree of control over the expression of dialogic engagement and intersubjective alignment, projecting the mobilized structures at will into the domains of interior or exterior sociality. In describing the practice of co-opting intersubjectivity, we recognize an impressive achievement of the socially organized individual.

But in another context, it must be acknowledged that the idea of co-opting intersubjectivity might not always be thought of as a good thing, depending on who’s doing it and why. In the academic world, current developments suggest that intersubjectivity is sufficiently attractive as a concept that the temptation arises to co-opt it in an entirely different sense—to appropriate the word without fully coming to terms with its implications. The idea of intersubjectivity has long elicited conflicting reactions from social scientists, attracted on the one hand by its apparent foundational status as a way of accounting for shared
knowledge between socially organized persons, but repelled on the other hand by the fact that intersubjectivity seems to require acknowledgment of—well, subjectivity. Recently, the rising market value of intersubjectivity in interaction has attracted the attention of scholars pursuing a variety of agendas, not always compatible with the dialogic vision of intersubjectivity advanced here. For example, Nick Enfield and Stephen Levinson (2006) have recently been promoting an approach to face-to-face interaction that privileges the somewhat mechanistic concept of a universal human “interaction engine” (Levinson 2006). Curiously, the list of claimed universal features of sociality offered in support of this mechanism is limited almost entirely to the behavioral surface, focusing on cross-linguistically recurrent patterns of structured conduct such as turn-taking systems, to the neglect of the open-ended interpretive processes by which participants negotiate the meanings of actions, evaluate objects, invoke sociocultural values, and so on. Once the scope of human sociality is opened up to include the processes of navigating the situationally and socioculturally variable domains of meaning, interpretation, affect, and value, interaction takes on new dimensions of subtlety and power. This suggests the need for a theory adequate to the full scope of human sociality, including a more sensitive approach to the dynamic construction of intersubjectivity. A more promising approach might be to dispense with the mechanistic imagery and deal more subtly with the task of describing the complexities of managing sociocultural value within a dynamically adaptable array of practices of social interaction. (One candidate would be the dialogic model of stance and intersubjectivity in interaction [Du Bois 2007, 2009, in progress-b], but there are any number of other ways to pursue a more inclusive approach to integrating interaction, interpretation, and intersubjectivity.)

Intersubjectivity gets co-opted in other ways than mechanizing it, of course. A more banal and ultimately debilitating move is to assume that intersubjectivity must by its very nature be shared uniformly among all members of a social group, as a pre-condition of communication. Though this position evidently glosses over the process whereby intersubjectivity gets dynamically constructed (e.g., within heterogeneous communities), to bank on intersubjectivity as a device for guaranteeing in advance the supposed commonality of member knowledge in social groups is to subvert the inquiry into intersubjectivity before it even begins. Intersubjectivity must remain a questionable construct until there is a way to investigate the means of its construction in social life, as well as its defense (Schegloff 1992). Presupposing it as always already there, or as a pre-condition of membership in a group, only postpones the task of developing an empirically viable theory of intersubjectivity. To make the dynamic construction of intersubjectivity visible, what is needed is to attend to participants’ overt practices of dialogic interaction, including the stance-
taking processes of evaluating objects, positioning subjects (including the self and others), calibrating and contesting intersubjectivity, and invoking systems of sociocultural value (Du Bois 2007). From a dialogic perspective, all of these social practices are compatible with the challenge of analyzing the intersubjective dimensions of active contestation by contending parties in ideologically heterogeneous communities (Du Bois in progress-b). What matters in the pursuit of social life is not only the formal organization of interaction, but also the construction of meaning and sociocultural value. The dynamic construction of intersubjectivity is as social as it gets, and calls for a correspondingly dynamic place in social theory.

Towards a Dialogic Rhetoric of the Self

Paradoxically, to gain perspective on the task of constructing intersubjectivity, it is useful to return to the situation of the individual in solitude. In such circumstances, the individual is by no means relieved of the condition of sociality. But there are differences: for example, the tempo and urgency of social demands are likely to be experienced differently, given the fluidity of social imagination and memory. And the individual in solitude may have more latitude to choose her own company, as by selecting what to read. One kind of solitary reading practice that can activate fairly definite social relations, eliciting the expression of subjectivity and indeed intersubjectivity in response, is the reading of a religious work such as a daily devotional text. Elsewhere I have analyzed one such reading, by the same speaker on the same morning represented here (Du Bois 2009). In that case, the other voices involved in the dialogic engagement can be given names; for example, Daniel engages dialogically with the represented voice of the apostle Paul, as occasioned by the devotional text for the day, scripted by Oswald Chambers. This kind of discourse alone in a room, actively sought by many religious individuals, parallels in certain respects the discourse of solitude described in examples 6–8 above, and broadens the scope of implications for intersubjective linkages between interior and exterior sociality. Sometimes, as in the cases presented in this article, the company one keeps in solitude is casual, making its presence felt with impromptu realizations of alternative voicings that emerge in situated response to local affective developments. At other times, the dialogic structure is more formal, with voicings organized partly in advance by the sociocultural constructs of ritual discourse. Either way, the solitary individual is implicated in the dynamics of constructing intersubjective relations, and the experience of emerging sociality goes on.
One way to think about the implications of such discourses is in terms of “the mode of action that an individual exercises upon himself,” as Foucault put it (1988). In his later writings, Foucault became particularly interested in what he called the “technologies of the self,” representing the means for such self-forming action. He assigned this category a key place in his typology of the technologies of practical reason, treating it as one of four fundamental categories, on a par with the more widely recognized technologies of production, power, and sign systems (i.e., the use of systems of signification and meaning). Foucault acknowledged the potential for interinfluences between the various classes of technologies, but showed little interest himself in pursuing, for example, the interaction between the technologies of signification and the technologies of self. Foucault’s decision is the more understandable if we accept his assessment of the semiotics of his day as fixated on the synchronic sign system as a complete, stable, and invariant structure. The paradigm of such a seemingly intractable, totalizing sign system could be found in a certain reading of Ferdinand de Saussure (1916)—though this is far from the only reading possible. But if instead of the structuralist conception of language as a fixed system we adopt a dialogic approach to discursive practice, we gain access to a more appropriate set of resources for addressing the issues Foucault raised. Central to these is what Foucault called the “forms of subjectivation,” by which the individual manages at once the “relation to oneself” and the ethical relation to generalized moral codes of behavior. (For a valuable discussion of Foucault’s ideas in this arena, see Robbins 2004.) Though Foucault focuses on subjectivation as a component of private acts of self-directed moral work, this work can also be considered to involve a kind of moral self-calibration with reference to external sociality as registered in culturally articulated codes of conduct. This is in line with Burke’s principle that the rhetoric of external sociality must be seconded by the rhetoric of internal sociality: “Only those voices from without are effective which can speak in the language of a voice within” (1950). This is where discourses of the kind we have been analyzing may usefully enter the picture, as they mediate the discursive processes by which subjectivation is brought into relation to intersubjectivation. A paradigm instance of the technology of the self must be the realization of a devotional ritual in solitude (Du Bois 2009), and here the dialogic engagement of voices is in full bloom, vividly linking the subjectivity of the current speaker to the subjectivities articulated in voices from the past. But even secular moments of discourse in solitude (e.g., as illustrated in examples 6–8 above) have their subjective and even moral ramifications, as the speaker engages in evaluations that implicitly invoke sociocultural systems of value. Through acts of evaluative stance-taking, whether public or private, ritualized or spontaneous, self-directed or
other-directed, individuals link their subjectivities to others’ as they perpetuate the ongoing dialogic construction of intersubjectivity.

In considering the sociality of the self by the twin lights of dialogicality and rhetoric culture, a prior question arises: What is cultural about rhetoric culture? Reframing the question from the perspective of sociocultural linguistics (Bucholtz/Hall 2005; Du Bois in progress-b), we can ask: How can a sociocultural framing of rhetoric practice play a meaningful role in understanding the linking of personal realms of subjectivity to generalized constructions of intersubjectivity? The scope and power of such sociocultural ramifications is well attested in Joel Robbins’s rich ethnographic study of the appropriation by the Urapmin of Papua New Guinea of Christian technologies of the self, through which they pursue a preoccupation with moral self-evaluation that is of long standing within Urapmin culture (2004). The capacity for such intensive moral self-work to dominate the activities of a community for long periods of time attests to the broader sociocultural ramifications of the linking of personal subjectivity to public moral codes via technologies of the self. Another example comes from Robin Ann Shoaps, whose ethnographic research on the Sakapultek Maya of Guatemala documents the verbal articulation of moral codes via the use of directives as embedded in public discursive practices such as wedding counsels (2004, 2007). On a smaller scale, Shoaps’s ethnographic research on a US evangelical Christian church documents the role of public prayer, at once personally individualized and interpersonally coordinated, in organizing expressions of subjectivity that yield intersubjective alignment along culturally validated lines. Taken in conjunction with my own studies of private devotional discourse (described above and in Du Bois 2009) and of secular rhetorical contestation (illustrated in examples 9–10 and in Du Bois in progress-b), the picture of the technologies of self that emerges is a diverse one. Ranging in scale from individual to mass, in context from private to public, the technologies of self can be practiced whether you are alone in a room or in the presence of others. Either way, you are not really alone: in the memory and practice of dialogic modes of discourse, you carry an intersubjective array of voices that partakes of both personal subjectivation and generalized systems of sociocultural value. Linking the perspectives of Rhetoric Culture and dialogicality, to complete the picture of the technology of self calls for a dialogic engagement between internal and external sociality.

More generally we can observe that in any community of discourse, the experiential history of rhetorical activity establishes a set of continuities and possibilities that project outward along the dimension of intertextuality to the discursive horizons of the community of discourse. But the intertextual dimension subsumes as well a broader array of available forms of dialogicality, not only prior texts but also prior voices. From the point of view of the creative
individual, which is to say everyone, this is experienced as open-ended rhetorical potential, the cultural offering of a repertoire of dialogically organized voices ready to be deployed as part of the collaborative construction of emerging intersubjectivity in the moment. In the continual circulation of rhetoric, intersubjectivity confronts a dialogicality that is projected simultaneously along dimensions of then-and-now and I-and-thou. The self, to the extent that it is organized already around a dialogically intersubjective rhetoric, internalized through the ongoing formative experiences of dialogic engagement, is constituted in advance to be capable of truly intersubjective engagement with the social other—who is, after all, another being like ourselves, articulated through processes of co-opting intersubjectivity at the deepest levels of individuality.

Conclusions

There is much to be learned by examining what happens when discourse crosses boundaries: between two voices dialogically juxtaposed; between two stances in opposition; between two ideologies confronting each other in rhetorical contestation; between two subjectivities that, if bound together, may articulate an intersubjectivity; between public and private arenas of social life; and between exterior and interior sociality. Via reflexivity the boundary-crossing is pushed further and deeper, propelled by rhetorical and dialogic processes capable of embedding a prior discourse into a new discursive, cognitive, affective, and interactional framing. Ultimately it is intersubjectivity itself that is co-opted, as it is appropriated from a public process of correlating subjectivities between socially engaged co-participants, to be projected into the myriad private spaces where the individual constitutes herself as a self, organized not only subjectively but intersubjectively. The discursively socialized individual lays down her own autobiography in the inscription of stances taken, yielding a developmental history that constructs a fundamentally dialogic self based on the sedimentations of co-opted intersubjectivity. In return, the processes of dialogic production that mediate the socialization of the self can be recycled and projected outward again into the arena of public discourse. In the dialogic moment of interacting with social others, the imperative to engage mobilizes internal dialogic structures, drawing on the organization of interior intersubjectivity to construct an effective response to the task of exterior intersubjective alignment as it arises dynamically in real-time face-to-face interaction. This completes the circuit of dialogically engaged voices, crossing the boundary from public to private—and back.

One context where the dialogic circulation of discourse may sometimes be observed occurs, paradoxically, when the individual is alone, left to her own
resources, as it were. Despite obvious challenges of empirical observation, the
practice of speaking in solitude, as evidenced in this chapter, is anything but
unknowable. Though grounded in psyche, talking to oneself is not crazy, not
mystical, nor is it merely metaphorical. Speaking in solitude is real, constitut-
ing a small or large part of the everyday lives of many individuals. Not only is
speaking in solitude a reality, it is a practice that can be subjected to empirical
inquiry by ordinary means, given the will to document it effectively. Armed
with such evidence, it is possible to move beyond a priori assertions to identify
the observable properties of the practice of speaking in solitude (at least for the
specific forms of this practice documented in this paper). Most importantly for
present purposes, speaking in solitude is revealed as firmly grounded in social-
ity. Speaking in solitude exploits the same practices of everyday life that orga-
nize social interaction in public, but with the difference that one person controls
both sides of the dialogic engagement. Paramount among the features are: the
mobilization of distinctive voices capable of representing distinct rhetorical
stances; the systematic juxtaposition of utterances in dialogic engagement, one
with another; the organization of sequentiality in turns, or turn-like increments
of verbal interaction, expressing the alternation of distinctive stances; and the
mobilization by the isolated individual of dialogic structures otherwise used by
multiple parties engaged in the management of intersubjective alignment.

I have invoked the phrase “co-opting intersubjectivity” to refer to processes
by which individuals take personal ownership of the capacity for dialogic en-
gagement, internalizing not just specific representations but fully generalized
practices of engagement between persons and voices, as they manage both sides of a creative dialogic engagement within their own psychic sphere. What
is the more remarkable is that individuals show a capacity to mobilize the cre-
vativity of their own inner dialogic productions as they project them outward
again into the public arena of social interaction, in the service of rhetorical
projects of the moment. Mastery of the dialogic principle means the capacity
not only to construct and manage structured arrays of engaged and interacting
voices, but to project these arrays in two directions, transferring them fluidly
between the public, interpersonal domain of exterior sociality and the pri-
ivate, psychic domain of interior sociality. I have sought to illustrate the power
of these dialogic processes by presenting a series of examples documenting
the engagement between voices differentiated within the discourse of one
individual. I have supplemented this argument with one suggestive instance
of the projection of interior dialogicality back into the public sphere. In the
sense I have used the term, co-opting intersubjectivity must be considered a
breakthrough achievement of the individual, who transforms the structure of
intersubjective engagement into a resource that can be projected inward or
outward as needed.
Social scientists widely acknowledge that they are dealing with socially organized persons, individuals who have been shaped in some way by their experience of sociality. What is not so widely agreed on is how to understand the nature of this experience, and how deeply its consequences penetrate within the individual. On the present view, the penetration is profound, and deeply consequential. The socially organized individual takes the experience of dialogic engagement with other persons and makes it personal, projecting it into the private realms of the self. In this way the self becomes fundamentally dialogic. This fact is perhaps most transparently expressed in such practices as speaking in solitude, once this practice is recognized as organized dialogically and hence implicitly a form of social action. But the impact of the dialogic self is evident also in the more typically social environment of face-to-face interaction, where it contributes to the organization of social action in public. This is visible, for example, in the self’s mobilization of its own self-critique as an outwardly projected dialogic structure participating in the public engagement of rhetorical interaction. It is a rich territory for future research to identify the many further aspects of social interaction that build on the dialogic organization of the self, and in return contribute to its formation. What is common to all this cyclic boundary-crossing in both directions between public interactions and private selves is the link that is established between the personal dimension of subjectivity and the interpersonal dimension of intersubjectivity. The intersubjective linkage is at once intimate and robust, constituting a fundamental and pervasive condition of human sociality. Crucially, intersubjectivity in this sense must not be conceived as a static, automatic birthright of the members of any social group. Such assumptions fail because they presuppose a totalizing, hegemonic imposition of intersubjectivity, obliterating the potential for difference and contestation between differently situated parties and classes within a community. There is no need to accept such uniformitarian assumptions, given a dialogic understanding of the construction of intersubjectivity. In this view, intersubjectivity represents the calibrated relation between one person’s subjectivity and another’s, and thus requires only commensurability, not commonality. Participants have the possibility in principle, whether they exercise it or not, to contest and recalibrate the sociocognitive relations of intersubjectivity. The social practices linked to the negotiation of contested intersubjectivities cry out for more study, alongside the more normative reproduction of equilibrated intersubjectivities. In this respect, the attunement to conflict implicit in rhetoric culture provides a useful intellectual framing.

The importance of the dialogic dimension in this chapter is to argue that the rhetorical realization of intersubjectivity points in two directions at once: extending now outward to organize the structures of interpersonal engagement, now inward to mediate the relations among the contending voices that
populate the inner domains of the psyche. The two moves must be well coordinated, taking into account the dialogic mode of circulation of discourse, which continually cycles between the engagements of inner and outer sociality. There is room in this approach to accommodate the power, subtlety, and vitality of intersubjective meanings as they are negotiated and contested in the dynamics of interaction between socially organized persons. The intention, ultimately, is to imagine a dialogic rhetoric of the socially potentiated self.

References


Notes

1. A critical challenge, of course, is to say just what the nature of this similarity is: whether the interior processes are supposed to model, reproduce, select, imagine, echo, or simply continue the external processes in a different medium. This is a vast issue, and will not be directly addressed here, though the evidence and analyses to be introduced below may give some hints as to the direction a dialogic approach would pursue.

2. In general, the transcription practices used below follow the revised Discourse Transcription (“DT2”) conventions (Du Bois in progress-a), representing an updated version of the earlier conventions originally used in the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (Du Bois/Englebretson 2005), as described in Du Bois et al. 1993. However, the initial examples in this section (i.e., examples 1–5) are presented in a simplified transcription, for both ease of reading and simplicity of exposition. In particular, examples (1–5) do not indicate the boundaries of intonation units, except indirectly as implied by the presence of punctuation.

3. The recording was made on 23 March 1995 in Houston, Texas, by the author (remotely).

4. For a recent reading that brings out the rich potential for a sociodynamic (re)interpretation of Saussure’s ideas, see Thibault 1997.